Showing posts sorted by relevance for query novation. Sort by date Show all posts
Showing posts sorted by relevance for query novation. Sort by date Show all posts

Thursday, June 1, 2017

No. 220: Connecticut Violates the Constitutional Rights of Insurance Policyholders

Connecticut recently enacted a law that authorizes a Connecticut-domiciled insurance company to divide itself into two or more insurance companies. In this post I explain the reasons for my opinion that the law violates the constitutional rights of insurance policyholders.

Novation
An insurance contract creates a creditor-debtor relationship between the parties. The policyholder is the creditor and the insurance company is the debtor. Consider this loan contract analogy:
Sue borrows money by entering into a loan contract with a bank. The bank is the creditor and Sue is the debtor. Sue and her friend Jim later enter into a separate contract under which Jim agrees to take over Sue's obligations. Imagine the reaction of the bank's loan officer when she receives this letter from Sue:
"Effective immediately, my obligations to you have been taken over by Jim. You have no recourse to me in the event of Jim's failure to meet his obligations to you."
The problem is that a debtor cannot be relieved of his, her, or its obligations to a creditor without the consent of the creditor. In the case of an insurance policy, the insurance company (the debtor) cannot be relieved of its obligations to the policyholder (the creditor) without the consent of the policyholder.

If the policyholder consents, the transaction would be a "novation," in which another debtor is substituted for the original debtor. Stated differently, another insurance company is substituted for the original insurance company. Stated still differently, the obligations under an insurance policy contract are transferred from the original insurance company to another insurance company.

Consent
The two major types of consent to a novation are affirmative (positive) consent and implied (negative) consent. Affirmative consent occurs when the creditor signs a form granting permission to complete the novation. Implied consent occurs when the creditor does nothing and is deemed to have consented to the novation.

The Penn Mutual Case
In 1963 Mr. X bought a noncancellable and guaranteed renewable disability insurance policy from Penn Mutual Life Insurance Company. In the 1970s Penn Mutual stopped issuing new disability policies, but continued to administer its previously issued disability policies.

In 1986 Penn Mutual sent Mr. X a letter informing him that his disability policy had been transferred to Benefit Trust Life Insurance Company. In response to Mr. X's inquiry, a Penn Mutual official said that Benefit Trust had taken total control of the disability policies and the obligations under them, and that Penn Mutual had no further obligations under the policies. In response to my subsequent inquiry, a Penn Mutual senior officer said policyholders would have no recourse to Penn Mutual in the event of Benefit Trust's insolvency. None of the three Penn Mutual letters said anything about the need for Mr. X's consent to the transfer.

The Advisory Committee
The Penn Mutual case and other similar cases prompted me to write many articles in The Insurance Forum about policy transfers. I also volunteered to serve on an advisory committee appointed by a working group of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) when the regulators sought to deal with the firestorm my articles had created. I was one of nine members of the advisory committee; the other eight represented insurance companies.

All nine members of the advisory committee agreed an insurance company must obtain the consent of the policyholders in a policy transfer. Eight industry members agreed that implied consent was adequate. I disagreed, insisting that affirmative consent was essential.

The chairman of the advisory committee asked the industry members to draft a model bill or model regulation based on implied consent. The advisory committee then submitted its model to the working group. I drafted a model based on affirmative consent and submitted my model to the working group as a minority report of the advisory committee.

The Constitutional Question
When the advisory committee submitted its model based on implied consent to the chairman of the working group, he was concerned about whether such a model would survive a challenge under the U.S. Constitution. He asked the chairman of the advisory committee to obtain a legal opinion. The chairman of the advisory committee asked an attorney member of the advisory committee to write a legal opinion. Here is the final sentence of the legal opinion:
For the reasons set forth above, we are of the opinion that the implied consent provision of the proposed Model Act would withstand a challenge based upon the United States Constitution.
I asked an attorney who specializes in constitutional law to review the legal opinion that the advisory committee had obtained. He wrote a memorandum that included these two sentences:
Having carefully reviewed the [advisory committee's opinion] letter and the authorities it discusses, I do not believe that the analysis set forth in the letter is persuasive. For the reasons discussed below, it is far from clear that an implied consent provision would pass muster under either the Due Process or Contract Clauses of the Constitution.
The working group and the NAIC decided to rely on the advisory committee's legal opinion. The NAIC model, therefore, is based on implied consent. In an article in the August 1992 issue of The Insurance Forum, I showed the full text of each of the two opinion letters.

The Recent Connecticut Law
On February 16, 2017, a legislative committee held a public hearing on House Bill 7025 "authorizing domestic insurers to divide." In testimony at the hearing, the Connecticut Insurance Department (CID) endorsed the bill, saying in part:
Generally, this bill will authorize a Connecticut domestic insurer to divide into two or more resulting insurers. This type of corporate restructuring is the reverse of a merger: instead of combining two or more insurers into one, a division will divide the Connecticut domestic insurer into two or more resulting insurers... The domestic insurer is required to file the plan of division with the Insurance Commissioner and obtain approval of the plan. The Commissioner may hold a public hearing to consider the matter if it is deemed in the public interest.
At the same hearing, The Hartford Group also spoke in favor of the bill. A company official said in part:
Being able to segregate businesses would allow domestic insurers to pursue more focused management strategies tailored for individual lines of business. This bill also provides domestic insurers a practical way to segregate and sell businesses that are no longer part of their business strategy, something that Connecticut law doesn't currently provide.
A case in point: In 2012, The Hartford announced it was no longer writing certain life insurance business. Later that year, we transferred our individual life and retirement plans businesses to Prudential and Mass Mutual, respectively. However, The Hartford could not realize a full and final sale of these businesses. Instead, we used the only practical option available. We entered into reinsurance arrangements with those companies. As a result, we have ongoing obligations, administrative complexity and compliance risk associated with those businesses. The long term obligations under the reinsurance arrangements means that The Hartford will experience that complexity and risk for many years to come.
On April 5, 2017, the Connecticut House of Representatives approved the bill. On May 3, the Connecticut Senate approved the bill. On May 8, the bill became law as Public Act No. 17-2 after Connecticut Governor Dannel Malloy did not sign or veto the bill within five days. The law will take effect October 1. I am not aware of anyone testifying against the bill at the hearing, nor am I aware of any publicity about the bill.

Based on testimony at the hearing, I believe that Connecticut's division law is patterned after similar laws in Arizona, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island. I plan to explore those laws and their origins.

The Debevoise Analysis
Debevoise & Plimpton is a law firm that represents insurance companies. On May 11, three days after the bill became law, Debevoise issued a "client update" on the new law. Debevoise said the new law
may prove to be a valuable tool for Connecticut domiciled insurance companies. It could be used to isolate a block of business for sale to a third party in a transactioon that without the statute could only be accomplished through reinsurance. It could also be used by a company to separate its active book of business from a troubled run-off block, potentially improving the capital position and credit rating of the active company.
General Observations
What Hartford failed to mention in its testimony is that the company could have asked the affected policyholders for their consent to novation of their contracts. Prudential and Mass Mutual would have taken over administration of all the contracts, and would have taken over Hartford's obligations under the contracts of policyholders who consented to the transfer of the obligations. With regard to the contracts of policyholders who did not consent to the transfer, Prudential and Mass Mutual would have continued to administer the contracts, but Hartford would have retained responsibility for the obligations under the contracts.

The "case in point" in Hartford's hearing testimony makes clear the objective of the "division law." The "reinsurance arrangements" were "assumption reinsurance agreements" under which Hartford transferred the policies to Prudential and Mass Mutual. Hartford would have been relieved of its obligations to each policyholder only with the consent of that policyholder, and would have had to retain the obligations to each policyholder who did not consent to the transfer. Because policyholder consent is not required for a "division" or for the sale of a company, Hartford is now able to place unwanted blocks of business in a second company and then sell the second company, thus transferring its obligations to all the affected policyholders without their consent.

Hartford is now permitted to write letters to their policyholders similar to Sue's letter to the bank in the loan contract analogy, and similar to Penn Mutual's 1986 letters to its disability insurance policyholders. In my opinion, the division law allows Connecticut-domiciled insurance companies to transfer their obligations without policyholder consent, and thereby to violate the constitutional rights of their policyholders.

Available Material
I am offering a complimentary 31-page PDF containing the full text of the division law (20 pages), the CID and Hartford testimony at the hearing (3 pages), the Debevoise client update (4 pages), and my article in the August 1992 issue of The Insurance Forum (4 pages). Email jmbelth@gmail.com and ask for the June 2017 package relating to Connecticut's division law.

===================================

Monday, April 16, 2018

No. 262: Georgia Moves Toward Enactment of a Law in Violation of the Constitutional Rights of Insurance Policyholders

In No. 220 (posted June 1, 2017) I discussed the enactment of a Connecticut law allowing a Connecticut-domiciled insurance company to divide itself into two or more insurance companies. I explained why I think the law violates the constitutional rights of insurance policyholders. Recently the Georgia legislature approved similar legislation that will become effective July 1, 2018 even if the governor does not sign it. Here I discuss the new Georgia legislation. As background, I urge readers to review No. 220 here.

The Baldo Article
On March 30, 2018, an article by Anthony Baldo appeared in The Insurance Insider. A reader brought the article to my attention. The lead sentence of the article reads:
Georgia legislation that lets insurers divide and opens a path for run-off transactions involving legacy books of business will become law by 1 July, even if Governor Nathan Deal fails to sign the measure.
The Creditor-Debtor Relationship
An insurance contract creates a creditor-debtor relationship between the policyholder (the creditor) and the insurance company (the debtor). A debtor cannot be relieved of his, her, or its obligations to a creditor without the consent of the creditor. Therefore, an insurance company cannot be relieved of its obligations to a policyholder without the consent of the policyholder. If the policyholder consents, the transaction would be a "novation," in which a different insurance company is substituted for the original insurance company.

The two major types of consent to a novation are affirmative (positive) consent and implied (negative) consent. Affirmative consent occurs when the creditor signs a form granting permission to complete the novation. Implied consent occurs when the creditor does nothing and is deemed to have consented to the novation. I strongly favor the use of affirmative consent.

My Writings on the Subject
My first two of many articles about what I call "insurance policy transfers" were in the October 1989 and December 1989 issues of The Insurance Forum. Three extraordinary cases, all of which came to my attention around the same time, prompted the two articles. I addressed the constitutionality question later, in the August 1992 issue of the Forum. Also, chapter 23 of my 2015 book entitled The Insurance Forum: A Memoir addresses insurance policy transfers.

The Georgia Division Law
Two lead sponsors of Georgia House Bill 754 (HB 754) were Representative Jason Shaw (R-Lakeland) and Senator P. K. Martin IV (R-Lawrenceville). Representative Shaw is a member of the House insurance committee and owns an insurance agency. Senator Martin is a member of the Senate insurance and labor committee and is an insurance agent. The Baldo article quotes both of them:
It quotes Representative Shaw as saying: "It just makes sense." He explained that, if a company has a plan of division, they can sell off an unwanted book "and not disrupt the whole operation."
It quotes Senator Martin as saying: "This bill would allow insurers more decision-making power when it comes to the split of a company, if they so choose, while protecting consumers through the approving authority of the insurance commissioner."
I wrote to Georgia Insurance Commissioner Ralph T. Hudgens. I sent him No. 220 about the Connecticut division law, said I was planning to post an item about HB 754, and asked for a statement to be included in the item. I have not yet received a statement from him. However, an insurance department spokesman said he was working on it. Meanwhile, the spokesman said this preliminarily:
What I can tell you now is that it was not an Insurance Department bill, and we did not oppose it. Also, the bill has not been signed by the Governor.
General Observations
As mentioned earlier, HB 754 will become law on July 1 if the governor does not sign it. Also, I hope the statement from Commissioner Hudgens will explain why the department did not oppose the bill. When this item is posted, I will send it to him and request that he urge the governor to veto the bill.

HB 754 allows a Georgia-domiciled insurance company to transfer its policyholder obligations to another company without obtaining the consent of the policyholders. Thus the bill allows the company to violate the constitutional rights of its policyholders. Further, there is no doubt that prime targets of such laws are legacy blocks of long-term care insurance policies, which have become major headaches for many companies.

With regard to the matter of commissioner approval, the language in HB 754 is important. The bill says:
The Commissioner shall approve a plan of division unless the Commissioner finds that the interest of any policyholder or shareholder will not be adequately protected, or the proposed division constitutes a fraudulent transfer under Article 4 of Chapter 2 of Title 18.  [Blogger's note: Several sections and subsections of Article 4 are interesting.]
Thus the insurance commissioner rather than the insurance company being divided has the burden of proving that the policyholders are adequately protected and that the transfer is not fraudulent. If the commissioner cannot meet the burden of proof, he must approve the plan. I think attorneys in the insurance industry drafted HB 754.

Available Material
I am offering a complimentary 24-page PDF consisting of HB 754 (10 pages) and articles in the October 1989, December 1989, and August 1992 issues of the Forum (14 pages). Email jmbelth@gmail.com and ask for the April 2018 package about the Georgia division law.

===================================

Friday, July 24, 2020

No. 383: Long-Term Care Insurance—An Alarming Development

The Request for Proposal
On July 8, 2020, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) issued a request for proposal (RFP) No. 2065 about "Long-Term Care (LTC) Insurance Restructuring." Here are the first two paragraphs (the ten-page RFP is in the complimentary package offered at the end of this post):
The National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) is soliciting proposals from law firms to research and report on existing state laws and regulations that could support a new regulatory framework authorizing insurers to separate policies from one another.
The chosen legal consultant will identify options for insurer restructuring or transfer of blocks of business to accomplish separation of policies from insurers' general accounts to avoid material cross-state rate subsidization and consider the potential risks to state guaranty funds, existing legal impediments, and other potential issues.
The LTC Task Force
The LTC Task Force (task force) of the NAIC is chaired by Commissioner Scott A. White of Virginia. When the task force was appointed, neither the Virginia Bureau of Insurance nor the NAIC answered my question about whether Virginia was selected because Genworth is based there. When I saw the RFP, I asked the Virginia Bureau for more details. A spokesperson referred me to the NAIC. The NAIC did not respond.

The task force has been operating partly in public and partly in secret. As I reported in No. 332 (September 12, 2019), the task force identified six "workstreams": (1) multistate rate review practices, (2) restructuring techniques, (3) reduced benefit options and consumer notices, (4) valuation of LTCI reserves, (5) non-actuarial valuations, and (6) data call design and oversight. I think the RFP discussed in this post grew out of one or both of the first two "workstreams."

Policy Transfers
I have written extensively about policy transfers from one insurance company to another in The Insurance Forum and later in this blog. My first article, of about 30 on the subject, was in the October 1989 issue of the Forum. When I circulated that article and one later article to each of the state insurance commissioners, many of them expressed keen interest. I described developments over the next quarter century in Chapter 23 of my 2015 book entitled The Insurance Forum: A Memoir. The three-page October 1989 article and the 15-page Chapter 23 are in the complimentary package offered at the end of this post.

The underlying issue is easily explained. In an insurance policy, which is a legal contract, the policyholder is the creditor and the insurance company is the debtor. A debtor cannot transfer its obligations under the contract to another party without the consent of the creditor. Such a transfer is called a "novation," which is the substitution of one debtor for another, and which cannot be accomplished without the creditor's consent.

General Observations
I am alarmed that the NAIC, through its RFP, may be thinking of taking steps that arguably would violate the constitutional rights of LTC insurance policyholders. The constitutionality issue is discussed in Chapter 23 of my Memoir. The RFP does not mention such an objective, but I fear they will try to avoid the need to obtain the consent of the policyholders. Should they try to do so, I think the NAIC and its legal consultant will face strenuous opposition.

Available Material
I am offering a complimentary 28-page PDF consisting of the RFP (10 pages), the October 1989 Forum article (3 pages), and Chapter 23 of my Memoir (15 pages). Email jmbelth@gmail.com and ask for the July 2020 package about the NAIC's RFP.

===================================

Thursday, November 1, 2018

No. 293: MetLife and a Tragic Theft of Structured Settlement Annuity Payments

Nicole Herivaux, now 38, was born August 1, 1980 in a hospital operated by New York City. The amended complaint referred to later says: "She suffered a serious physical injury during the birth process, resulting in an Erbs palsy to her arm, rendering same permanently undeveloped and useless." According to the American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons:
Erb's palsy is a form of brachial plexus palsy. It is named for one of the doctors who first described the condition, Wilhelm Erb. The brachial plexus is a network of nerves near the neck that give rise to all the nerves of the arm. These nerves provide movement and feeling to the shoulder, arm, hand, and fingers. Palsy means weakness, and brachial plexus birth palsy causes arm weakness and loss of motion. One or two of every 1,000 babies have this condition. It is often caused when an infant's neck is stretched to the side during a difficult delivery.
The Medical Malpractice Lawsuit
Marie Herivaux, Nicole's mother and natural guardian, filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against New York City. The case ended in a settlement on February 25, 1983. It provided that Marie, who was not injured, was to receive a one-time payment of $25,000.

The settlement also provided that Nicole was to receive $50,000 immediately; $2,200 per month for life; $100,000 on August 1, 1998 (her 18th birthday); $200,000 on August 1, 2005 (her 25th birthday); $200,000 on August 1, 2015 (her 35th birthday); and $200,000 on August 1, 2025 (her 45th birthday). The money for Nicole, until she turned 18, was to be paid jointly to Marie, who was Nicole's mother and natural guardian, and a bank officer. The money for Nicole was to be kept for her benefit in certain savings accounts. The money thereafter was to be paid to Nicole.

The Structured Settlement Annuity
To assure that Nicole's benefits would be paid, New York City purchased a structured settlement annuity from Alpine Life Insurance Company. The company made the payments properly until 1995, when Nicole was 15.

Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (MetLife) acquired the structured settlement annuity from Alpine on January 1, 1995 as part of a block of business. MetLife mistakenly made Nicole's benefits payable to "Marie Herivaux" rather than to "Marie Herivaux as guardian of Nicole." Over the years, Marie received checks in her own name and MetLife paid Nicole nothing.

Nicole's Lawsuit against MetLife
On February 13, 2017, when Nicole was 36, she filed a lawsuit against MetLife in state court in New York. She filed an amended complaint on October 9, 2017. (See Nicole Herivaux v. MetLife, Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of New York, Index No. 650783/2017.) How Nicole learned that Marie had been stealing money from her is described in a memorandum of law Nicole's attorneys filed in opposition to MetLife's motion to dismiss her original complaint. The words shown here in brackets were in a footnote.
From time to time Marie would give Nicole some money, advising Nicole that the monies were from her settled case, but Nicole was never provided any details about the settlement, and Nicole relied on what her mother told her. For instance, Marie gave Nicole $100,000 on August 1, 1998, her 18th birthday; another $100,000 on August 1, 2005, her 25th birthday; and a small amount on August 1, 2015, her 35th birthday. [According to the court order, Nicole should have received $100,000 on August 1, 1998; a full $200,000 on August 1, 2005; and a full $200,000 on August 1, 2015.]
More recently, Marie stopped giving plaintiff money altogether, and Nicole, who is now 37 years old, grew curious as to why the payments had stopped. While at her mother's house in Florida, Nicole came across an old check from MetLife showing a payment of $2,200 dated September 1, 2012—when Nicole was already 32 years old and no longer an infant. Nicole noticed that the MetLife check was made out to Marie, without any "for the benefit of" language.
When she discovered the payment, Nicole called MetLife to inquire whether she was owed any money and was told that MetLife had no record of Nicole being the beneficiary of any annuity or funds. Nicole then located Attorney Michael D. Wolin, whom she knew her mother had dealt with. Mr. Wolin advised that he had not been with the Julien Schlesinger & Finz firm for thirty years, that he did not have a file concerning the settlement, nor did he have any specific recollection of the settlement terms, although he remembered the case.
Mr. Wolin further advised that the court order should be on file at the courthouse. Nicole had someone obtain a copy of the order from the courthouse. Nicole then contacted Mr. Wolin, who wrote to MetLife to inquire as to why Nicole was not receiving the proceeds of the settlement she was entitled to. A brazen stonewalling response was received from MetLife stating that it had no record of any annuity for Nicole at all and that she was not listed as an annuitant on its records.
The Factoring Transaction
In the course of Nicole's lawsuit against MetLife, her attorneys learned to their amazement that in 2009 Marie had sold half the $200,000 August 1, 2015 payment to Novation Capital LLC, a factoring company. In her affidavit in connection with the transaction, Marie said this under oath: "I am currently divorced and have one dependent, Emily Seymour, a daughter, born on 6/14/2002." As if the failure to mention Nicole was not enough, Marie also made these brazen lies, also under oath:
I am entitled to the settlement payments set forth in the Transfer Agreement. The structured settlement payments arose as a result of a medical malpractice claim. The cause of action associated with the aforementioned lawsuit has been resolved. Pursuant to a Settlement Agreement, I was entitled to receive certain periodic payments, to wit: a lump sum payment of $200,000 due on 8/1/2015, a lump sum payment of $200,000 due on 8/1/2025, and monthly payments of $2,200 for life, thereby creating a structured settlement.
Nicole's attorneys also learned that the Miami attorney who handled the factoring transaction—Jose M. Camacho, Jr.—was disbarred for forging signatures relating to structured annuities. Several documents relating to the factoring transaction are among the appendixes to Nicole's amended complaint and are in the package offered at the end of this post.

The Consent Order
On September 11, 2018, after the parties (but not Marie) had reached a settlement, the judge issued a consent order. He entered a default judgment against Marie, who had failed to respond to the amended complaint or otherwise appear. MetLife demanded, and Nicole agreed, to assign the default judgment to MetLife. Nicole also agreed not to try to collect on the default judgment. I do not know whether MetLife will attempt to collect on the default judgment.

MetLife agreed to pay Nicole for life the suspended and future monthly payments beginning with the payment that was due April 1, 2017, including 9 percent interest on the suspended payments. MetLife also agreed to pay Nicole the $200,000 due in 2025. The parties agreed to bear their own costs and attorney fees.

The consent order is silent on the $100,000 payment due in 1998, which Nicole received; the $200,000 payment due in 2005, half of which Marie apparently stole; and the $200,000 payment due in 2015, half of which Marie sold to the factoring company in 2009, and the other half of which, except for a "small amount," Marie apparently stole. The judge dismissed the case with prejudice (permanently).

The Article in The Wall Street Journal
On February 21, 2018, The Wall Street Journal carried an article entitled "Lawsuit Alleges MetLife Helped a Woman Keep Settlement Money From Her Daughter." The reporter was Leslie Scism, who interviewed Nicole. Aside from comments that "Nicole lives in a cheap apartment in Detroit, has $30,000 in student debt and sometimes relies on free-food pantries," Nicole said: "I could have done so many different things with my life" had she received the full proceeds, she had sometimes borrowed from her mother, and "The ironic thing was I was paying back myself."

General Observations
I think Nicole's attorneys—Wolin, David Jaroslawicz, and others—did excellent work on the case. The attorneys for MetLife are associated with the firm of Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP. I sympathize with them, because I think they were on the wrong side in this tragic case.

On February 9, 2018, Christina M. White, an attorney for New York City, submitted a statement in opposition to a MetLife motion to dismiss the amended complaint. I was impressed by her statement. She assembled a substantial amount of background information on the case despite the lack of many documents that were not available because of the document retention (document destruction) policy of several of the organizations involved in the case.

This is one of the most shocking cases I have ever seen. It is inconceivable to me that a mother would steal money month after month and year after year from her permanently disabled daughter.

Available Material
I am offering a complimentary 104-page PDF consisting of Nicole's amended complaint (15 pages), exhibits to the amended complaint (40 pages), the memorandum of law in opposition to MetLife's motion to dismiss the amended complaint (26 pages), Christina White's statement (19 pages), and the consent order (4 pages). Email jmbelth@gmail.com and ask for the November 2018 package about the case of Herivaux v. MetLife.

===================================

Thursday, July 5, 2018

No. 275: Athene, the New York Department, and the Victimization of Life Insurance Policyholders

On June 28, 2018, the New York State Department of Financial Services (DFS) issued a press release announcing an extraordinary regulatory action taken against Athene Life Insurance Company of New York (Athene) and First Allmerica Financial Life Insurance Company (FAFLIC). The regulatory action took the form of a consent order requiring Athene to pay a $15 million fine for insurance law violations and FAFLIC to take corrective actions totaling up to $40 million.

In No. 272 (June 21, 2018) I discussed an extraordinary regulatory action taken by the California Department of Insurance (CDI) 16 days earlier against Accordia Life and Annuity Company and Athene Annuity and Life Company. The CDI and DFS regulatory actions arose out of the same types of activities that have been victimizing life insurance policyholders. Here I discuss the DFS action.

The Market Conduct Examination
On April 28, 2017, after DFS received many life insurance policyholder service related complaints, Maria T. Vullo, DFS Superintendent of Financial Services, appointed an examiner to conduct a targeted market conduct examination of Athene. The examination period was from January 1, 2012 through March 31, 2017. As necessary, the examiner reviewed matters occurring after March 31, 2017. The report of the examination is dated February 2, 2018. According to the report, Athene committed seven violations of New York laws and regulations. Here are two of the violations:
  • The Company violated Section 3211(b) of the New York Insurance Law by failing to mail premium due notices to policyholders at their last known address.
  • The Company violated Section 3211(g) of the New York Insurance Law by failing to provide annual reports or cash surrender value notices to policyholders.
The examination report includes a section tracing the history of the companies involved in this regulatory action. Among the company names mentioned in that section are Gotham Life Insurance Company of New York, Bankers Life and Casualty Company of New York, Bankers Life Insurance Company of New York, Southwestern Life Insurance Company, Indianapolis Life Insurance Company, AmerUs Group Company, Libra Acquisition Corporation, Aviva plc, Aviva Life Insurance Company of New York, Aviva Life and Annuity Company of New York, Aviva USA Corporation, Aviva Life Insurance Company, Aviva Life & Annuity Company, First Allmerica Financial Life Insurance Company, Apollo Global Management LLC, Athene Life & Annuity Assurance Company of New York, and Athene Life Insurance Company of New York.

The full scope of the problems that prompted the complaints and led to the DFS targeted market conduct examination is staggering. The only way to understand the problems fully is to read the examination report.

The Consent Order
The consent order directed at Athene lists seven findings and various violations of New York laws and regulations. It also describes the steps Athene and FAFLIC must take to remedy the violations.

The consent order provides for Athene to pay a $15 million civil penalty to DFS. It also describes the remediation plan Athene and FAFLIC must undertake. The consent order was signed by President Grant Kvalheim of Athene, President Robert Arena of FAFLIC, DFS Executive Deputy Superintendent of Insurance Laura Evangelista, and DFS Superintendent Vullo.

General Observations
In No. 272 about the CDI regulatory action, I mentioned references to transfers of policies from one insurance company to another. That is a subject on which I have written extensively. In the DFS regulatory action against Athene and FAFLIC, there are references to assumption reinsurance agreements and the concept of novation. For discussions of those subjects, see No. 220 (June 1, 2017) and No. 262 (April 16, 2018).

Also, as I said in No. 272, the types of administrative problems that prompted the CDI and DFS regulatory actions are difficult to solve. Yet those types of problems are to be expected when private equity firms create or acquire long-term obligations of insurance companies in an effort to earn short-term profits for the benefit of their investors. At least two major state insurance regulatory agencies—CDI and DFS—have recently witnessed first hand some of the implications of the involvement of private equity firms in the business of insurance.

I do not know how much knowledge other state insurance regulatory agencies have about problems involving private equity firms. Nor do I know whether and to what extent the National Association of Insurance Commissioner has been looking into the problems.

Available Material
I am offering a complimentary 40-page PDF consisting of the DFS press release (1 page), the DFS market conduct examination report (24 pages), and the DFS consent order directed at Athene and FAFLIC (15 pages). Email jmbelth@gmail.com and ask for the July 2018 package about the DFS/Athene/FAFLIC case.

===================================