Thursday, August 21, 2014

No. 66: Lawsky's Strong Letter about Captives

On August 12, 2014, Benjamin Lawsky, Superintendent of the New York Department of Financial Services, wrote to his fellow insurance commissioners about the recent work of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) relating to captive insurance companies owned by life insurance companies. The letter is strongly worded and highly critical of the NAIC.

The Lawsky Letter
Lawsky refers to the February 2014 report prepared by the NAIC's consultant, Rector & Associates, Inc., and the revised and weakened June 2014 Rector report. At the end of the first paragraph of his letter, Lawsky says that if the NAIC cannot devise a better means of policing the use of captives by life insurance companies, it would all but invite federal authorities to do so. Here is the final paragraph of the Lawsky letter:
When the NAIC enlisted Rector to address the troubling boom of reserve financing through captives, it appeared to be doing so with a seriousness and urgency that recognized that these structures pose a clear and present danger to our system. Sadly, the revised and now-defanged [Rector] report simply permits more of the same. The NAIC's initial seriousness and urgency on this issue appears to have been overcome by industry lobbying. As we recognized last year, if the NAIC fails to take meaningful action with respect to captives, we will have left unresolved a gaping regulatory problem that is central to the safety and soundness of our system and the protection of policyholders. And that is where we find ourselves today.
Lawsky sent copies of his letter to three federal officials. They are Jacob Lew, Secretary of the Treasury; Mary Miller, Under Secretary of the Treasury for Domestic Finance; and Michael McRaith, Director of the Federal Insurance Office in the Department of the Treasury.

General Observations
I have long been critical of state insurance regulators for ignoring the need to strengthen rather than weaken financial requirements in the face of exotic new products. For example, in the March 2013 issue of The Insurance Forum, I wrote a major article entitled "A Review of More Than a Century of Efforts to Weaken Life Insurance Reserves." In that article, I expressed the opinion that so-called principles based reserves are contrary to the public interest and are a form of reserve weakening whose impact will not be fully revealed for many decades. I applaud Superintendent Lawsky for speaking out forcefully about the reserve weakening and artificial balance sheet inflation caused by the improper use of captives owned by life insurance companies.

I am offering a complimentary PDF of the four-page Lawsky letter. Send an e-mail to jmbelth@gmail.com and ask for Lawsky's August 12 letter about captives.

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Wednesday, August 20, 2014

No. 65: A Life Settlement in a Bankruptcy Case

On August 13, 2014, Melville Capital issued a press release entitled "Melville Capital, LLC Brokers Sale of Initially Undisclosed Life Insurance Policy, Delivers $460,000 to Chapter 7 Estate." Melville calls itself "the country's premier Life Settlement Broker practicing in the area of restructuring and insolvency." The press release discusses a lumber company bankruptcy case where the trustee found life insurance policies that were not listed among the company's assets. The press release identifies nine other cases in which Melville was involved.

The Lumber Company Case
In the lumber company case, the bankruptcy trustee asked Melville to review the policies. Melville determined that one policy had value. The trustee retained Melville on a "success fee basis" to sell the policy through a life settlement in the secondary market for life insurance. Afterward, the trustee said he "was able to liquidate what appeared to be a worthless asset for a very significant amount of money for the benefit of the estate."

The Policy
In the press release, Melville says the policy was sold for $460,000, but provides no further details. I contacted Melville. A representative graciously answered several questions but, as will be seen, declined to answer two questions. I verified most of the information by reviewing public documents in the bankruptcy court file.

The policy was universal life with a face amount of $1 million and no available surrender value. It was policy No. B00399008 issued by Protective Life Insurance Company (Birmingham, AL). The policy was sold to Magna Life Settlements, Inc. (Austin, TX) for $460,000. Melville received a commission of 18 percent ($82,800), out of which Melville undoubtedly covered some expenses, and the bankruptcy estate received the remaining $377,200. (In Re: Hubert Moore Lumber Co., U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Middle District of Georgia, Case No. 13-71347.)

General Observations
I had never heard about the use of life settlements in bankruptcy proceedings. I am posting this item to call attention to the subject.

Melville says the bankrupty estate received the gross purchase price of $460,000. I think it would be more accurate to say the estate received the net amount of $377,200.

I was surprised that the gross purchase price was 46 percent of the face amount. Such a high ratio is reminiscent of viatical settlements involving terminally ill insureds. I asked Melville about the insured's age and also about the insured's general health at the time of the life settlement. Melville declined to answer those questions because of concerns about privacy and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). I tried without success to contact Magna and Protective. I think the insured must be very old, very ill, or both.

I am offering a complimentary PDF of Melville's press release. Send an e-mail to jmbelth@gmail.com and ask for Melville's release.

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Thursday, August 14, 2014

No. 64: Coventry First—A Setback in the Griswold Case

In No. 27 posted February 3, 2014, I discussed a class action lawsuit filed against Coventry First LLC (Fort Washington, PA), an intermediary in the secondary market for life insurance. The plaintiff is Lincoln Griswold, a Pennsylvania resident.

The Underlying Lawsuit
In 2006, Griswold purchased an $8.4 million policy from United of Omaha Life Insurance Company. In 2008, he sold the policy to Coventry. Later he learned that an agent involved in the transaction received a much larger commission than what Griswold had been led to believe. In October 2010, Griswold filed a class action lawsuit against Coventry in state court. Coventry removed the case to federal court.

In December 2010, Coventry filed a motion to dismiss the complaint or compel arbitration. In June 2011, the district court judge conducted a hearing on the motion. In February 2013, the district court judge denied the motion. (Griswold v. Coventry, U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Case No. 2:10-cv-5964.)

The Appellate Ruling
Coventry appealed the decision. In January 2014, after extensive briefing, a three-judge appellate panel heard oral arguments.

On August 11, 2014, the appellate panel handed down a unanimous ruling. The panel said it lacked appellate jurisdiction to review the district court's denial of Coventry's motion to dismiss Griswold's complaint. The panel also said it affirmed the district court's denial of Coventry's motion to compel arbitration. (Griswold v. Coventry, U.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, Case No. 13-1879.)

General Observations
As I said in No. 27, I think the Griswold case is important. It is reminiscent of the serious charges filed against Coventry in October 2006 by then New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, and the settlement of the charges in September 2009 by then New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo. The Florida Office of Insurance Regulation also issued an order to show cause and later resolved the matter by issuing a consent order. (See the January/February 2007, December 2007, and December 2009 issues of The Insurance Forum.)

It remains to be seen whether Coventry will ask the panel to reconsider its ruling and/or ask the full Third Circuit to review the ruling, whether Griswold will seek class certification in the district court, whether discovery—including the taking of depositions—will occur, and whether a trial date will be set in the district court. Should a class be certified in this case, one can only imagine its huge potential impact on Coventry. Also, lurking in the background is the possibility that Coventry will try to settle the case and persuade Griswold to agree to keep the terms of the settlement confidential.

I am offering a complimentary PDF containing the Third Circuit panel's 22-page ruling. Send an e-mail to jmbelth@gmail.com and ask for the Griswold/Coventry appellate ruling.

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Wednesday, August 13, 2014

No. 63: Life Partners—An Update Based on Recent Filings with the SEC

I wrote extensively in The Insurance Forum about Life Partners, Inc. (Waco, TX), which is an intermediary in the secondary market for life insurance and a subsidiary of Life Partners Holdings, Inc. (NASDAQ:LPHI). I also wrote about LPHI in Nos. 15, 22, 29, 30, 35, 36, and 37. This follow-up provides an update based on recent LPHI filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).

Net Losses and Declining Settlements
LPHI incurred net losses in 11 of the 13 most recent fiscal quarters. During that period, the firm averaged about ten life settlements per quarter compared to about 56 per quarter during the preceding 52 quarters. Here are the figures for the 13 most recent quarters:

Quarter
 Ended
Net Income
(000)
Number of
Settlements
---------- ---------
------
---------
------
05/31/11 –$874
18
08/31/11 –323 16
11/30/11 –1,083 10
02/29/12 –843 18
05/31/12 1,037 10
08/31/12 –1,849 3
11/30/12 –754 12
02/28/13 –1,311 10
05/31/13 1,679 12
08/31/13 –1,793 3
11/30/13 –939 6
02/28/14 –1,399 5
05/31/14 –1,737 1

Dividends
Despite the net losses and the declining volume of business, LPHI has continued paying dividends to its shareholders. The quarterly dividends were 20 cents per share during the first three quarters shown in the table above, ten cents per share during the next five quarters, and five cents per share during the last three quarters.

According to the proxy statement filed with the SEC on July 2, 2014, LPHI had 18,647,468 shares outstanding. Brian D. Pardo, LPHI's chief executive officer, beneficially owns 9,377,605 (50.3 percent) of the shares. Other officers and directors together own 484,651 shares.

Pardo Family Holdings, Ltd. (PFH) owns 9,363,470 of Pardo's shares. LPHI's latest proxy statement says PFH is located at LPHI's headquarters address in Waco, Texas. However, PFH's most recent filing with the SEC, in January 2009, says PFH is located in Gibraltar, a British overseas territory.

The dividends during the above 13 quarters add up to $1.35 per share. Thus Pardo received more than $12.6 million in dividends during those 13 quarters. Also, Pardo received total compensation of $570,742 for the fiscal year ended February 28, 2013, and $667,261 for fiscal 2014. However, the Pardo gravy train may end soon, in light of the following extraordinary paragraph at the bottom of page 20 in the 26-page 10-Q quarterly report that LPHI filed with the SEC on July 15, 2014:
We believe our existing working capital and future cash flows from operating activities will allow us to fund our current operations through fiscal 2015. Our recurring operations are not currently generating sufficient cash to support operations. To fund our short and long-term operations and to pay dividends, we have liquidated much of our investment portfolio, including most of our investments in policies. We presently hold policies carried at $1.6 million, of which $967,116 is classified as a current asset as we anticipate selling the policy interests within the next twelve months. We monetized our investment in the life settlement trust by assigning our current rights to future income. During the fourth quarter of fiscal 2014 we received a Federal income tax refund of $3,507,242, which aided our cash available. Except for our cash and cash equivalents, we have few sources of additional liquidity. As a result, we may not be able to continue to pay dividends at the historical rate and may reduce or eliminate dividends to conserve working capital until we can realize improved operating results.
General Observations
In 2010 LPHI share prices were close to $20, in 2012 they were around $6, and in 2013 they were around $4. The shares closed on August 8, 2014, at $2.04. It will be interesting to see what happens to share prices when dividends are reduced or eliminated. In any case, the paragraph quoted above suggests that the company is in liquidation mode.

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Monday, August 11, 2014

No. 62: Pollock Financial and Florida Regulators Enter into a Consent Order Relating to Florida's Pasco County School District

In No. 53 posted June 16, 2014, I said the Pasco County School District (Land O'Lakes, FL) rejected a life insurance plan offered by Pollock Financial Group (Chagrin Falls, OH). The rejection came after the district received from the Florida Office of Insurance Regulation (FLOIR) a June 12 letter critical of the plan. This follow-up relates to a July 8 consent order filed by FLOIR and directed at Pollock.

The Consent Order
The consent order is similar to the FLOIR letter, but the language of the order is stronger. For example, the letter says the plan may violate Florida's insurable interest law, but the order says the FLOIR "finds" that the plan "lacks insurable interest."

Also, the order focuses on Pollock's inability to identify the life insurance company that would have issued the policies. The order says:
[Pollock] was unable to provide [FLOIR] with the name of the life insurance company that would be issuing the life insurance policies for the proposed products. [Pollock] represented to [FLOIR] that it had not yet identified the life insurance company that would issue the policies.
[FLOIR] finds that, by marketing a life insurance product in Florida to insure Florida lives without being appointed by an insurance company authorized to provide the product in the state of Florida, [Pollock] and its employees, including Mark G. Pollock and William "Bill" Olive, transacted insurance in the state of Florida without complying with the Florida Insurance Code, in violation of Sections 624.11 and 624.401, Florida Statutes.
Pollock does not admit violating any laws. However, Pollock agrees to comply with Florida laws and cease and desist from marketing the plan or any similar plan to Florida consumers. Pollock waives its right to a hearing and waives its rights to contest the order in any forum available to it. Each party bears its own costs. (In the Matter of Pollock Financial Group, Florida Office of Insurance Regulation, Case No. 155737-14-CO.)

General Observations
I do not know how Pollock illustrated the results of the plan over many years when it did not know what company was going to issue the policies. Perhaps the illustrated numbers were imaginary numbers.

This is my fourth post about the "too good to be true" plan Pollock offered Pasco. The earlier posts were Nos. 43, 48, and 53. From the first my unsolicited advice to the district was to reject the plan.

In No. 48, I offered a complimentary 14-page Pasco package of documents. In No. 53, I offered a complimentary 15-page second Pasco package of documents. Now I am offering a complimentary eight-page PDF containing the consent order. Send an e-mail to jmbelth@gmail.com and ask for the third Pasco package. The first two Pasco packages are still available.
 
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Friday, August 8, 2014

No. 61: Stranger-Originated Life Annuities—SEC Actions Against Michael Horowitz and Others

On July 31, 2014, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued an order directed at Michael A. Horowitz, a Los Angeles resident who the SEC says was the "architect" of "a fraudulent scheme to profit from the imminent deaths of terminally ill hospice and nursing home patients" through more than $80 million of variable annuities. I refer to such annuities as stranger-owned life annuities (STOLA).

The Order
The order says Horowitz submitted a settlement offer the SEC accepted. Horowitz agreed to admit wrongdoing; pay the SEC $850,000 consisting of disgorgement, prejudgment interest, and civil penalties; cease and desist from violating federal securities laws; and be barred from the securities industry. (Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-15790.)

The order consists of 23 pages, including a four-page annex containing Horowitz's admissions. This summary paragraph appears near the beginning of the order:
The scheme was orchestrated by Respondent Horowitz, then a registered representative of a large broker-dealer firm. Horowitz, together with others, made material misrepresentations and used deceptive devices to obtain the personal health and identifying information of terminally ill hospice and nursing home patients in order to designate them as annuitants on variable annuity contracts that Horowitz marketed to wealthy investors. Horowitz marketed these variable annuities—which are designed by their issuers to be long-term investment vehicles—as opportunities for short-term gains with a hedge against market losses. Horowitz recruited Respondent Cohen to facilitate the sale of additional "stranger-owned" annuities and they each obtained their firms' approval of variable annuity sales by making material misrepresentations and omissions on trade tickets, customer account forms and/or point-of-sale forms, which the broker-dealer principals used to conduct investment suitability and related reviews. As a result of the Respondents' fraudulent acts and practices, certain insurance companies unwittingly issued variable annuities that they would not otherwise have sold. The annuities sold during the scheme—which included five annuities sold to Horowitz's close relatives for profits in excess of $900,000—generated lucrative upfront sales commissions for the Respondents, with Horowitz receiving more than $300,000 and Cohen receiving more than $700,000 in commissions.
The Other Respondents
Moshe Marc Cohen (Brooklyn, NY) is referred to in the above mentioned order. He has not yet agreed to terms.

Seven others were the subjects of three SEC orders issued on March 13, 2014. They are Harold Ten (Los Angeles), Menachem "Mark" Berger (Chicago), Debra Flowers (Chicago), Howard A. Feder (Woodmere, NY), BDL Manager LLC (Woodmere, NY), Marc Steven Firestone (Los Angeles), and Richard Mark Horowitz (Los Angeles). (Administrative Proceeding File Nos. 3-15787, 3-15788, and 3-15789.)

Flowers, an "annuitant finder" recruited by Berger, agreed to cooperate in the investigation. She submitted a sworn statement of her financial inability to pay anything, and she was not charged.

The other six respondents agreed to pay various amounts to the U.S. Treasury as disgorgement, prejudgment interest, and civil penalties. The total amounts were: Ten ($292,000), Berger ($231,000), Feder ($130,000), BDL Manager ($3.3 million), Firestone ($186,000), and Richard Horowitz ($370,000). They agreed to cease and desist from violations of federal securities laws. Ten, Berger, Feder, and BDL Manager also agreed to cooperate in the investigation and be barred from the securities industry.

My First Article about STOLA
The June 2009 issue of The Insurance Forum carried a short article entitled "Money Laundering through Annuities." The article lacked detail because I had heard about the subject only through an unsolicited telephone call. I did not mention STOLA, and hoped to learn more later. What I learned later was more than I wanted to know.

My Second Article about STOLA
The lead article in the April 2010 issue of The Insurance Forum was entitled "Stranger-Originated Life Annuities." The first section of the article dealt with an interpleader lawsuit filed by MetLife Investors USA. It involved a premium wired to the company by a trust. The forged application was for a large variable annuity on the life of a Chicago nursing home patient facing imminent death. Upon her death 12 days after the annuity was issued, the company was uncertain where to send the death benefit. The same trust had applied to other companies for large variable annuities on the same life: Genworth Life & Annuity, Hartford Life & Annuity, ING USA Annuity & Life, New York Life Insurance & Annuity, and Sun Life of Canada US.

The second section of the article dealt with a series of civil lawsuits filed by Transamerica Life and Western Reserve Life of Ohio. The defendants were Joseph Caramadre, a Rhode Island attorney, and Raymour Radhakrishnan, an employee of Caramadre. They had arranged for large variable annuities on the lives of terminally ill individuals for the benefit of Caramadre and his clients.

As my April 2010 article was going to press, The Wall Street Journal carried an article on February 16, 2010 by reporters Mark Maremont and Leslie Scism. The article was entitled "Investors Recruit Terminally Ill To Outwit Insurers on Annuities."

My Third Article about STOLA
The March 2012 issue of The Insurance Forum carried a major article entitled "Recent Civil and Criminal Cases Relating to Stranger-Originated Life Annuities." The first section of the article dealt with the ongoing Rhode Island civil cases.

The second section of the article dealt with the fact that the U.S. Attorney in Rhode Island had filed criminal charges against Caramadre and Radhakrishnan. The charges related not only to the variable annuity scheme, but also to a "death-put bond" scheme. The latter involved corporate bonds owned jointly by two parties—an investor and a terminally ill person—with right of survivorship. The bonds were purchased at prices well below their face value. At the death of a co-owner, the surviving co-owner redeemed the bond at full face value.

The third section of the article provided an update and a major elaboration on the interpleader case. Here are some of the names of individuals mentioned in the public documents I reviewed: Menachem (Mark) Berger, Marc (Moshe) Cohen, Eli Finestone, Debra Flowers, Abraham Gottesman, Asher Gottesman, Akiva Greenfield, the late Dr. Mark Harvey, and Daniel A. Zeidman. I expressed this opinion about the interpleader case:
I think the outright lies, fraudulent misrepresentations, deceptive practices, concealment of material information, forgery of documents, bribery of relatives, perjured testimony, identity misappropriation, and other forms of wrongdoing that allegedly occurred in the case warrant investigation into the existence of a criminal conspiracy—sweeping across the country from New York to Illinois to California—to misappropriate the identities of terminally ill individuals....
My Later Articles about Caramadre
I did not write further about the interpleader case. However, I wrote follow-up articles about the Caramadre criminal case in the February 2013, April 2013, and October 2013 issues of The Insurance Forum. Also, in No. 17 posted January 2, 2014, I wrote about the sentencing of Caramadre to a six-year prison term and the sentencing of Radhakrishnan to a one-year prison term.

General Observations
As stated in my third article about STOLA, I think the nature and scope of the case involving Michael Horowitz and others amounted to a criminal conspiracy. It is hard to believe that using hospice patients and others facing imminent death does not warrant criminal prosecution.

I am making available, as a complimentary PDF, the July 31 SEC order including the annex with the Michael Horowitz admissions. Send an e-mail to jmbelth@gmail.com and ask for the SEC/Horowitz order.

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Wednesday, August 6, 2014

No. 60: Stranger-Originated Life Insurance—The Sentencing of Three Promoters on Federal Criminal Charges

Blogger's note: In No. 57 posted July 14, I said I was taking a few months off but would interrupt the break if something important happens. In No. 59 posted July 21, I brought to your attention the latest post by Alastair Rickard concerning the proposed demutualization of Canada's Economical Mutual Insurance Company. Now I need to report here and in No. 61 two other important recent developments.

Background on the Binday Case
In the May 2012 and April 2013 issues of The Insurance Forum, and in No. 5 posted October 30, 2013, I discussed a federal criminal case against three promoters of stranger-originated life insurance (STOLI): Michael Binday, James Kevin Kergil, and Mark Resnick. See No. 5 for discussions of the criminal charges against each defendant, the delay caused by the withdrawal of Binday's attorney because of a conflict of interest, the 11-day jury trial, and the conviction on all counts after 15 minutes of jury deliberation. (U.S.A. v. Binday et al., U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York, Case No. 1:12-cr-152.)

The Sentencing
On July 31, 2014, U.S. District Court Judge Colleen McMahon sentenced Binday to serve 12 years in prison, Kergil nine years, and Resnick six years. They were sentenced to those terms for each of four criminal charges, with the sentences to run concurrently. Each sentence is to be followed by three years of supervised release. The defendants are to report to begin serving their sentences on November 4, 2014. At this writing, the defendants have not yet filed notices of appeal.

Judge McMahon also ordered the defendants to pay a total of $39.3 million in restitution: Binday $13.5 million, Kergil $13.5 million, and Resnick $12.2 million. Those figures and the figures below are shown to the nearest tenth of a million. According to the restitution order:
Defendants' liability for restitution shall be joint and several with one another and with that of any other defendant ordered to make restitution for the offenses in this matter, specifically, Paul Krupit... Each Defendant's liability for restitution shall continue unabated until either he has paid the full amount of restitution ordered herein, or every victim has been paid the total amount of his loss from all the restitution paid by the Defendants and Mr. Krupit.
The restitution is to be paid in the following amounts to eight victimized companies: American General Life ($10.4), AXA Equitable Life ($0.2), John Hancock Life USA ($4.5), Lincoln National Life ($3.4), MetLife Investors USA ($0.1), Prudential Insurance ($0.2), Security Mutual Life of New York ($5.7), and Union Central Life ($14.7). Another seven companies that were "interested parties" in the case are not sharing in the restitution: Aviva Life & Annuity of New York, Lincoln Benefit Life, Massachusetts Mutual, PHL Variable, Phoenix Life, Pruco Life, and Sun Life of Canada.

An Attorney-Client Dispute
Binday's criminal defense attorney was Elkan Abramowitz of the New York firm of Morvillo Abramowitz Grand Iason & Anello. After the trial but long before sentencing, Abramowitz, saying there had been a breakdown in attorney-client relations, moved to withdraw as Binday's attorney. Abramowitz did not want to explain to Judge McMahon the reason for the breakdown because of a concern that the explanation might prejudice Binday at sentencing. Judge McMahon therefore referred the matter to Judge Lewis Kaplan, who held a hearing on January 15, 2014. The transcript of the hearing was under seal, but Judge Kaplan ordered it unsealed. I recently obtained the 23-page transcript, which provides a rare glimpse into attorney-client relations.

General Observations
The Binday case may be the first STOLI case to result in criminal convictions and prison time for defendants. I think it will not be the last.

Another pending STOLI case involves three defendants associated with Imperial Holdings, Inc.: Abraham Kirschenbaum, Maurice Kirschenbaum, and Robert Wertheim. They pleaded guilty to federal criminal charges in late February and early March 2013. Sentencing was delayed and is currently scheduled for December 15, 2014. I wrote about the case in the October 2013 issue of The Insurance Forum.

These cases suggest that engaging in fraudulent activity for the purpose of hoodwinking insurance companies into issuing STOLI policies may sometimes lead to criminal charges rather than civil charges. Whether the possibility of criminal charges will deter activity by wrongdoers trying to make a quick buck in the STOLI business remains to be seen.

I am making the transcript of the hearing before Judge Kaplan available as a complimentary PDF. Send an e-mail to jmbelth@gmail.com and ask for the Binday/Abramowitz transcript.

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Monday, July 21, 2014

No. 59: The Proposed Demutualization of Canada's Economical Mutual Insurance Company

Alastair ("Al") Rickard is a former Canadian insurance executive and the founding editor of The Canadian Journal of Life Insurance. Although his Journal is no longer published, he is a blogger (www.RickardsRead.com). Through his blog I learned two years ago about the shocking terms of the proposed demutualization of Economical Mutual Insurance Company (Waterloo, Ontario), a large, federally regulated mutual property and casualty insurance company. I invited Rickard to write an article on the subject. He did so, and the article appeared under his byline in the October 2012 issue of The Insurance Forum.

Rickard has posted on his blog several articles about the Economical Mutual proposal, which remains pending. Rickard's most recent post on the subject is his No. 268 dated July 15. I decided to interrupt my summer break to call this latest post to your attention. I urge you to read not only his No. 268, but also at least some of his earlier posts on the subject (his Nos. 208, 209, and those mentioned in the second paragraph of his No. 268). To go to Rickard's post No. 268, click here.

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Monday, July 14, 2014

No. 57: A Note to Readers

In the final two issues of The Insurance Forum—the November and December 2013 issues—I expressed the hope to keep in contact with readers through my blog (www.josephmbelth.com). On October 7, I posted the first item. For a few months thereafter I posted items at the rate of two per week, and later cut back to one per week. Now I have decided to take a summer break during which I may not post anything for a few months. However, I might post an item if something interesting occurs.

In the November issue, where I explained the reasons for my decision to end publication of The Insurance Forum, I said a major reason was my desire to write a memoir about my 40-year experience with the newsletter. I have made some progress, but during the break I plan to concentrate on the project in an effort to complete it fairly soon.

During the break, feel free to communicate with me. It is always good to hear from readers. Thank you for your interest in my work.

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Monday, July 7, 2014

No. 56: J. Edgar Hoover, the FBI, and a Superb New Book about a Famous 1971 Burglary

On the night of March 8, 1971, more than a year before the break-in at the Watergate, eight civil rights and antiwar activists broke into an office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in Media, Pennsylvania, near Philadelphia. The burglars stole—and released to reporters and members of Congress—secret FBI files revealing the existence of unconstitutional programs that violated the civil rights of individuals and organizations. The burglary became one of the most embarrassing unsolved mysteries in the history of the FBI under its legendary director, J. Edgar Hoover.

In 1971, Betty Medsger was a young reporter for The Washington Post. She was one of the first to see the secret files and break the news about them. Now, after more than 40 years, she has written a superb book about the burglary. She found seven of the eight burglars and reveals for the first time—with their permission—the identity of five of them. All of them had avoided detection and were prepared to go to their graves without being identified as the burglars. Two of them agreed to be interviewed for the book but still refused to allow their identification despite the fact that the statute of limitations has long since run out; those two are referred to by fictitious names. The 596-page book, published in 2014, is entitled The Burglary: The Discovery of J. Edgar Hoover's Secret FBI.

I found noteworthy Medsger's detailed analysis of the thought processes of the burglars leading to their decision to break the law and risk lengthy prison terms in order to reveal the illegal operations of the FBI. She describes the meticulous planning that went into the burglary, including the decision to conduct the raid on the night when the nation was absorbed with the heavyweight championship boxing match between Joe Frazier and Muhammad Ali at Madison Square Garden.

Also noteworthy is Medsger's detailed descriptions of the burglars' life experiences preceding the burglary, and their lives after the burglary as they released the stolen files and struggled for years to avoid detection in the massive FBI investigation of the case. For example, the leader of the burglars was a college professor; he died in his eighties in 2013 after a long struggle with Parkinson's disease. Two others were a married couple with three small children (a fourth was born later); the couple made careful arrangements for the care of their children in the event of capture and long prison terms. Especially interesting is the description of how they broke to their children years later the news of their parents' criminal act.

Because I was and still am in Bloomington, I was intrigued by Medsger's discussion of the FBI investigation following the burglary. On pages 147-148 of the book is a list of reports that came in from FBI field offices across the country. Here is one of seven reports mentioned:
From Indianapolis: The field office checked on the whereabouts on March 8 of a man from Bloomington, Indiana, who agents there thought might do such a thing.
The Medsger book is a well written page turner. It is also a thought provoking piece of work. I strongly recommend the book. 

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Monday, June 30, 2014

No. 55: Watergate—The Reissue of a Superb Book on the Subject

August 9, 2014 is the 40th anniversary of the resignation of President Richard Nixon in the wake of the Watergate affair. In those days I followed the news closely, and I read several books on the subject. One book I did not read then was by Elizabeth Drew, a regular contributor to The New York Review of Books and the former Washington correspondent of The New Yorker and The Atlantic. She lives in Washington, is the author of several books, and is a gifted writer.

As Drew explains, on the day after Labor Day in 1973, she and William Shawn, editor of The New Yorker, decided she should write a journal of the period we were entering that Fall. In 1974 her resulting journal ran in The New Yorker "as sets of three parts each," and in 1975 it was published as a book entitled Washington Journal: Reporting Watergate and Richard Nixon's Downfall.

Drew's book has been out of print for many years. Recently, with the anniversary approaching, Drew arranged for a new printing of the book. The new book includes an "Afterword" identifying some things learned in the years after the resignation, and describing Nixon's efforts to rehabilitate himself during the 20 years until his death in 1994.

Drew's book, despite the seriousness of the subject, is laced with humor. One example involved John W. Dean, III, counsel to the President, and John D. Erlichman, assistant to the President for domestic affairs:
Dean has said that Erlichman suggested that he shred the sensitive documents, and "deep six" the other material in the Potomac one evening on his way home to Virginia. Erlichman denied later that he had made either suggestion. He said that he had never in his life proposed to anyone that they shred papers. He said his practice was to burn them.
The book has no photographs, but they are not needed. Drew paints vivid pictures with words. For example, here is a small part of her description of Nixon when he announced his resignation on television the evening before it became effective:
It is hard to believe that this is the last speech Richard Nixon will make as President. Yet there he is, sitting in that familiar scene, at the familiar desk, one flag in his lapel, one by his side, holding white sheets of paper.... He looks bad—the face more creased and drawn. He is wearing a dark suit, a dark tie, and a white shirt....
Drew's 450-page book is superb, but I have a warning. For people who were not around at the time, for people who were around but did not follow developments closely, and for people who are not familiar with the Washington scene, it will be difficult to sort out all the individuals, events, and details. In the front of the book is a five-page list of "Figures in the Events of 1973-1974," but even that is only a small fraction of the people mentioned in the book.

On the other hand, for those familiar with the events and the cast of characters, Drew's book is a delight—a beautifully written page turner. It resembles a diary describing day-by-day developments, and it is extremely difficult to put down. It begins with Labor Day 1973, more than a year after the famous June 1972 break-in, and almost a year after Nixon's landslide reelection victory in November 1972. There are many flashbacks to events that occurred before September 1973.

In the Afterword, Drew refers to the Watergate affair as "the second greatest test of the Constitutional system in our nation's history," implying that the greatest test was the Civil War. I recall others making a similar statement, and I agree with them. If you do not agree, reading Drew's book might cause you to reconsider. I strongly recommend the book.

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Monday, June 23, 2014

No. 54: Daniel Carpenter and a Host of Criminal Allegations

Daniel E. Carpenter (Simsbury, CT), attorney and businessman, was scheduled to report to a federal prison on Friday, June 20. His saga involves cases over more than a decade in federal district courts, circuit courts of appeal, and the Supreme Court. Among the federal agencies involved in the cases are the Department of Justice, the Department of Labor, the Department of the Treasury, and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Several cases are ongoing despite Carpenter's incarceration.

The Section 1031 Fraud Allegations
Carpenter owned and operated Benistar, Ltd. and its subsidiaries. One Benistar function was to act as an intermediary in Section 1031 property exchanges. That section of the Internal Revenue Code allows the owner of investment property to defer capital gains taxes on the sale of the property by rolling the proceeds of the sale into the purchase of replacement property. However, the tax deferral is lost if the owner (the "exchangor") takes possession of the sale proceeds. Therefore, companies such as Benistar offer to act as an intermediary by holding the proceeds in escrow until the exchangor is ready to close on the replacement property.

Carpenter promoted the services of Benistar by offering to hold the funds safely, pay a small amount of interest, and provide the funds when needed. However, without the knowledge or consent of the exchangors, Carpenter embarked on a highly speculative program of options trading in the hope of generating large gains for himself.

Carpenter at first used an account at Merrill Lynch, which warned him about the dangers of options trading. He then switched to Paine Webber, which also warned him about the dangers. Initially his plan worked well, but early in 2000 he began suffering large trading losses. By late 2000 the losses had mushroomed to about $9 million.

In February 2004, a federal grand jury in Massachusetts returned a 19-count indictment charging Carpenter with 14 counts of wire fraud and five counts of mail fraud. The indictment identified seven exchangors who lost a total of about $9 million. Carpenter pleaded not guilty on all counts. In September 2004, the grand jury returned a superseding 19-count indictment. Carpenter again pleaded not guilty on all counts.

In July 2005, a 13-day jury trial ended with conviction on all counts. In December 2005, the judge granted Carpenter's motion for a new trial on the grounds that the government used inflammatory language in its closing argument. The First Circuit, in a split decision, upheld the district court's ruling. The Supreme Court declined to review the case.

In June 2008, a second 13-day jury trial ended with conviction on all counts. Carpenter again filed a motion for a new trial. After a three-year delay, the judge granted the motion on the grounds that the government erred in various ways in the closing argument. This time, however, the First Circuit reversed the judge's ruling, reinstated the conviction, and remanded the case for immediate sentencing. The Supreme Court again declined to review the case.

In presentencing memoranda, Carpenter asked for probation and the government asked for 60 months' imprisonment. In February 2014, the judge sentenced Carpenter to 36 months in federal prison on each count, with the terms to run concurrently. That is to be followed by 36 months of supervised release, with the terms to run concurrently.

In the presentencing memoranda, Carpenter said there should be no restitution because the victims had won settlements from Merrill Lynch and Paine Webber, and the government asked for about $14 million in restitution. The judge ordered Carpenter to pay restitution of about $310,000, fined him $100,000, and assessed him $1,900. Initially the judge ordered Carpenter to report to prison on April 25, but later changed the reporting date to June 6, and still later to June 20.

On May 23, 2014, the judge denied Carpenter's motion for a stay of imprisonment pending appeal. The judge reasoned that Carpenter's business activities present a danger of "pecuniary or economic harm" to the public. On June 11, Carpenter filed a notice of appeal to the First Circuit. (U.S.A. v. Carpenter, U.S. District Court, District of Massachusetts, Case No. 1:04-cr-10029.)

The Section 419 Angle
Carpenter marketed multi-employer welfare benefit plans. For many years the IRS has been investigating such plans, through which participants may qualify for favorable federal income tax treatment under Section 419 of the Internal Revenue Code. Contributions to Section 419 plans may be deductible for federal income tax purposes. The IRS considers some of the plans to be abusive tax shelters.

Since 2004, the IRS has been trying to obtain from Carpenter detailed information about his Section 419 plans. He provided some documents, but has fought hard against releasing all the requested documents. In 2008, the IRS filed a lawsuit in an effort to obtain the documents. The case is ongoing. (U.S.A. v. Carpenter, U.S. District Court, District of Connecticut, Case No. 3:08-mc-111.)

The STOLI Fraud Allegations
In December 2013, the U.S. Attorney in Connecticut filed a 33-count indictment against Carpenter and his brother-in-law, Wayne Bursey, relating to stranger-originated life insurance (STOLI). There were 23 counts of wire fraud, nine counts of mail fraud, and one count of conspiracy. Another person mentioned in the indictment was Joseph Edward Waesche IV, an insurance agent who worked with Carpenter. Waesche was charged in a separate case described later.

The indictment provides background on life insurance in general and STOLI in particular. It alleges that Carpenter and his associates provided materially false information to life insurance companies ("providers") regarding the purpose of the insurance, the income and net worth of the insured, the presence of premium financing, and the intent of the applicant to sell the policy in the secondary market for life insurance.

The indictment describes how providers are harmed by earlier and greater payout of death benefits, reduced premium income, financial projections rendered unreliable, delayed premium payments, and payment of large commissions. The providers mentioned are American National, AXA Equitable, Jefferson Pilot, Lincoln National, Metropolitan Life, Penn Mutual, Phoenix, Sun Life of Canada, and Transamerica.

Because Lincoln National received funds under the Treasury Department's Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), TARP's special inspector general is involved in the case. Also, because of the multi-employer welfare benefit plans, the Department of Labor is involved.

The indictment describes a Section 419 plan in which Bursey was plan sponsor and trustee of the plan and the accompanying trust. The plan purported to provide death benefits to employees of employers who adopted the plan. An adopting employer designated one or more employees ("straw insureds") on whom the trust purchased life insurance policies.

The indictment mentions 12 straw insureds ranging in age from 69 to 78. The straw insureds were promised free life insurance for two years and a share of the proceeds when the policies were sold in the secondary market after two years. The straw insureds were not obligated to pay anything and were told the premiums were being borrowed from a third party, which was a Benistar affiliate. Each straw insured was told the loan would be repaid from the death benefit if the insured died within two years or from the proceeds when the policy was sold in the secondary market after two years. Although the indictment mentions Section 419 plans, there is no mention of whether the income tax advantages of those plans were a factor in promoting the STOLI arrangements.

Carpenter and Bursey pleaded not guilty on all counts and were released on bond. The jury trial was set for March 11, 2014.

On January 30, 2014, Carpenter filed a motion to delay the trial. On February 4, Bursey filed a motion to delay the trial. On March 5, the U.S. Attorney filed a motion to delay the trial. On March 10, the judge granted the motions and reset the trial for March 10, 2015.

On May 14, 2014, the U.S. Attorney filed a 57-count superseding indictment against Carpenter and Bursey. The added counts were one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering, 13 counts of engaging in illegal monetary transactions, and ten counts of money laundering. The superseding indictment also added details about one additional straw insured. On May 17, Carpenter pleaded not guilty on all counts. On June 5, Bursey filed a motion to delay his arraignment because of illness. On June 6, Carpenter filed a motion to dismiss the superseding indictment for lack of federal jurisdiction. (U.S.A. v. Carpenter, U.S. District Court, District of Connecticut, Case No. 3:13-cr-226.)

The Waesche Case
In December 2013, the U.S. Attorney filed an "Information" charging Waesche with one count of conspiracy. Waesche pleaded guilty, was released on bond, and has not yet been sentenced. (U.S.A. v. Waesche, U.S. District Court, District of Connecticut, Case No. 3:13-cr-224.)

The Information describes the false answers Waesche and others gave in a total of five applications submitted to Lincoln National, Phoenix, and Penn Mutual. Here is what Waesche said in his own handwriting in his plea petition:
Beginning in 2006 and continuing until around 2013, I agreed with others with whom I worked in Simsbury, Stamford and Norwalk to take steps to get insurance companies to issue life insurance policies under false pretenses that would be financed by others and sold on the life settlement market. I caused to be submitted to life insurance companies false applications that stated that the policies were not being financed by outside investors, that there were no discussions about the sale of the policies, and that the policies were for legitimate estate planning needs. Specifically, I submitted such an application on July 3, 2008 to Penn Mutual. I knew what I was doing and I knew that it was wrong.
In a June 6 motion to dismiss the superseding indictment in the STOLI case, Carpenter calls Waesche "now an admitted felon" and blames Waesche for the problems. Carpenter denies knowing what was going on and claims to have been a victim of Waesche's activities.

General Observations
The one Massachusetts case and the three Connecticut cases described in this post are not all the ongoing cases relating to Carpenter. For example, documents in those cases refer to cases involving Carpenter in New York and Wisconsin. However, the cases described here provide insight into the scope of the alleged criminal activities in which Carpenter has been engaged for more than a decade.

The 21-page sentencing memorandum filed by Carpenter and the 18-page sentencing memorandum filed by the government in the case concerning the Section 1031 property exchanges provide interesting contrasts about the views of the parties. I offer the two memoranda (without exhibits) as a complimentary 39-page PDF. Send an e-mail to jmbelth@gmail.com and ask for the Carpenter package.
 
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Monday, June 16, 2014

No. 53: Florida's Pasco County School District Rejects a Proposed Life Insurance Plan

In Nos. 43 and 48 posted April 21 and May 12, I discussed a life insurance plan promoted to the Pasco County School District (Land O'Lakes, FL) by Pollock Financial Group (Chagrin Falls, OH). I said this in both posts: "My unsolicited advice to the district is to reject the plan." As reported in No. 48, the Florida Office of Insurance Regulation (FLOIR) initiated an "official inquiry" into the plan. In this follow-up, I discuss the results of the inquiry.

The Miller Letter
On June 12, Belinda Miller, general counsel of FLOIR, sent a five-page letter to Alison Crumbley, chairwoman of the Pasco County School Board. The letter says FLOIR reviewed documents submitted by Pasco in response to the "official inquiry" letter, documents submitted by Pollock Financial Group, and documents relating to similar proposals by Pollock Financial Group to two other governmental units in Floridathe City of Sarasota and the Gulf County School Board (Port St. Joe, FL).

On May 8, FLOIR met with William "Bill" Olive (Clearwater, FL), Mark G. Pollock, Rene Stuifzand, John "Drew" Smith, and attorneys for Pollock Financial Group. The attorneys were Bruce D. Platt and Edward L. Kutter of Akerman LLP (Tallahassee, FL).

Stuifzand was introduced to Pasco by Olive as the "architect of this entire program." According to the Miller letter, Stuifzand "was allegedly a participant in an alleged fraud scheme at InsCap Capital Markets, LLC."

The Miller letter says the earlier versions of the plan proposed to the City of Sarasota and the Gulf County School Board listed William A. "Tinker" Kelly (Nashville, TN) and Derek Siewert (Jacksonville, FL) as team members. The letter mentions consent orders they entered into with the Pennsylvania Insurance Department regarding a "Legacy Life Insurance Program" implemented in Pennsylvania in 2012-2013.

The Miller letter says FLOIR does not have any "finalized documents" relating to the proposed Pasco plan, such as "a finalized life insurance policy form or the name of the Bermuda life insurance company that would issue the policies." The letter mentions these other concerns:
  • Neither Pasco nor its employees would be an owner or beneficiary of the policies. Rather, the policies would be owned by an offshore investment vehicle, and the investment vehicle and an offshore trust would be the beneficiaries. Thus, other than any contractual obligations between the Cayman Islands trust and Pasco's trust, Pasco has no guarantee of receiving any money from the plan.
  • There is significant doubt that Pasco would have any enforceable rights to insurance money in exchange for the effort and expense of administering the plan.
  • Money from the plan may be taxable to the employees' designated beneficiaries.
  • Issuance of insurance may potentially exhaust or limit the employees' ability to purchase life insurance in the future.
  • The plan may violate Florida's insurable interest law.
  • The plan may violate Florida's group life insurance law.
The Miller letter uses strong language to discourage Pasco from entering into the arrangement. The next to last sentence reads:
In sum, as explained more fully above, the Office [FLOIR] has significant concerns relating to this proposal and has significant doubts that such an arrangement would comply with Florida law.
The Lathrop Memorandum
FLOIR conducted a records and background search on individuals involved in making the proposal to Pasco, including Stuifzand, Olive, and Mark Pollock. The results of the searches relating to them are presented in a six-page thoroughly sourced memorandum dated June 11 and sent to Miller by Alyssa S. Lathrop, assistant general counsel of FLOIR.

With regard to Stuifzand, the Lathrop memorandum discusses not only the InsCap matter but also some subsequent litigation. It also mentions a Chapter 7 individual bankruptcy filing in 2012 and says Stuifzand does not currently hold a broker's license.

With regard to Mark Pollock, the Lathrop memorandum says he currently has appointments with Lincoln National, Connecticut General, Berkshire Life of America, Guardian Life, Principal Life, and Great-West Life & Annuity, none of which is featured in the proposal to Pasco. The memorandum also says that he and his wife filed for Chapter 7 individual bankruptcy in 2012, and that Pollock Financial Group is not registered with the Florida Division of Corporations to do business in Florida.

With regard to Olive, the Lathrop memorandum says he holds three life insurance, health insurance, and variable annuity licenses with the Florida Department of Financial Services. The memorandum also says he currently has no active appointments with any insurers licensed in Florida.

The Platt/Kutter Memorandum
On May 14, Platt and Kutter, attorneys for Pollock Financial Group, sent a four-page memorandum and several attachments to Miller responding to several issues that arose at the May 8 meeting. As mentioned earlier, one of Miller's concerns is the possible effect of the program on the ability of an employee to purchase life insurance in the future. The version of the program provided to FLOIR does not indicate the amount of insurance on each life, but in No. 48 I said one version of the program mentioned $250,000 and another mentioned $350,000. Either way, it is a fairly substantial amount for Pasco teachers and other employees.

On that point, Platt and Kutter explain why the program would not affect an employee's ability to buy life insurance in the future. Here is the explanation, which contains the troublesome implication that the employee, in any future application, would be expected to conceal from the life insurance company the existence of the Pasco coverage:
Insurance companies use various formulas and information sources when calculating the total insurance capacity for an individual. The information is heavily weighted toward (a) reason for insurance and (b) net worth. The central database for information on individual insurance policies is maintained by MIB [Medical Information Bureau] Group. MIB is owned by its insurance company members who voluntarily report information on insureds to the central database (www.mib.com). The sole source of information for MIB is information that is self-reported by its members. The potential Bermuda insurance company is not a member of MIB and does not report information to MIB. Additionally, MIB contains information relating solely to individual life insurance policies. Group life insurance policies are not reported to MIB. Additionally, the individual insured is not a beneficiary under a group life insurance policy. As such, the death benefit accruing thereunder would not be counted in an individual's total insurance capacity. In light of the foregoing, the Contract should have no impact on an individual's eligibility for individual life insurance coverage.
General Observations
I requested but have not yet received an official statement from Pasco that it will reject the plan. In answer to my inquiry on June 13, however, a spokesperson made this unofficial statement, which leaves no doubt about what will happen:
At this point, I can say we will not be moving forward with any agreements with Pollock Financial Group, Bill Olive, or any of them. We were waiting on the FLOIR report, and we are grateful for their research and recommendation. From the board members I have spoken with today, they have no interest in continuing discussions about Legacy Life, a Benefit Stabilization Plan, or any other metamorphosis of the product.
On June 14, The Wall Street Journal carried an article about the situation. The article is entitled "'Doubts' Over Insurance Plan" and is under the byline of reporter Leslie Scism.

In No. 48, I offered a "Pasco Package," a complimentary 14-page PDF containing several important documents. In this follow-up, I offer a "Second Pasco Package," a complimentary 15-page PDF containing the Miller letter, the Lathrop memorandum, and the Platt/Kutter memorandum (without attachments). Send an e-mail to jmbelth@gmail.com and ask for the second Pasco package. Also, the first Pasco package is still available.

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Tuesday, June 10, 2014

No. 52: Massachusetts Mutual's Corporate Governance


In June 2005, corporate governance at Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company came to public attention when the board of directors fired Robert J. O'Connell, the company's chairman, president, and chief executive officer. The action led to a protracted dispute over O'Connell's severance package. (See the July 2005, January/February 2007, and March/April 2007 issues of The Insurance Forum.)

In February 2014, MassMutual sent policyholders a proxy statement announcing the annual meeting to be held April 9 at the company's home office in Springfield. The proxy included several bylaw changes to be voted on at the meeting. The changes angered Jessica C. Rule (Natick, MA), a policyholder. She retained Jason B. Adkins of the Boston law firm of Adkins, Kelston & Zavez, P.C. Around the same time, the company received two awards for excellence in corporate governance. In this post I discuss the controversy over the bylaw changes and mention the awards.

The Bylaw Changes
Numerous bylaw changes were proposed. In the order in which the changes appeared in the proxy, here are 12 that deserve comment.
  1. The old bylaws said the annual meeting was to be held at the home office in Springfield. The new bylaws say the meeting will be held as determined by the board "at any location ... either within or outside of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts." Allowing the board to hold the meeting anywhere in the world could cause inconvenience for policyholders who want to attend.
  2. For a special meeting, the new bylaws provide for notification to policyholders through announcements in newspapers. The bylaws should provide for notification to policyholders by mail. 
  3. For an item to be brought to an annual meeting, or to call for a special meeting, the bylaws require the request to be signed by at least half of 1 percent of the policyholders. That requirement creates a huge barrier because policyholders have no means of communicating among themselves. 
  4. The new bylaws provide that policyholders who request a special meeting would be "jointly and severally" responsible for paying the costs of the meeting, including the mailing of proxy statements, unless all the resolutions introduced by those policyholders are adopted. This is a harsh change. 
  5. A bylaw change eliminates a provision that allowed, at the board chair's discretion, a matter raised by a policyholder to be brought before a meeting for a vote or to determine the "sense" of the policyholders, even when the steps taken to raise the matter did not follow the bylaws. That change is regrettable. 
  6. A bylaw change allows the chair to adjourn a meeting for any reason, to another date, time, or place, without notice to policyholders if a new meeting is held within 30 days. This change eliminates notification requirements and gives the chair the power to suspend a meeting at which policyholders are poised to adopt a change that is contrary to the wishes of management. This is a harsh change. 
  7. A bylaw change lowers the minimum board size from 11 to 7, and leaves the maximum at 21. 
  8. A bylaw change eliminates the mandatory retirement age of 70 for directors. 
  9. A bylaw change eliminates the requirement that directors be given 48 hours' notice of a board meeting. 
  10. A bylaw change eliminates the requirement that a quorum for a board meeting has to be at least seven directors, a majority of whom are independent directors. Now the bylaws say a quorum is a majority of the directors in office. 
  11. A new bylaw provision allows approval of a bylaw change or repeal by a two-thirds vote at a policyholders' meeting following board approval of such bylaw change or repeal. This harsh provision allows the change or elimination of a bylaw previously approved by the policyholders. 
  12. A new bylaw provides that the board may remove an officer at any time with or without cause. That may have been added for clarity as a result of the dispute in the O'Connell matter.
The March 20 Adkins Letter
On March 20, on Rule's behalf, Adkins wrote to Mark Roellig, executive vice president and general counsel of MassMutual. Adkins asked for documents relating to the board's deliberations and approval of the bylaw changes. He also expressed concern about some of the changes.

The March 27 Lashway Letter
On March 27, Scott Lashway, vice president and assistant general counsel of MassMutual, replied. He said Rule does not have a right of access to the company's books and records, for two reasons. First, he cited statutes that do not provide for policyholder access. Second, he cited cases on the lack of a common law right of policyholder access. As a "potential" third reason, he mentioned "improper purposes such as facilitating baseless lawsuits." Nonetheless, he offered to provide the minutes of board meetings that included discussions of the bylaw changes, and expressed a willingness to meet with Rule and Adkins.

The March 31 Adkins Letter
On March 31, Adkins replied. He described his review of five sets of redacted minutes of meetings of the board and the board's Corporate Governance Committee (CGC). He said in part:
Based on these board records, it is apparent that the board did not engage in a thorough or independent process before voting to make significant changes to MassMutual's bylaws and seek member approval. It is also apparent that CGC and the full board did not retain independent outside advisors or counsel in this process, which was driven by management on painfully insufficient notice.
On behalf of Rule and all MassMutual policyholders, Adkins requested documents, reports, minutes, and e-mails relating to CGC's and/or the board's deliberative process between December 10, 2013 and January 23, 2014. He also asked that the bylaw changes be tabled pending notice to policyholders about who made the submission, disclosure of the process undertaken by the board in recommending the changes, and recognition of Rule's concerns about the changes and the process.

The Newspaper Article
On April 4, the Boston Business Journal carried an article by Matthew L. Brown entitled "Natick policyholder locks horns with MassMutual over rules changes." Brown identified some controversial bylaw changes. He also said: "Still, despite the feel-good talk about mutual companies being owned by policyholders, Rule and others who try to exert any real influence over corporate governance may find themselves whistling in the wind." Brown referred to a MassMutual statement, which I obtained from the company. Here is the statement:
We believe strong corporate governance is the foundation of a successful organization and we take seriously our obligation to operate in our members' best interest. After careful consideration and research, MassMutual and its Board of Directors proposed revised amendments to the company's bylaws. The proposed changes are good for the company's members, policyowners and the company. Each amendment has a clear rationale and, importantly, they are consistent with best practices at mutual life insurance companies and others that are held in the highest regard with respect to corporate governance. These proposed changes were communicated to members in our proxy mailing, and those who have voted agree overwhelmingly with us.
The April 7 PC/CFA Letter
Public Citizen (PC) seeks to "advance health, safety, and democracy, as well as to promote a just and equitable economy." Consumer Federation of America (CFA) seeks to "advance the consumer interest through research, advocacy, and education." On April 7, PC and CFA sent a joint letter to MassMutual's policyholders and board expressing concerns about some of the bylaw changes and the process by which the changes were developed. The two organizations asked policyholders to vote against the changes, and asked the board to table the changes pending notice to policyholders about the concerns.

When I saw the PC/CFA letter, I asked a MassMutual spokesperson to comment on it. In response, I received a statement similar to the one the company provided to the Boston Business Journal.

The Lawsuit
On April 9, Rule filed a lawsuit in state court against MassMutual. She seeks an order requiring production of the requested books and records. She also seeks attorney fees and costs. The company has not yet responded to the complaint. (Rule v. MassMutual, Middlesex Superior Court, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Civil Action No. 2014-3762-A.)

The Annual Meeting
On April 9, at the annual meeting, according to Adkins' notes about the meeting, about 40 persons attended. Only twoAdkins as a proxy for Rule, and one other policyholderwere not directors, officers, or employees. The meeting lasted about 20 minutes, almost half of which were used by Adkins to read a prepared statement. He described some bylaw changes he considers objectionable, and expressed concern about the process by which the changes were developed. Requests by the two independent policyholders to table the changes were ignored, and their questions were not answered.

The Voting
Owners of individual life policies have one vote, with one additional vote for each $5,000 of insurance in force. Owners of individual annuities have one vote for each $150 of annual annuity income. Owners of variable life policies, variable annuities, and group annuities have one vote. Owners of accident and health and disability income policies have one vote. No policyholder is entitled to more than 20 votes.

I asked MassMutual for the results of the vote. A spokesperson said there were 882,301 votes for the bylaw changes, 50,326 votes against the changes, and 59,426 abstentions. Thus the changes were adopted.

The Process
In Adkins' statement at the annual meeting, he summarized problems with the process by which the bylaw changes were developed. He said:
  • The changes did not go through the normal committee or board process, but were proposed by two officers. 
  • The CGC did not meet separately to consider the changes. 
  • The board did not retain independent advisors to consider the changes. 
  • The board did not meet separately from management to consider the changes. 
  • The board did not meet in person, but instead held a 15-minute telephone conference call dominated by a one-sided management presentation about the changes.
The Awards
On March 20, the Ethisphere Institute, "an independent center of research promoting best practices in corporate ethics and compliance," announced the names of the 144 companies that received the 2014 "World's Most Ethical Company" designation. One was MassMutual. Among other insurance companies receiving the designation were Aflac, CUNA Mutual, Hartford Financial, ING (U.S.), Knights of Columbus, Swiss Re, and Thrivent Financial. 

On April 10, the National Association of Corporate Directors New England Chapter announced its 2014 "Director of the Year Awards," which recognize independent directors of public, private, and nonprofit boards in New England, as well as entire boards, that have "significantly protected or enhanced stakeholder value." MassMutual received the "Private Company Board of the Year Award" for "demonstrating excellence in corporate governance."

General Observations
In its proxy statement, MassMutual said the changes align the bylaws "with widely accepted corporate governance best practices." The company made a similar comment in its statement to the Boston Business Journal. I think the comment is incorrect because some of the changes are contrary to the interests of policyholders. Also, the 50,326 votes against the changes and the 59,426 abstentions suggest some dissatisfaction among policyholders.

I am offering a complimentary 12-page PDF consisting of the March 20 Adkins letter, the March 27 Lashway letter, the March 31 Adkins letter, and the April 7 PC/CFA letter. Send an e-mail to jmbelth@gmail.com and ask for the MassMutual package.

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Monday, June 2, 2014

No. 51: Swisspartners Companies' Non-Prosecution Agreement with the U.S. Government

On May 8, 2014, four Swisspartners companies entered into a non-prosecution agreement (NPA) with the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York (U.S. Attorney). The NPA was approved by the Tax Division of the U.S. Department of Justice. The Swisspartners companies agreed to pay $4.4 million to the U.S. The U.S. Attorney agreed not to criminally prosecute the companies for participation in a conspiracy to defraud the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) from about 2001 through about 2011. The NPA was based on "voluntary self-reporting, extraordinary cooperation, and voluntary implementation of remedial measures." The only four entities to which the NPA applied were:
  • Swisspartners Investment Network AG, a Swiss-based asset management firm, and three subsidiaries.
  • Swisspartners Wealth Management AG, a Zurich-based trust services provider that established, organized, and managed entities, such as foundations and trusts, on behalf of, among others, U.S. taxpayer-clients.
  • Swisspartners Insurance Company SPC Ltd., a Cayman Islands-based life insurance carrier that offered life insurance and annuity products to, among others, U.S. taxpayer-clients.
  • Swisspartners Versicherung AG, a Liechtenstein-based insurance carrier that offered a variety of insurance and annuity products to, among others, U.S. taxpayer-clients.
On May 9, the U.S. Attorney filed a forfeiture complaint for $3.5 million of fees received by the Swisspartners companies. The other $900,000 paid to the U.S. was restitution to the IRS. The NPA was attached to the complaint as an exhibit. The complaint referred to "insurance policies," and the NPA referred to "life insurance and annuity products." However, neither document indicated the types of life insurance policies and annuity contracts used in the schemes. (U.S.A. v. $3,500,000 in U.S. Currency, U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York, Case No. 14-cv-3385.)

I am offering a complimentary 24-page PDF consisting of the complaint and the NPA. Send an e-mail to jmbelth@gmail.com and ask for the Swisspartners package.

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Tuesday, May 27, 2014

No. 50: Credit Suisse Pleads Guilty to a Federal Criminal Charge

Credit Suisse and the U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia (U.S. Attorney) recently reached a Plea Agreement under which Credit Suisse, a major Switzerland-based investment banking firm, pleaded guilty to a criminal charge of conspiracy to defraud the U.S. government. The same day, Credit Suisse entered into a Consent Order with the New York State Department of Financial Services (DFS). In this post I discuss the case.

The SEC Order
On February 21, 2014, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued an order instituting administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings against Credit Suisse for violations of U.S. securities laws. The SEC censured the bank and ordered it to cease and desist from violations and future violations of securities laws. The bank disgorged $82.2 million, paid prejudgment interest of $64.4 million, and paid restitution of $50 million to the SEC. (In the Matter of Credit Suisse Group AG, SEC Release No. 71593.)

The Senate Subcommittee Report
On February 26, the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs released a 181-page report entitled "Offshore Tax Evasion: The Effort to Collect Unpaid Taxes on Billions in Hidden Offshore Accounts." The report focused on widespread misconduct by Switzerland-based banks, and used Credit Suisse as a case study.

The Information
On May 19, the U.S. Attorney filed an Information charging Credit Suisse, including subsidiaries Credit Suisse Fides and Clariden Leu Ltd., with one criminal count of conspiracy "to willfully aid, assist in, procure, counsel, and advise the preparation and presentation of false income tax returns and other documents to the Internal Revenue Service" (IRS). The Information explained how Credit Suisse carried out the conspiracy, and described the cases of two unidentified clients--one a naturalized U.S. citizen living in Charlottesville, Virginia, and the other a U.S. citizen living in Elizabeth, New Jersey. Credit Suisse waived its right to prosecution by indictment and consented to prosecution by information. (U.S.A. v. Credit Suisse AG, U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Virginia, Case. No. 1:14-cr-188.)

The Plea Agreement
Also on May 19, the U.S. Attorney filed a Plea Agreement in which Credit Suisse agreed to plead guilty to the one criminal conspiracy count. The parties agreed on a fine of $1.137 billion and restitution of $666.5 million to the IRS. Incorporated in the Plea Agreement was a Statement of Facts. The parties agreed that, if the matter had gone to trial, the U.S. government would have proven the facts beyond a reasonable doubt. 

The New York Order 
Also on May 19, the DFS issued a Consent Order "In the Matter of Credit Suisse AG." The bank agreed to pay a civil monetary penalty of $715 million to the DFS, engage an independent monitor, and file certain reports. The bank also agreed to terminate the employment of Markus Walder, Susanne Ruegg Meier, and Marco Parenti Adami, who had remained employed by the bank on administrative leave. In addition, the bank agreed to refrain from entering into any direct or indirect business relationship with the above mentioned three persons and six others found by the DFS to have participated in the conduct discussed in the order: Roger Schaerer, Emanuel Agustino, Michele Bergantino, Andreas Bachmann, Joseph Dörig, and Beda Singenberger.

Major Media Coverage
On May 20 and the next few days, major newspapers carried articles about the Credit Suisse case. The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, and The Washington Post carried front-page stories on May 20.

General Observations
The Credit Suisse criminal guilty plea is reminiscent of Drexel Burnham Lambert in 1989 and Arthur Andersen in 2002. For that reason, there has been speculation about the impact of a criminal guilty plea on Credit Suisse. The regulators are determined to avoid having the criminal plea become a death sentence. For example, the SEC is not terminating securities licenses, the DFS is not terminating banking licenses, and the New York Federal Reserve Bank is not terminating Credit Suisse as a primary dealer in U.S. securities. It remains to be seen whether customers will continue doing business with a bank that pleaded guilty to criminal wrongdoing.

I am offering a complimentary 46-page PDF consisting of the 4-page Information, the 17-page Plea Agreement, the 16-page Statement of Facts, and the 9-page DFS Consent Order. Send an e-mail to jmbelth@gmail.com and ask for the Credit Suisse package.

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Monday, May 19, 2014

No. 49: Imperial Holdings and a Recent Note Offering

Imperial Holdings, Inc. (NYSE:IFT), based in Boca Raton, Florida, was founded in 2006. It became a major source of premium financing for stranger-originated life insurance (STOLI) policies. Recently Imperial took preliminary steps toward a rights offering to shareholders, later completed an offering of notes, and then withdrew the proposed rights offering.

Background
In September 2011, the existence of a criminal investigation became publicly known when federal agents raided Imperial's headquarters. In February 2012, the company disclosed it was also under investigation by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC); that investigation remains ongoing. In April 2012, the company and the Office of the U.S. Attorney in New Hampshire (USAO) entered into a non-prosecution agreement under which the company paid an $8 million fine, terminated its life insurance premium finance business, and agreed to other terms. (See the May 2012 and July 2012 issues of The Insurance Forum.)

In February 2013, the USAO entered into plea agreements with three individuals who were associated with Imperial and charged with criminal wrongdoing. Sentencing was scheduled for March 24, 2014, but is now scheduled for December 15, 2014. (See the October 2013 issue of The Insurance Forum.)

The Proposed Rights Offering
On August 30, 2013, Imperial filed with the SEC a preliminary registration statement covering a proposal to offer subscription rights to its shareholders to purchase up to $60 million of senior unsecured notes. In the filing was a preliminary prospectus containing few details about the proposed notes and saying the purpose of the proposed notes was to "raise funds to make selective investments in the life settlement asset class, to pay the premiums on certain life insurance policies that we own and for general corporate purposes, including working capital."

The Notes Offering
On February 11, 2014, in an 8-K (material event) report filed with the SEC, and in a press release, Imperial said it had commenced a private offering of $70 million of five-year senior unsecured convertible notes to be sold to qualified institutional buyers and accredited investors. The company said:
The purpose of this offering is to raise funds to make selective investments in the life settlement asset class including by making senior secured loans collateralized by portfolios of life insurance policies that we believe have attractive underwriting and cash flow characteristics and by strategically acquiring life insurance policies in the secondary and tertiary markets. We also expect to use a portion of the proceeds to pay the premiums on certain life insurance policies that we own and for general corporate purposes, including working capital.
Imperial expressed the belief that "our loans will be used to make premium payments to bridge a period where the investors need a cost effective alternative to fund premium payments on their policies to retain potential future death benefits." The company also said "substantial demand exists in the market for us to make these types of loans," for three reasons. First, many banks and traditional lenders are reluctant to lend to owners of life settlements. Second, many owners of life settlements have struggled with redemptions and "under-funded premium reserves since the onset of the financial crisis." Third, owners of many existing portfolios want to maintain ownership of them while limiting their cash outlay, and borrowing "allows them to retain much of their investment upside while stopping their cash outlays for ongoing premiums."

Private offerings are made through confidential offering memoranda. In this case, Imperial disclosed, in an attachment to the 8-K, excerpts from the preliminary offering memorandum. Among those excerpts are 26 "risks related to our business." The discussion of each risk consists of a boldface title followed by an explanation. These 12 are among the 26 risk titles:
(4) Our success in operating our life finance business is dependent on making accurate assumptions about life expectancies and maintaining adequate cash balances to pay premiums.
(5) Contractions in the market for life insurance policies could make it more difficult for us to opportunistically sell policies that we own and may make it more difficult to borrow under the Revolving Credit Facility.
(7) The life insurance policies that we own may be subject to contest, rescission and/or non-cooperation by the issuing life insurance company, which may have a material adverse effect on our business, financial condition and results of operations.
(8) Premium financed life insurance policies are susceptible to a higher risk of fraud and misrepresentation on life insurance applications, which increases the risk of contest, rescission or non-cooperation by issuing life insurance carriers.
(9) Delays in payment and non-payment of life insurance policy proceeds can occur for many reasons and any such delays may have a material adverse effect on our business, financial condition and results of operations.
(13) The SEC Investigation could materially and adversely affect our business, our financial condition and results of operations.
(14) Negative press and reputational concerns have had and continue to have a material adverse effect on our business, financial condition and results of operations.
(16) The secondary market is highly regulated; changes in regulation, the USAO Investigation and the SEC Investigation could materially affect our ability to conduct our business.
(17) If a regulator or court decides that trusts that were formed to own life insurance policies that once served as collateral for our premium finance loans do not have an insurable interest in the life of the insured, such determination could have a material adverse effect on our business, financial condition and results of operations.
(19) If a life insurance company is able to increase the premiums due on life insurance policies that we own, it will adversely affect our returns on such life insurance policies.
(21) Uncooperative co-trustees may impair our ability to service its life insurance policies.
(22) Changes to statutory, licensing and regulatory regimes governing premium financing or life settlements could have a material adverse effect on our activities and revenues.
Details on the Notes
On February 12, 2014, in an 8-K report and a press release, Imperial provided further details on the note offering. The company said it entered into a purchase agreement with FBR Capital Markets & Co. (FBR), the notes will pay interest semiannually at an annual rate of 8.5 percent, and FBR will have a 30-day option to purchase up to an additional $14 million of notes. The company also described the terms under which note holders can convert the notes into common stock of the company, and the procedure to be followed should the company decide to redeem the notes prior to maturity.

The IRS Investigation
On February 19, 2014, in an 8-K report, Imperial said that, although the offering was scheduled to close on February 19, the offering was postponed. The company said:
The offering of the Notes has been postponed due to the Company's receipt on February 19, 2014 of a summons from the Internal Revenue Service Criminal Investigations division and the Company's determination that this information should be disclosed to investors in the Notes. The summons requires the Company to produce information about the Company and its former structured settlement business from 2010 to the present. Although the Company has confirmed that the investigation relates to the Company, it is not aware of what allegations, if any, the IRS intends to investigate. The Company believes that the investigation is in a preliminary stage and is not aware of when such investigation will be concluded. The Company is unable to predict what action, if any, might be taken in the future by the IRS as a result of the matters that are the subject of the summons or what impact, if any, the cost of responding to the summons might have on the Company's financial position, results of operations, or cash flows.
Subject to reconfirming orders from investors, the Company expects to close the offering no later than February 21, 2014.
The Closing
On February 21, 2014, in an 8-K report, Imperial said it completed the offering. FBR partially exercised its option for $743,000 of additional notes and may exercise the remainder of its option later. The company received net proceeds of about $67 million after FBR's discount, placement fees, and offering expenses. The notes were issued under an indenture dated February 21 between Imperial and U.S. Bank National Association as trustee, registrar, paying agent, and conversion agent. The company attached the indenture to the 8-K as an exhibit.

The Withdrawn Registration
On February 24, 2014, Imperial filed with the SEC a request to withdraw the August 30, 2013 preliminary registration of a proposed rights offering to its shareholders. The company said it does not intend to pursue the proposed rights offering at this time, and asked that all fees paid to the SEC in connection with the filing of the registration of the proposed rights offering "be credited for future use by the Company."

The Latest Financial Statement
On May 8, 2014, Imperial filed with the SEC the 10-Q report for the quarter ended March 31, 2014, filed an 8-K report, and issued a press release. As of March 31, the company owned 601 policies with a total face value of $2.9 billion and a total estimated fair value of $315.5 million. In estimating fair value, the company blended the results of life expectancy reports from AVS Underwriting and 21st Services.

Of the 601 policies, 558 were previously premium financed, and 19 were issued by two companies with below-investment-grade financial strength ratings. Of the $2.9 billion of face value, 20.6 percent was issued by Lincoln National Life, 20.5 percent by Transamerica Occidental Life, and 11.2 percent by AXA Equitable Life. Antony Mitchell is Imperial's chief executive officer. In the May 8 press release, he is quoted as saying: "With the recent capital raise behind us, we are focused on sourcing accretive lending and investment opportunities within the life finance space. Our current pipeline looks encouraging and we expect to deploy capital later this year."

General Observations
Prior to the raid on Imperial's Boca Raton headquarters by federal agents in September 2011, the company was known as a major premium finance lender in the creation of STOLI policies. After the company shut down its premium financing business pursuant to the non-prosecution agreement with the USAO, a question was how the company would expand its business. Now it appears the company wants to increase its activities as a secondary market intermediary through the purchase and sale of existing secondary market portfolios, and through loans against existing secondary market portfolios.

Whether Imperial will be successful in the face of what it calls "contractions" in the secondary market, and in what might be called a "game of musical chairs" in that shrinking market, remains to be seen. Also, developments in the SEC and IRS investigations bear watching.

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