No. 123: Surplus Notes—Another Dimension of a Bizarre Financial Instrument

Readers of The Insurance Forum over the years, and readers of chapter 25 of my new book entitled The Insurance Forum: A Memoir, know I take a dim view of surplus notes. Those bizarre financial instruments represent debt, but the insurance company that borrows the money is not required to establish a liability. Thus the amount borrowed is treated as an asset and increases the company's surplus.

Most of the insurance company executives who decide to issue surplus notes, and most of the state insurance regulators who approve the issuance of surplus notes, will be long gone when the debt comes due and has to be repaid. That is just one of the reasons why I call surplus notes a classic example of a WWNBA transaction: We Will Not Be Around.

Another Dimension of Surplus Notes
For several years, Senior Health Insurance Company of Pennsylvania (SHIP) has been running off the long-term care insurance business of a former subsidiary of what at the time was Conseco, Inc. In August 2015, a reader sent me—out of the blue—SHIP's statutory statement as of December 31, 2014. My reader did not say why he sent me the statement, but he may have done so because he was aware of my keen interest in surplus notes.

The statement reflects the recent issuance of a $50 million surplus note. As indicated in the "Notes to Financial Statements," the interest rate on the surplus note is 6 percent, and the maturity date is April 1, 2020. Thus the maturity date is five years away, in contrast to the 20-year or 30-year maturities of most surplus notes. SHIP issued the surplus note to (in other words, borrowed the money from) Beechwood Re Investments, LLC, a unit of Beechwood Bermuda International, Ltd. (Hamilton, Bermuda).

The big surprise was that the surplus note was issued February 19, 2015, seven weeks after the "as of" date of the 2014 statement. The statement, which had to be filed around March 1, 2015, did not show the $50 million surplus note as an asset; instead, the statement showed a $50 million surplus note receivable as an asset, which in turn increased SHIP's surplus by $50 million.

I asked Patrick Carmody, senior vice president and general counsel of SHIP, whether the Pennsylvania Insurance Department had approved the inclusion of the surplus note receivable as an asset in the 2014 statement. Carmody graciously provided a copy of a letter dated February 12, 2015, to Brian Wegner, president and chief executive officer of SHIP, from Stephen Johnson, deputy insurance commissioner in the Pennsylvania Department. Johnson granted SHIP's request to issue the surplus note no later than February 15, 2015. (SHIP missed that date by four days.) Johnson's letter also said:

Additional approval is granted for the transaction to be booked with a December 31, 2014 effective date, in accordance with SSAP 72, paragraph 8. As required by SSAP 72, paragraph 8, the company must submit to the Department evidence that the surplus note receivable was collected in cash prior to filing the company's financial statement as of December 31, 2014. The transaction must also be disclosed as a Type I subsequent event, in accordance with SSAP 9, in the company's financial statement as of December 31, 2014. To the extent any of the surplus note receivable is not collected prior to the filing of the financial statement as of December 31, 2014, it shall be non-admitted.

SSAPs (Statements of Statutory Accounting Principles) are promulgated by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC). I wondered about the exact language of the two SSAPs referred to in the Johnson letter. Here is paragraph 8 of SSAP No. 72:

Notes or other receivables received as additional capital contributions satisfied by receipt of cash or readily marketable securities prior to the filing of the statutory financial statement shall be treated as a Type I subsequent event in accordance with SSAP No. 9 and as such shall be considered an admitted asset based on the evidence of collection and approval of the domiciliary commissioner. To the extent that the notes or other receivables are not satisfied, they shall be nonadmitted.

Paragraph 3 of SSAP No. 9 says "material subsequent events" are either Type I "recognized subsequent events" or Type II "nonrecognized subsequent events." Here are the definitions:

Type I: Events or transactions that provide additional evidence with respect to conditions that existed at the date of the balance sheet, including the estimates inherent in the process of preparing financial statements.

Type II: Events or transactions that provide evidence with respect to conditions that did not exist at the balance sheet date but arose after that date.

SHIP's Explanation of the Problem
SHIP's 2014 statement shows a net loss of $56 million in 2014, compared with a $3 million net loss in 2013. When I asked Carmody for the Department's letter, I also inquired about the primary drivers of the relatively large net loss in 2014. The response, from a senior paralegal writing on behalf of Carmody, is somewhat technical. However, I show it here for those readers who will understand it:

2014 results were impacted by reserves [sic] changes in the Company's "TLI" book of business. Actual-to-Expected ratios did not decline as much as expected and reserves were adjusted accordingly. Those ratios are showing signs of declining in 2015. Financial projections continue to show lifetime solvency, therefore the Company is continuing to refrain from seeking rate increases; its mission is to serve the interests of the policyholders, not to accumulate surplus.

SHIP's Risk-Based Capital
SHIP's risk-based capital (RBC) numbers show what may have prompted the issuance of the surplus note. Here is the relationship between each RBC "level" and company action level: company action level is 100 percent, regulatory action level is 75 percent, authorized control level is 50 percent, and mandatory control level is 35 percent.

SHIP's total adjusted capital as shown in the 2014 statement, which was filed around March 1, 2015, was $118 million. Its company action level was $109 million. Therefore SHIP's RBC ratio was 108 percent ($118 million divided by $109 million, with the quotient expressed as a percentage), and was slightly above company action level of 100 percent.

Consider the situation, however, without the $50 million capital contribution that resulted from showing the surplus note receivable as an asset. SHIP's total adjusted capital would have been $68 million ($118 million minus $50 million). Therefore SHIP's RBC ratio would have been 62 percent ($68 million divided by $109 million, with the quotient expressed as a percentage). Thus SHIP's RBC ratio would have been below regulatory action level of 75 percent but above authorized control level of 50 percent.

General Observations
It is likely that SHIP discovered—while preparing its 2014 statement early in 2015—that its RBC ratio was below regulatory action level. That normally would trigger a regulatory investigation. To avoid such an investigation, SHIP needed what was in essence a backdated contribution to its total adjusted capital to improve its RBC ratio.

It is also likely that SHIP discussed the matter with the Pennsylvania Department immediately upon discovering the problem. The Department may have suggested the idea of issuing a surplus note and showing the "surplus note receivable" as an asset. An alternative would have been for Beechwood to backdate the surplus note to December 31, 2014. However, it is possible that state insurance regulators prefer an "in essence" backdated capital contribution rather than a truly backdated capital contribution. I dislike backdating in any form, because it falsely portrays a company's year-end financial condition.

When this item is posted, I will send it to the NAIC and ask the following questions. (1) Do you agree with me that a backdated capital contribution falsely portrays the financial condition of a company as of the statement date? If you disagree with me, please explain. (2) When did you begin allowing backdated capital contributions (the two SSAPs discussed here were effective January 1, 2001)? (3) Why do you allow backdated capital contributions? (4) Are banks and other regulated financial institutions allowed to accept backdated capital contributions? Also, I will tell the NAIC that I will report its responses in a future blog post.

Available Material
For readers who want to see the relevant items in SHIP's 2014 annual statement, I am offering a complimentary 51-page PDF of the statement. E-mail jmbelth@gmail.com and ask for SHIP's 2014 statement. The relevant items are the sworn statement at the bottom of page 1, lines 25 and 2501 on page 2, line 32 on page 3, lines 35 and 48 on page 4, paragraph 13(11) on page 19.12 (page 30 of the PDF), and lines 30 and 31 on page 22 (page 45 of the PDF).

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No. 122: Risk-Based Capital—A Classic Example of the Perennial Confusion over the Denominator of the Ratio

On October 13, 2015, MetLife, Inc. (NYSE:MET) filed an 8-K (material event) report with the Securities and Exchange Commission. The report provides a classic example of the perennial confusion over the denominator used in calculating risk-based capital (RBC) ratios.

The Nature of the Confusion
An RBC ratio is a comparison of two numbers. The numerator of the ratio is "total adjusted capital" (TAC), which is the company's net worth with a few adjustments. The denominator of the ratio, in theory, could be any of the several RBC "levels." However, companies invariably use either "company action level" (CAL) or "authorized control level" (ACL). CAL is exactly twice ACL.

The responsibility for the confusion rests with the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, which made a politically motivated change when the RBC system was adopted in the early 1990s. I discussed the problem on pages 308-310 in my recently published book, The Insurance Forum: A Memoir. I concluded the discussion there by saying that one thing is certain: whenever an RBC ratio is mentioned, it is essential to indicate what RBC level was used as the denominator.

The Language in the 8-K Report
In the recent 8-K report, MetLife said its "Combined RBC Ratio" at the end of 2014 was 398 percent "instead of in excess of 400% as previously reported in the 2014 10-K and 410% as previously communicated on the Company's first quarter 2015 earnings call." I do not know what was said on the earnings call, but the recent 8-K report did not say what denominator was used in calculating the combined RBC ratio.

To find out, I reviewed MetLife's 10-K report for the year ended December 31, 2014. I found the answer buried on page 299 of the 361-page 10-K report. The denominator was CAL.

The Language in the 10-K Report
One paragraph in the 10-K report explains the RBC system. It is necessary to read the entire paragraph carefully to learn that CAL was the denominator used in the combined RBC ratios mentioned in the recent 8-K report. Here is the full paragraph:

The states of domicile of MetLife, Inc.'s U.S. insurance subsidiaries imposes [sic] risk-based capital ("RBC") requirements that were developed by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners ("NAIC"). American Life does not write business in Delaware or any other domestic state and, as such, is exempt from RBC requirements by Delaware law. Regulatory compliance is determined by a ratio of a company's total adjusted capital, calculated in the manner prescribed by the NAIC ("TAC") to its authorized control level RBC, calculated in the manner prescribed by the NAIC ("ACL RBC"). Companies below specific trigger levels or ratios are classified by their respective levels, each of which requires specified corrective action. The minimum level of TAC before corrective action commences is twice ACL RBC ("Company Action RBC"). While not required by or filed with insurance regulators, the Company also calculates an internally defined combined RBC ratio ("Combined RBC Ratio"), which is determined by dividing the sum of TAC for MetLife, Inc.'s principal U.S. insurance subsidiaries excluding American Life, by the sum of Company Action RBC for such subsidiaries. The Company's Combined RBC Ratio was in excess of 400% for all periods presented. In addition, all non-exempted U.S. insurance subsidiaries individually exceeded Company Action RBC for all periods presented.

An Omission from the 10-K
MetLife did not disclose in the 2014 10-K report the CAL RBC ratios for its principal U.S. insurance subsidiaries. To calculate the figures, it is necessary to obtain—from the statutory annual statement for each subsidiary—TAC and ACL, multiply ACL by two to determine CAL, divide TAC by CAL, and express the quotient as a percentage.

Although the combined CAL RBC ratio was 398 percent, according to the recent 8-K report, there may be a wide range of CAL RBC ratios among MetLife's principal U.S. subsidiaries. To get an inkling of the range, I reviewed the year-end 2014 statutory annual statements of three subsidiaries. Here are the TAC, CAL, and CAL RBC ratios:

Company	TAC	CAL	Ratio
	(in millions)	(in millions)	(%)
	---------------	---------------	-------
MetLife Ins Co USA	$6,710	$1,527	439
Metropolitan Life Ins Co	17,367	4,576	380
Metropolitan Tower Life Ins Co	836	230	363
	----------	---------	-------
Three Companies Combined	$24,913	$6,333	393

The CAL RBC ratios for the three subsidiaries are all comfortably in the adequate zone; that is, they are all well above the CAL RBC ratio of 125 percent, which is the "red flag level." Thus no type of corrective action is necessary.

Also, as indicated in the table above, I calculated the combined CAL RBC ratio for the three subsidiaries, using the methodology described in the quoted paragraph from the 2014 10-K report. The combined CAL RBC ratio for the three subsidiaries is 393 percent, which is close to the 398 percent combined CAL RBC ratio cited in the recent 8-K report for all the principal U.S. subsidiaries of MetLife other than American Life.

Availability of My New Book
Ordering information for The Insurance Forum: A Memoir is available at www.theinsuranceforum.com. The book is also available from Amazon.

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Email: jmbelth@gmail.com

Blog: www.josephmbelth.com

No. 121: Cost-of-Insurance Increases in the News

In 2003 I wrote extensively in The Insurance Forum about cost-of-insurance (COI) increases imposed by an operating subsidiary of Conseco, Inc. on owners of certain policies Conseco had acquired from other companies. Later I wrote extensively in the Forum and on my blog about COI increases imposed by operating subsidiaries of The Phoenix Companies, Inc. on owners of certain policies involved in stranger-originated life insurance (STOLI) transactions. Recently COI increases appear to be spreading among other companies.

Conseco's COI Increases
The Conseco story began in 1992, when Massachusetts General Life Insurance Company and Philadelphia Life Insurance Company imposed COI increases on certain universal life policies. A policyholder sued the companies alleging they had breached their contracts. A federal judge ruled the companies had breached their contracts, the case was converted to a class action, the class was certified, the case was settled, and the companies rolled back the COI increases. Conseco acquired Massachusetts General and Philadelphia Life in the late 1990s. The unanswered question is whether Conseco officials were aware that the policies they acquired had been significantly underpriced for sales purposes and were a disaster waiting to happen.

In 2003 Conseco launched an assault on its policyholders by imposing sharp COI increases. One example: the COI on a $1,000,000 policy issued in 1988 to a man aged 52 increased from $373.78 per month to $1,484.05 per month. Another example: the COI on a $250,000 policy issued in 1987 to a man aged 56 increased from $26.65 per month to $349.81 per month. Litigation ensued. Eventually the cases were settled, and the policyholders were awarded substantial benefits.

My most extensive material on Conseco's COI increases appeared in the 16-page December 2003 issue of the Forum. The issue was devoted in its entirety to the Conseco story.

Phoenix's COI Increases
In 2010 Phoenix imposed substantial COI increases on the owners of policies of the type used in STOLI transactions. The New York Department of Insurance received complaints and, after an investigation, ordered Phoenix to rescind the COI increases—but only for New York policyholders. Phoenix complied.

In 2011 Phoenix imposed new increases on New York policyholders, and the Department did not object. Meanwhile, insurance regulators in California and Wisconsin ordered Phoenix to rescind the 2010 increases, but Phoenix refused to comply. California dropped the matter, but Wisconsin began legal proceedings that are yet to be finally resolved.

Phoenix was also the target of several lawsuits relating to the COI increases. In May 2015 Phoenix moved to settle two long-standing class action lawsuits just before the trial. The settlement was later approved by the court, and has been completed. Also, Phoenix is in the process of settling some of the other cases.

My major articles in the Forum about Phoenix's COI increases are in the October 2012, December 2012, and November 2013 issues. My three blog posts about Phoenix's COI increases are No. 9 (November 21, 2013), No. 26 (January 29, 2014), and No. 103 (June 15, 2015).

COI Increases at Other Companies
Recently I have learned of announcements by several other companies who are imposing COI increases. The announcements are vague about the magnitude of the increases, and about the reasons for the increases. However, it appears at least some increases will be substantial, and at least some increases are caused by increased prices of reinsurance or low market interest rates. Furthermore, it appears at least some increases apply to policies of $1 million or more issued at ages 70 and above. Among the companies imposing COI increases are AXA Equitable Life, Banner Life, Security Life of Denver, Transamerica Life, and William Penn Life.

Nassau's Acquisition of Phoenix
On September 29, 2015, Phoenix announced it was being acquired by Nassau Reinsurance Group Holdings L.P. for $37.50 per share, or an aggregate of $217.2 million. The purchase price represents a 188 percent premium over Phoenix's closing stock price of $13.03 on September 28. Nassau is backed by Golden Gate Capital, a private investment firm. After completion of the acquisition—expected by early 2016—Nassau will contribute $100 million of new capital into Phoenix, which will be a privately held, wholly owned subsidiary of Nassau.

General Observations
I mention Nassau's acquisition of Phoenix here because I think there is a connection between that development and the settlements of the lawsuits against Phoenix relating to the COI increases. The most important settlement, which I discussed in No. 103, occurred almost literally on the courthouse steps just before the trial was to begin. Phoenix had been fighting those lawsuits for years, and also had been fighting to keep confidential many of the documents filed in court in those cases. A few of those documents, however, have been unsealed, as discussed in No. 26. I think Nassau probably had no interest in acquiring a company bogged down in litigation over COI increases.

Available Material
I am offering a complimentary five-page PDF containing the Phoenix press release. E-mail jmbelth@gmail.com and ask for the Phoenix press release dated September 29, 2015. Ordering information for back issues of the Forum is available at www.theinsuranceforum.com.

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No. 120: The Federal Insurance Office Expresses Concern about Principles-Based Reserving and Captive Reinsurance Transactions

In September 2015, the Federal Insurance Office (FIO) of the U.S. Department of the Treasury issued its Annual Report on the Insurance Industry. The FIO expresses concern about principles-based reserving (PBR) and the related subject of captive reinsurance (sometimes called "shadow insurance"). Here are three excerpts from the Report:

• Wholesale adoption of PBR continues to raise concerns, including potential overreliance on an insurer's internal modeling and a shortage of resources and expertise on state insurance regulatory staffs.
• State insurance regulators are developing a framework for consistent standards for reinsurance captives that would allow lower-quality assets to support the so-called "redundant reserves" relating to term life and universal life with secondary guarantee products. The Report outlines FIO's concerns about the scope and yet-to-be-determined specific details of the framework, including that reinsurance captives will continue to be established in states competing to serve in that capacity.
• While disclosure requirements of life insurers pertaining to cessions of reinsurance captives of reserves related to term and universal life with secondary guarantee products has improved, state insurance regulators do not require public disclosure of the financial statements of reinsurance captives.

The Report is in the form of a 105-page PDF. The first two excerpts above are on page 15 of the PDF, and the third is on page 67. The full discussions of PBR and captive reinsurance are on pages 65-68.

Presumably the discussions of PBR and captive reinsurance are of great interest to members of the American Council of Life Insurers and members of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners. However, I am not aware of any comments on those topics, or about the Report generally, from either of those organizations.

General Observations

I agree with the first excerpt above. I believe that adequate staffing in state insurance departments to handle PBR is not possible.

I also agree with the second excerpt above. The way it is worded in the Report is a polite way of describing what has become a race to the bottom in terms of the rigor of state regulation of insurance companies.

I agree with the third excerpt as far as it goes. However, it is not merely the lack of a requirement for public disclosure of the financial statements of reinsurance captives that concerns me. Rather, I am concerned about the lack of a requirement for public disclosure of the details of the phony assets carried by reinsurance captives. Among those assets are parental guarantees, contingent notes, credit linked notes, variable funding notes, note guarantees, and letters of credit.

If there were rigorous disclosure of the details of those assets, I think regulators would be so embarrassed that they would not approve such assets. Indeed, I think promoters would not even try to get such assets approved. As I have said previously, captive reinsurance is a shell game, and no shell game can survive disclosure.

Available Material

I am offering a complimentary 105-page PDF containing the 2015 Report of the FIO. E-mail jmbelth@gmail.com and ask for the FIO Report issued in September 2015.

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Email: jmbelth@gmail.com

Blog: www.josephmbelth.com

No. 119: Robert D. May, CLU—A Memorial Tribute

Robert D. May, CLU, 1994

Robert D. May, CLU, of Bloomington, Indiana, died June 30, 2015, at age 88. Bob was in the life insurance business for more than 50 years and retired several years ago. When I met him in the 1960s, he was an agent for Acacia Mutual Life Insurance Company. His favorite life motto was a quote that has been attributed to Theodore Roosevelt: "People don't care how much you know until they know how much you care."

I became acquainted with Bob shortly after I arrived in Bloomington. The School of Business at Indiana University did not offer preparatory courses for examinations leading to the Chartered Life Underwriter (CLU) designation. However, when the Bloomington chapter of what was then the National Association of Life Underwriters asked me to conduct an off-campus class for aspiring CLUs, I agreed to do so. Bob was in my first group of about ten agents who enrolled in the class, and he was the first of the group to receive the CLU designation. He and I became good friends.

One of Bob's favorite stories involved Elvis J. Stahr, Jr., who served as president of Indiana University from 1962 to 1968. (I always felt an affinity for Stahr because he and I joined Indiana University effective the same day—July 1, 1962.) Bob said he received a telephone call from Stahr out of the blue. Stahr had been invited to join Acacia's board of directors. According to the company's rules, however, a board member had to be an Acacia policyholder. So Stahr had to buy an Acacia policy right away. Knowing Bob, I am sure he did not allow Stahr to buy the smallest possible policy.

When I launched The Insurance Forum at the end of 1973, Bob subscribed immediately, and he remained a subscriber continuously until I closed down the Forum at the end of 2013. A close friend of mine in Bloomington was the first subscriber, and Bob was the second. When my first subscriber died several years later, Bob became my oldest living subscriber in terms of the length of his subscription. Bob often told me he was proud of that distinction.

The last time I saw Bob was on June 9, 2014, when he attended a celebration in Bloomington organized by three academic friends of mine to commemorate the 40 years of The Insurance Forum. It is regrettable that Bob did not live to see The Insurance Forum: A Memoir. I mentioned publication of the book in No. 118, which was posted on September 28, 2015. Bob was a wonderful human being and a dear friend.

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No. 118: My Memoir about The Insurance Forum Is Now Available

When I ended publication of The Insurance Forum at the end of 2013, I said one reason was my desire to write a memoir about my 40-year experiment in insurance journalism. The 379-page cloth bound book, entitled The Insurance Forum: A Memoir, is now available.

The book has five appendixes, a glossary, and an index. The book also has a foreword by Professors Travis Pritchett of the University of South Carolina, Joan Schmit of the University of Wisconsin—Madison, and Harold Skipper of Georgia State University. They call the book "an immensely enjoyable memoir" and "a compelling 'must read' for industry insiders, insurance regulators, reporters, lawmakers, and any others considering insurance issues."

My thanks to those who supported the Forum over the years. I am also grateful to those who submitted ideas and articles.

Information about how to obtain the book may be found at our website (www.theinsuranceforum.com). Here are the chapter titles:

1. Introduction
2. The Pre-Indiana Years: 1929-1962
3. The Indiana Years: 1962-2015
4. The Policy Replacement Problem
5. The A. L. Williams Replacement Empire
6. Life Insurance Prices and Rates of Return
7. The Collapse of Executive Life
8. Fractional (Modal) Premium Charges
9. The Secondary Market for Life Insurance
10. Universal Life Insurance
11. The Military-Insurance Interlock
12. Distortion of Important Policy Provisions
13. Deceptive Sales Practices
14. Professional Codes of Ethics
15. Credit Life Insurance
16. Disability Insurance
17. Medical Insurance
18. Long-Term Care Insurance
19. The Annuity Business
20. The Secondary Markets for Annuities
21. Charitable Gift Annuities
22. Financial Strength Ratings
23. Transfers of Policies between Companies
24. Compensation of Insurance Executives
25. Surplus Notes
26. The Demutualization Wave
27. Life Insurance Policy Dividends
28. Agents' Contracts with Insurance Companies
29. The Insurance Regulators
30. The Insurance Regulatory Information System
31. Risk-Based Capital
32. Conclusion

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No. 117: Life Partners—A New Dimension of the Bankruptcy Case

Life Partners Holdings, Inc. (LPHI), together with its operating subsidiaries, was an intermediary in the secondary market for life insurance. On January 20, 2015, LPHI (Waco, TX) filed for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11 of the federal bankruptcy law. The case was assigned to U.S. Bankruptcy Court Judge Russell F. Nelms. On March 13, 2015, the U.S. Trustee appointed H. Thomas Moran II the Chapter 11 Trustee in the LPHI case, and Judge Nelms affirmed the appointment six days later. (See In re LPHI, U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Northern District of Texas, Case No. 15-40289.)

I wrote extensively about LPHI in The Insurance Forum, and later I posted numerous blog items before and after the bankruptcy filing. Here I discuss a new dimension of the LPHI bankruptcy case. On September 11, 2015, Trustee Moran filed a 52-page complaint against Brian D. Pardo, the former chief executive officer of LPHI. (See Moran v. Pardo, U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Northern District of Texas, Case No. 15-04079.)

The Adversary Proceeding
Trustee Moran's complaint is called an "adversary proceeding," which is a lawsuit filed within a bankruptcy case and assigned its own case number in the bankruptcy court. In this instance, a major purpose of the adversary proceeding is to recover, for the benefit of the bankruptcy estate, property that Trustee Moran alleges was fraudulently transferred to Pardo prior to the bankruptcy filing.

The cover sheet of the complaint mentions a "demand" of $41 million. That figure appears at two places in the complaint, but other figures also appear. Therefore, I asked Trustee Moran to clarify what the figure represents. In response he said:

The $41 million is the total of salaries, bonuses, and other compensation ($5.8 million), dividends ($34 million or more), and other personal remuneration.

Trustee Moran is represented by three attorneys in the Dallas firm of Thompson & Knight LLP. Pardo is representing himself.

Trustee Moran's Complaint
The introductory section of Trustee Moran's complaint briefly describes the "scheme to defraud" and the "marketing of fraudulent life expectancy estimates." The factual background section contains three subsections, one of which is a subsection about such matters as purposeful reduction of life expectancies to lure investors and inflate profits, transfers to an insider company, failure to disclose policy lapses, exorbitant and undisclosed commissions and fees, and monies paid to Pardo.

The complaint contains 12 counts: two counts of actual fraudulent transfer, two counts of constructive fraudulent transfer, and one count each of preferences, fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, sham to perpetrate a fraud, unjust enrichment, disallowance of Pardo's claims, violation of the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970, and equitable subordination. Trustee Moran also seeks attorneys' fees.

General Observations
Trustee Moran's complaint contains an elaborate discussion of the arbitrage involving two life expectancy estimates. One estimate, on which Life Partners relied in deciding what it would pay to acquire a policy, was based on a realistic estimate provided by one of the prominent firms that provide life expectancy estimates. The second estimate, invariably much shorter, was used in pricing fractional interests sold to investors. The shorter estimates were provided to Life Partners by Donald T. Cassidy, MD (Reno, NV), an internal medicine practitioner with no experience or training in the preparation of life expectancy estimates.

Trustee Moran's complaint relies heavily on a declaration he filed in the bankruptcy case on May 20. I described the declaration in No. 102 posted May 26, and offered the declaration to readers at the time. However, the recent complaint goes beyond the declaration in some respects, and I think it is stronger than the declaration.

In an adversary proceeding, trial is set routinely at the time of filing. On September 14, the bankruptcy court clerk set the trial for March 2016 before Judge Nelms. Under federal bankruptcy rules, the parties are to confer within 30 days, consider the claims and defenses, consider the possibilities for a prompt settlement, and submit a proposed schedule. In the absence of a settlement, a brief bench trial to resolve the complaint seems likely.

Available Material
I am offering a complimentary 52-page PDF containing Trustee Moran's complaint. E-mail jmbelth@gmail.com and ask for Trustee Moran's September 11 complaint against Pardo.

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No. 116: Voting Rights—An Important New Book about the Ongoing Battle for the Franchise in the United States

Ari Berman is a political correspondent for The Nation. He is the author of an important 2015 book about the long and arduous political and legal battle for the franchise in our country. The book is entitled Give Us the Ballot: The Modern Struggle for Voting Rights in America.

Selma and the 1965 Voting Rights Act (VRA)
The book begins with "Bloody Sunday" in Selma, Alabama, and President Lyndon Johnson's introduction of a voting rights bill eight days later. Johnson already had achieved passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and had defeated Barry Goldwater decisively in November 1964. When Johnson signed the Voting Rights Act (VRA) in August 1965, it became one of the crown jewels of his "Great Society," along with the Civil Rights Act and Medicare. The purpose of the VRA was to prevent racial discrimination in the voting process and thereby enforce the 14th and 15th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.

Many were surprised by Johnson's actions because they differed so sharply from many of his previous actions in Congress. For example, Berman notes that Johnson's first vote as a freshman member of the U.S. House of Representatives in 1937 was against an anti-lynching bill.

Berman describes Johnson's famous speech—later known as the "We Shall Overcome Speech"—announcing introduction of the voting rights bill. Johnson delivered the speech to a joint session of Congress in March 1965; it was the first joint session in 19 years.

Early Efforts to Undermine the VRA
Berman describes early efforts to undermine the VRA. They were unsuccessful in part because of the U.S. Supreme Court headed by Chief Justice Earl Warren (an Eisenhower appointee). In 1966, for example, in an 8 to 1 decision, the Warren court upheld the constitutionality of the VRA in the case of South Carolina v. Katzenbach. (In 1954, in a 9 to 0 decision, the Warren Court had ordered desegregation of public schools in the landmark case of Brown v. Board of Education.)

Developments in 1968
Berman describes some major events in 1968. Among them were Johnson's decision not to seek re-election, the assassinations of Martin Luther King, Jr. and Robert Kennedy, Richard Nixon's "Southern Strategy," Nixon's election, and the appointment of Attorney General John Mitchell to head the U.S. Department of Justice, whose Civil Rights Division was charged with enforcing the VRA.

Developments in 1976
Berman describes some major events in 1976. Barbara Jordan of Texas in 1972 had become the first black woman elected to Congress from the South. In July 1976 she became the first black politician to keynote the Democratic National Convention. That event occurred 28 years before an Illinois state senator named Barack Obama keynoted the convention.

Jimmy Carter was elected in 1976, and he owed the election to black voters. Ironically, the state that put him over the top in that tight election was Mississippi, where blacks delivered a third of Carter's total and gave Carter the state by 11,537 votes. Nationally, Carter narrowly lost the white vote, but won 92 percent of about 6.6 million black votes.

Obama's Election in 2008
The election of Barack Obama in 2008 was a wake-up call for VRA opponents. Berman describes the voter identification laws and other laws enacted in various states to restrict voting rights. Also, by then the U.S. Supreme Court had moved sharply to the right with the appointments of Justice Antonin Scalia (a Reagan appointee), Justice Clarence Thomas (a George H. W. Bush appointee), Chief Justice John Roberts (a George W. Bush appointee), and Justice Samuel Alito (a George W. Bush appointee).

The Veasey Lawsuit
Berman describes a major lawsuit that grew out of the enactment of Texas Senate Bill 14 (SB 14) in 2011. It placed important restrictions on the ability of many Texans to vote, especially Hispanics, African-Americans, and the poor. In June 2013 several individuals and organizations filed a lawsuit seeking to prevent implementation of SB 14.

The lead plaintiff was Marc Veasey, then a member of the Texas House of Representatives and now a member of the U.S. House of Representatives. Among the organizations was the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice. The lead defendant was Rick Perry in his official capacity as Texas governor; Greg Abbott became the Texas governor in 2015 and succeeded Perry. (See Veasey v. Perry, U.S. District Court, Southern District of Texas, Case No. 2:13-cv-193.)

The case was assigned to District Judge Nelva Gonzales Ramos (an Obama appointee). She conducted a nine-day bench trial. On October 9, 2014, she issued a 147-page opinion. She entered a permanent and final injunction against enforcement of the voter identification provisions of SB 14. The seven major sections of the opinion are Texas's history with respect to racial disparity in voting rights, the status quo before SB 14 was enacted, the Texas photo identification law, the method and result of passing SB 14, challenges to photo ID laws, discussion, and the remedy. Berman referred to the Ramos opinion as "searing." Here are its three opening paragraphs:

The right to vote: It defines our nation as a democracy. It is the key to what Abraham Lincoln so famously extolled as a "government of the people, by the people, [and] for the people." The Supreme Court of the United States, placing the power of the right to vote in context, explained [in 1964]: "Especially since the right to exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights, any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized."

In this lawsuit, the Court consolidated four actions challenging Texas Senate Bill 14 (SB 14), which was signed into law on May 27, 2011. The Plaintiffs and Intervenors (collectively "Plaintiffs") claim that SB 14, which requires voters to display one of a very limited number of qualified photo identifications (IDs) to vote, creates a substantial burden on the fundamental right to vote, has a discriminatory effect and purpose, and constitutes a poll tax. Defendants contend that SB 14 is an appropriate measure to combat voter fraud, and that it does not burden the right to vote, but rather improves public confidence in elections and, consequently, increases participation.

The case proceeded to a bench trial, which concluded on September 22, 2014. Pursuant to [Section 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure], after hearing and carefully considering all the evidence, the Court issues this Opinion as its findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Court holds that SB 14 creates an unconstitutional burden on the right to vote, has an impermissible discriminatory effect against Hispanics and African-Americans, and was imposed with an unconstitutional discriminatory purpose. The Court further holds that SB 14 constitutes an unconstitutional poll tax.

The Appeals
The defendants appealed to the Fifth Circuit to stay the injunction. On October 14, 2014, a Fifth Circuit panel granted the stay primarily because the injunction was imposed less than a month before the 2014 election. The 12-page judgment was written by Judge Edith Brown Clement (a George W. Bush appointee), and a one-page concurrence was written by Judge Gregg Costa (an Obama appointee). Judge Catharina Haynes (a George W. Bush appointee) also concurred. (See Veasey v. Perry, U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, No. 14-41127.)

The plaintiffs appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court to vacate the stay. On October 18, 2014, without explanation, the Supreme Court denied the appeal. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg (a Clinton appointee) wrote a seven-page dissent. Justice Elena Kagan (an Obama appointee) and Justice Sonia Sotomayor (an Obama appointee) concurred in the dissent. (See Veasey v. Perry, U.S. Supreme Court, No. 14A393.)

In August 2015 a partly different Fifth Circuit panel issued a 53-page judgment written by Judge Haynes of the previous panel. She vacated and remanded the plaintiffs' discriminatory purpose claim for further consideration; she affirmed the district court's finding that SB 14 has a discriminatory effect in violation of the VRA, and remanded for consideration of the proper remedy; she vacated the district court's holding that SB 14 is a poll tax; she vacated the district court's finding that SB 14 unconstitutionally burdens the right to vote; and therefore she dismissed the plaintiffs' constitutional claims. Chief Judge Carl E. Stewart (a Clinton appointee) concurred. District Judge Nannette Jolivette Brown of the Eastern District of Louisiana (an Obama appointee), sitting by designation, also concurred. (See Veasey v. Abbott, U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, No. 14-41127.)

General Observations
Immigrants, African-Americans, Hispanics, young people, and low-income people tend to vote Democratic, and large voter turnouts favor Democratic candidates. The objective of efforts to undermine the VRA is to shrink the size of the electorate so as to favor Republican candidates. Opponents of the VRA have not produced evidence to support any of their arguments, such as the need to protect against voter fraud. The Berman book is required reading for those interested in the subject of voting rights. The Ramos opinion is also required reading.

Available Material
I am offering a complimentary 220-page PDF consisting of the 147-page October 2014 Ramos opinion, the 13-page October 2014 Fifth Circuit ruling, the 7-page Ginsburg dissent to the October 2014 U.S. Supreme Court ruling, and the 53-page August 2015 Fifth Circuit ruling. E-mail jmbelth@gmail.com and ask for the package relating to the Veasey case.

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No. 115: Annuity Factoring Companies in the Crosshairs

The August 2011 and October 2011 issues of The Insurance Forum contain major articles critical of factoring companies that pay cash to annuitants and in exchange receive the annuitants' annuity payments. The articles generated almost no feedback. I thought perhaps I was whistling in the wind, but a recent lawsuit causes me to think otherwise.

The CFPB/DFS Complaint
On August 20, 2015, the federal Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) and the acting superintendent of the New York State Department of Financial Services (DFS) filed a lawsuit against two annuity factoring companies and three individuals. The plaintiffs are represented by several CFPB attorneys and an assistant attorney general of New York. The case was assigned to U.S. District Judge Josephine L. Staton and Magistrate Judge Jay C. Gandhi. (See CFPB v. Pension Funding, U.S. District Court, Central District of California, Case No. 8:15-cv-1329.)

Defendants Pension Funding LLC and Pension Income LLC are related companies that extend consumer credit, service consumer loans, and transmit money in connection with their loan business. They are at the same address in Huntington Beach, California. Steven Covey, Edwin Lichtig, and Rex Hofelter are associated with the defendants, which together are a successor to Structured Investments Co. LLC. The latter company was mentioned in my October 2011 article. Here is a lightly edited version of some of the allegations in the complaint:

• Defendants said they transacted pension buyouts and advanced the cash when needed. They said a pension buyout was not a pension loan but rather was a pension lump sum.
• Defendants denied their product was a loan, and they did not disclose fees or interest rates.
• Defendants claimed the cost to consumers could be as little as 13 percent and contrasted their product with credit cards charging 18 to 24 percent or more per year in compound interest.
• Defendants said their product was not a loan and there was no interest rate.
• Defendants said that there was no interest because their program was not a loan, and that their "range" was a cost of money rate or a discount rate.
• Defendants compared the discount rate to a typical mortgage and claimed participants paid approximately the same or less than credit card rates and not the highest rates.
• The complaint says that the transactions on average had an effective annual interest rate of 28.56 percent, and that the transactions with New York consumers consistently had nominal annual interest rates in excess of both the New York civil usury cap of 16 percent and the New York criminal usury cap of 25 percent.

The seven counts in the complaint are unfair acts or practices in violation of the federal Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010 (CFPA), deceptive acts or practices in violation of CFPA, abusive acts or practices in violation of CFPA, usury, false and misleading advertising of loans, intentional misrepresentation of a material fact regarding a financial product, and unlicensed money transmitting. The plaintiffs seek injunctive relief, damages, redress to harmed consumers, disgorgement, civil monetary penalties, and costs.

General Observations
In my 2011 articles, I deplored the lack of disclosure of vital information to the annuitant, especially what I called the "crucial disclosure" of the annual interest rate or annual percentage rate associated with the transaction. I also mentioned the absurd argument that paying cash to an annuitant in exchange for receiving the annuitant's annuity payments does not constitute a loan to the annuitant. As shown above, the defendants said such a transaction was not a loan and there was no interest, but also mentioned interest and understated the interest rate.

Available Material
I am offering a complimentary 29-page PDF consisting of the 24-page CFPB/DFS complaint, my three-page August 2011 article, and my two-page October 2011 article. Send an e-mail to jmbelth@gmail.com and ask for the package relating to the CFPB/DFS lawsuit against two annuity factoring companies.

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No. 114: AIG's War Against Coventry and the Buergers Goes to Trial

In No. 67 (posted September 16, 2014) entitled "AIG Declares War against Coventry and the Buergers," I discussed a lawsuit by Lavastone Capital, a unit of American International Group (AIG), against Coventry First (Fort Washington, PA), an intermediary in the secondary market for life insurance. In that posting, I offered the 151-page text of the Lavastone complaint. Here I summarize the complaint briefly and mention some subsequent developments. (See Lavastone v. Coventry, U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York, Case No. 1:14-cv-7139.)

The Complaint
Lavastone filed its complaint on September 5, 2014. The defendants were Coventry; four firms affiliated with Coventry (including the "LST Entities"); Alan Buerger, chief executive officer of Coventry; Constance Buerger, wife of Alan Buerger; Reid Buerger, son of Alan Buerger; and Krista Buerger, wife of Reid Buerger. The case was assigned to U.S. District Judge Jed S. Rakoff.

Over a period of more than ten years, Coventry became a major player in the secondary market by acquiring thousands of policies and passing them along to Lavastone pursuant to the parties' agreements. In its complaint Lavastone made 13 claims and sought, among other items, compensatory damages, punitive damages, treble damages, injunctive relief, declaratory judgments, disgorgement, attorney fees, and prejudgment interest.

On November 4, 2014, Coventry filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. On February 3, 2015, Judge Rakoff denied the motion. He also dismissed three of Lavastone's claims. The remaining ten claims were violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act, conspiracy to violate RICO, fraud, fraudulent inducement, breach of contract, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, negligent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty, and unjust enrichment.

Recently Filed Documents
On May 18, 2015, Lavastone and Coventry filed cross motions for summary judgment. On the same day, Constance Buerger filed a separate motion for summary judgment.

On July 10, Judge Rakoff issued an Order, and on July 30 he issued a Memorandum explaining the reasoning behind the Order. He granted Lavastone's motion for summary judgment relating to breach of contract, but left for trial the matter of damages. He also said there were several other matters that needed to be resolved at trial. He denied Coventry's motion for summary judgment, granted Constance Buerger's motion for summary judgment, and dismissed her from the case.

On August 13, Coventry filed a motion for clarification, or, in the alternative, reconsideration, of Judge Rakoff's July 10 Order and July 30 Memorandum. Judge Rakoff denied the motion.

On August 20, Lavastone and Coventry jointly filed a Pretrial Consent Order. The document includes, among other things, a joint overview of the case, statements of the parties' claims and defenses, facts on which the parties agree, the plaintiff's statement of the relief sought, and the names of witnesses the parties intend to call at the trial. Attached to the document are lists of exhibits the parties intend to introduce at the trial. Two amendments to the document were filed later.

The Parties' Statements
The first paragraph below shows, from the Pretrial Consent Order, the plaintiff's statement prepared without input from the defendants. The second paragraph below shows the defendants' statement prepared without input from the plaintiff.

Plaintiff alleges that, over the course of the parties' relationship, Defendants exploited Lavastone's trust and confidence, violated the parties' agreements, and executed a scheme to defraud Lavastone, by, inter alia, systematically misusing Lavastone's proprietary and confidential information, including its maximum purchase price; misrepresenting the underlying purchase price and broker's fees incurred in the acquisition of Life Policies; artificially inflating the price of Life Policies; charging Lavastone for broker's fees that were not actually paid by Defendants to Life Policy brokers; laundering the Life Policies through affiliates to conceal the underlying purchase price; diverting irrevocable beneficiary interests that benefitted the Defendants and diminished the value of the Life Policies; and reselling Life Policies to Lavastone with hidden mark-ups. Defendants induced Lavastone to pay over $150 million in markups and broker's fee overcharges, in addition to the $1 billion in origination, incentive, and other fees Lavastone paid to Coventry First for its expertise and assistance in identifying, negotiating, and acquiring Life Policies in the secondary market. Defendants' conduct violated federal and state law.

Defendants contend that Lavastone's claims and factual allegations are without merit. In particular, Defendants believed that the Origination Agreements permitted Coventry First and the LST Entities to sell Life Policies that were not subject to the exclusivity provisions of the contracts ("nonexclusive Life Policies") to Lavastone at a price greater than acquisition cost, without restriction, and the parties' repeated course of conduct confirmed that belief. Defendants made numerous disclosures to Lavastone of the existence and amount of gains on nonexclusive Life Policy sales, and Lavastone never claimed that such claims breached the contracts or suggested that they were fraudulent. Moreover, Lavastone indicated to Defendants, both by its actions and words, that it and its senior executives believed the contracts permitted these gains on sale. Lavastone—through Defendants' disclosures, its ordinary business activities, and its own formal audits of Coventry First and Lavastone's fiscal agents—knew and approved of Coventry First or its affiliates selling Lavastone nonexclusive Life Policies at prices higher than acquisition cost. Lavastone concedes that Coventry First or its affiliates properly sold Lavastone hundreds of Life Policies at greater than acquisition cost. Similarly, Lavastone approved of Coventry First in certain instances reimbursing broker compensation on an aggregate basis across Life Policy sales, as well as Coventry First's decision to place irrevocable beneficiary interests on certain Life Policies. Lavastone has incurred no damages as a result of any conduct by Defendants.

The Trial
The trial began on August 27. Judge Rakoff is presiding, and there is no jury. The parties estimate that the trial will take 10 to 15 full court days, which probably will translate into a calendar month or more. It is my understanding that the first day consisted of opening statements and some testimony from David Fields, who is the first witness called by Lavastone, that the second day consisted of further testimony by Fields, and that the trial will resume after Labor Day.

General Observations
The Lavastone/Coventry case may be one of the most important in the history of the secondary market for life insurance, and should be followed by persons interested in that market. An eventual result adverse to Coventry could have devastating consequences for the firm, which has long been a major player in the market. I plan to report the results of the trial when Judge Rakoff hands down his decision.

David Fields headed the team that initiated AIG's entry into the secondary market in 2001, despite reservations expressed by Maurice "Hank" Greenberg, then chief executive officer of AIG. That incident is discussed in the August 2005 issue of The Insurance Forum, in an appendix to my article about the lawsuit filed against AIG, Greenberg, and Howard Smith by then New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer and then New York Superintendent of Insurance Howard Mills.

Another possible witness during the trial is Reid Buerger, who repeatedly invoked the Fifth Amendment during an investigation of Coventry by Spitzer. I discussed that incident in the January/February 2007 issue of The Insurance Forum, where I discussed Spitzer's investigation.

Available Material
I am offering a complimentary 55-page PDF consisting of Judge Rakoff's 3-page July 10 Order, his 22-page July 30 Memorandum, and the 30-page Lavastone/Coventry August 20 joint Pretrial Consent Order (not including attachments and amendments). E-mail jmbelth@gmail.com and ask for the July/August 2015 Lavastone/Coventry package.

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Blog: www.josephmbelth.com

No. 113: Consulting Physicians—Their Role in Denying Disability Insurance Claims

In the June 2010 issue of The Insurance Forum, in an article entitled "How a Medical Reviewer Helped Reliance Standard Deny Disability Claims," I described the work of a physician who served as a consultant to an insurance company and helped the company deny many disability insurance claims. A recent Sixth Circuit decision in a disability case prompts me to revisit the subject of consulting physicians who are retained by parties seeking to deny claims, have a conflict of interest because of the compensation they receive from those parties, do not see the claimants, and render their opinions based solely on reviews of medical records.

The Shaw Case

Raymond Shaw, a 39-year-old customer service representative for Michigan Bell, stopped working in August 2009 because of chronic neck pain. He was covered under a disability program (Plan) administered by Sedgwick Claims Management Services, Inc. He received short-term disability benefits for one year, but his application for long-term disability (LTD) benefits was denied. His appeal to the Plan was also denied.

In March 2013 Shaw filed a lawsuit against the Plan alleging that he was wrongly denied LTD benefits. In July 2013 Shaw filed an amended complaint. In September 2013 the Plan answered the amended complaint. In February 2014 both parties filed motions for judgment on the record. In September 2014, the district court granted the Plan's motion and denied Shaw's motion. Two weeks later Shaw filed a notice of appeal. (See Shaw v. AT&T Umbrella Benefit Plan No. 1, U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Michigan, Case No. 5:13-cv-11461.)

On July 29, 2015, a three-judge appellate panel reversed the district court's ruling. The reversal was in an 18-page opinion by Chief Judge Ransey Guy Cole, Jr. and joined by Senior Judge Ronald Lee Gilman. They ruled that "the Plan acted arbitrarily and capriciously in denying Shaw LTD benefits." They not only remanded the case but also ordered the district court to enter an order awarding LTD benefits to Shaw.

A perfunctory two-paragraph dissent was filed by Judge Raymond M. Kethledge. He said the Plan's denial was not arbitrary and capricious because Shaw failed to provide "objective medical documentation," and because the Plan relied on the opinions of specialists who reviewed Shaw's medical records. (See Shaw v. AT&T Umbrella Benefit Plan No. 1, U.S. Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, Case No. 14-2224).

The Consulting Physicians

In dealing with Shaw's initial appeal of the Plan's denial of LTD benefits, Sedgwick sent Shaw's medical records to Dr. Imad M. Shahhal, a neurosurgeon, and to Dr. Jamie Lee Lewis, a specialist in physical medicine and rehabilitation and pain medicine. Each called Shaw's treating physicians and asked them to call back within 24 hours or the reports would be "based on available medical information." The treating physicians did not meet the deadline and the consulting physicians promptly concluded that Shaw was "not disabled from any occupation."

The two appellate judges who reversed the district court ruling apparently were outraged by the imposition of a 24-hour deadline on busy physicians. Also, the two judges said that "Dr. Lewis's conclusions have been questioned in numerous federal cases, in all of which he was hired by Sedgwick." They cited details from four such cases. In one of them, Dr. Lewis was described as having submitted a review that "ignored or misstated evidence by treating physicians."

My June 2010 Article

As indicated at the outset, an article about insurance company use of consulting physicians was in the June 2010 issue of The Insurance Forum. It focused on Dr. William S. Hauptman, a specialist in gastroenterology and internal medicine, who had a contract with Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company. Over three years he conducted 446 reviews for the company and received compensation of about $400,000.

Dr. Hauptman's work has been mentioned in numerous lawsuits. My June 2010 article described two cases in some detail. In one of them, the court illustrated the bias in his reports by citing his use of boldface type and underlining to emphasize his points supporting denial of the claim.

In the article I said the use of a consulting physician creates a serious conflict of interest for the physician because he or she knows that the insurance company wants support for an adverse claim decision, that he or she will be paid generously for providing that support, and that failing to provide that support will discourage the company from using the physician. I suggested that it might be helpful to disclose publicly the number and percentage of cases handled by a consulting physician where he or she recommended denial of a claim.

Available Material

I am offering a complimentary 22-page PDF consisting of the appellate ruling, the brief dissent, and my June 2010 article. E-mail jmbelth@gmail.com and ask for the package relating to the Shaw case.

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Blog: www.josephmbelth.com

No. 112: Shadow Insurance—Confidential Documents Dated 2003 Are Now in the Public Domain

Readers of this blog know I have been trying without success to obtain documents associated with shadow insurance transactions between insurance companies and their wholly owned reinsurance subsidiaries. In the Ross case discussed in No. 111 (posted August 3, 2015), certain 2003 documents are now available in court filings. Despite their age, the documents shed light on the subject. (See Ross v. AXA Equitable Life, U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York, Case No. 1:14-cv-2904.)

The Exhibits

The exhibits mentioned here were filed in the Ross case on April 27, 2015. Exhibit 8 is an automatic level term reinsurance agreement between The Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States (Equitable), which later became AXA Equitable Life, and AXA Financial (Bermuda) Ltd., a wholly owned reinsurance subsidiary of Equitable. The agreement was signed by the parties on December 22 and 29, 2003.

Exhibit 9 is an automatic lapse protection rider reinsurance agreement between the same parties. The agreement was signed by the parties on December 22 and 29, 2003.

Exhibit 10 consists of two standby letters of credit. The first, for $60 million, was issued by National Australia Bank (New York, NY) to AXA Financial (Bermuda) Ltd., was dated December 22, 2003, and expired December 21, 2004. Equitable was the beneficiary. The second, for $40 million, was issued by ABN Amro Bank N.V. (Chicago, IL) to AXA Financial (Bermuda) Ltd., was dated December 30, 2003, and expired December 21, 2004. Equitable was the beneficiary.

Exhibit 11 consists of a letter dated November 7, 2003 to the New York Department of Insurance (Department) from Equitable, and two proposed inter-company service agreements between Equitable and Athena Reinsurance, Ltd. (Bermuda). At the time Athena was being formed as a wholly owned reinsurance subsidiary of AXA Financial, Inc.

Exhibit 14 is a letter dated December 19, 2003 to Equitable from the Department. The Department expressed "no objection" to the agreements submitted with Equitable's November 7, 2003 letter.

The Freedom of Information Law

I have experience with New York State's Freedom of Information Law (FOIL). Equitable's November 7, 2003 letter to the Department referred to the FOIL exemption for trade secrets. The company requested confidential treatment for the letter and the agreements, and said the information was "provided with the express understanding that the confidentiality of such information will be safeguarded pursuant to all applicable provisions of the law . . . ."

Here is my understanding of what the above request means. If the Department had received a FOIL request for the material, the Department would have notified the company and asked the company to justify confidential treatment, with the burden of proof on the company.

If the company had submitted justification, and if the Department had agreed with the company, the Department would have denied the FOIL request. The requester could then have submitted to the Department an administrative appeal of the denial. If the Department had denied the appeal, the requester could have sought court review of the denial. If the Department had granted the appeal, the company could have sought a court order preventing the Department from releasing the material.

On the other hand, if the Department had disagreed with the company's justification, the company could have submitted to the Department an administrative appeal of the determination. If the Department had denied the appeal, the company could have sought court review of the determination. If the Department had granted the appeal, the requester could have sought court review of the determination.

The above is an oversimplified and incomplete description of the procedures associated with a FOIL request. Suffice it to say that going through the exercise can consume months or years. I was involved in such an exercise a few years ago when I sought documents filed with the Department by Phoenix Companies, Inc. relating to its cost-of-insurance increases on universal life policies used in stranger-originated life insurance transactions. The struggle went on for more than a year and was never fully resolved. However, I was able to announce in No. 26 (posted January 29, 2014) a judge's unsealing of several documents that had been filed initially under seal in lawsuits against Phoenix.

Available Material

I am offering a complimentary 88-page PDF consisting of the 19-page Exhibit 8, the 20-page Exhibit 9, the seven-page Exhibit 10, the 40-page Exhibit 11, and the two-page Exhibit 14. E-mail jmbelth@gmail.com and ask for the five exhibits in the case of Ross v. AXA Equitable Life.

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Blog: www.josephmbelth.com

No. 111: Shadow Insurance—A Legal Setback in the Struggle against the Life Insurance Shell Game

On July 21, 2015, U.S. District Judge Jesse M. Furman issued an Opinion and Order dismissing for lack of jurisdiction a class action lawsuit relating to the use of shadow insurance. He ruled the plaintiffs had failed to show they suffered a "concrete injury-in-fact," as required to establish standing under the U.S. Constitution. He dismissed the complaint, and he denied the plaintiffs' motion for class certification as moot. (See Ross v. AXA Equitable Life, U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York, Case No. 1:14-cv-2904.)

The Ross (Yale) Lawsuit
The initial complaint was filed in April 2014. At that time, the lead plaintiff was Andrew Yale. On February 24, 2015, the judge granted Yale's unopposed motion to substitute—"due to family medical issues"—Jonathan Ross and David Levin as lead plaintiffs. Two days later they filed an amended complaint. On March 24 they filed a second amended complaint. On April 1 they filed a motion to certify the class. On April 14 AXA filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. On May 5 the plaintiffs filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss. On May 12 the defendant replied to the plaintiffs' opposition. Here, with citations omitted, are the two concluding paragraphs of Judge Furman's July 21 Opinion and Order (NYDFS is the New York Department of Financial Services):

For the reasons stated above, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs fail to demonstrate an injury sufficient to "satisfy the strictures of constitutional standing," and that the Complaint must therefore be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. In light of that conclusion, the Court need not and will not address Defendant's other grounds for dismissal. Further, Plaintiffs' motion for class certification must be and is denied as moot.

The Court does not arrive at its conclusion lightly. The pervasiveness of shadow insurance in New York—and AXA's alleged failure to disclose details of those transactions—may well pose a threat to the stability and reliability of the state's insurance system, as NYDFS suggested. Nevertheless, the Court cannot address the legality or propriety of AXA's conduct without the constitutional authority to do so. The absence of "a substantial controversy ... of sufficient immediacy and reality to justify judicial resolution" does not, of course, mean that Plaintiffs—or life insurance policyholders more generally—are without recourse. To the contrary, one of the purposes of the injury-in-fact requirement is to ensure that generalized claims of this nature are "committed ... ultimately to the political process." Notably, it appears that that process has at least partially served its purpose in this case: As plaintiffs themselves concede, the NYDFS promulgated a new regulation after its investigation "explicitly requiring disclosure of additional information regarding shadow insurance transactions." Ultimately, having to establish an injury-in-fact worthy of federal judicial intervention, it is those political channels (or, perhaps, state court) through (or in) which plaintiffs must seek to resolve their grievances.

Other Shadow Insurance Lawsuits
Several shadow insurance lawsuits have been filed in federal courts. Aside from the cases discussed in Nos. 107 (June 30, 2015) and 110 (July 17, 2015), and in addition to Ross, other cases have been consolidated under Senior District Judge Denise L. Cote in the same court as the Ross case. Among those other cases are two lawsuits against Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. (See Robainas v. Metropolitan Life and Intoccia v. Metropolitan Life, U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York, Case Nos. 1:15-cv-3061 and 1:14-cv-9926.)

On July 22, the day after Judge Furman issued his ruling, an attorney for Metropolitan Life sent a letter to Judge Cote about Judge Furman's "well reasoned" decision in the "nearly identical" Ross case. The attorney "wanted to be sure the Court had the benefit of Judge Furman's thinking as it considers [Metropolitan Life's] motion to dismiss" the Robainas complaint, and he attached Judge Furman's decision "for the Court's convenience."

On July 23 an attorney for Ross sent a courtesy letter to Judge Furman and attached a copy of a letter sent to Judge Cote in response to the above mentioned July 22 letter. In the letter to Judge Cote the attorney for Ross said: "Plaintiffs intend to appeal Judge Furman's decision and respectfully submit that it would be error for this Court to adopt the reasoning of that opinion in the MetLife cases." He described the analysis in Judge Furman's ruling as "flawed for several independent reasons," and he identified those reasons. Presumably the appeal will be filed in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

My Open Records Law Request in Iowa
In No. 109 (July 13, 2015) I discussed the May 2015 independent auditor reports filed by the eight "limited purpose subsidiaries" (LPSs) domiciled in Iowa. I mentioned dubious assets carried by the LPSs in their financial statements as of the end of 2014. Six of the LPSs carry as assets items that are not allowed under generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) and are not allowed under statutory accounting practices. The other two LPSs carry as assets items that are not allowed under GAAP.

On July 24, pursuant to the Iowa Open Records Law, I requested copies of the documents associated with each of those dubious assets, including documents reflecting the Iowa Insurance Division's approval of those assets. The Division denied my request. I now plan to appeal the denial to Nick Gerhart, the Iowa insurance commissioner.

Available Material
I am offering a complimentary 28-page PDF consisting of three items: the 23-page July 21 Opinion and Order by Judge Furman, the two-page July 22 letter to Judge Cote from an attorney for Metropolitan Life, and the three-page July 23 letter to Judge Cote from an attorney for Ross. Email jmbelth@gmail.com and ask for the package relating to the case of Ross v. AXA Equitable Life.

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Blog: www.josephmbelth.com

No. 110: Aviva, Guggenheim, Allegations of Phony Reinsurance, and a Strange Coincidence

In No. 107 posted June 30, 2015, I wrote about a federal class action lawsuit filed on June 12 against Aviva, Athene, and Apollo alleging phony reinsurance and violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). At the time I vaguely recalled a similar lawsuit filed earlier and withdrawn without explanation the next day. I located the earlier lawsuit and found a strange coincidence. The earlier case was against Guggenheim and others. There were differences from the Aviva case; however, the earlier case involved the same plaintiffs' law firms, many of the same plaintiffs' attorneys, similar allegations of phony reinsurance, and similar RICO allegations. Here I update the Aviva case and describe the earlier Guggenheim case.

The 2015 Complaint against Aviva
In No. 107 about the Aviva case, I identified the plaintiffs' attorneys. The defendants' attorneys are Bruce Roger Braun, Hille von Rosenvinge Sheppard, Joel Steven Feldman, Peter K. Huston, and Sarah Alison Hemmendinger of Sidley Austin LLP; and Reginald David Steer and Steven M. Pesner of Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP. The parties have consented to proceed before a magistrate judge, and have agreed that the defendants will answer, move, or otherwise respond to the complaint by August 24. (See Silva v. Aviva, U.S. District Court, Northern District of California, Case No. 5:15-cv-2665.)

The 2014 Complaint against Guggenheim
On February 11, 2014, the plaintiffs' attorneys filed a federal class action lawsuit against Guggenheim and others. The 105-page complaint alleged phony reinsurance transactions with affiliates and participation in a RICO enterprise. The lead plaintiffs were Clarice Whitmore, an Arkansas resident who bought an annuity in 2012 from Security Benefit Life Insurance Company; and Helga Maria Schulzki, a California resident who bought an annuity in 2013 from EquiTrust Life Insurance Company.

The plaintiffs' attorneys in the 2014 case (italics indicate those involved in the Guggenheim case but not involved in the Aviva case) were Steve W. Berman, Sean R. Matt, Elizabeth A. Fegan, and Robert B. Carey of Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP; Andrew S. Friedman and Francis J. Balint Jr. of Bonnett Fairbourn Friedman & Balint PC; Erin Dickinson and Chuck Crueger of Hansen Reynolds Dickinson Crueger LLC; and Ingrid M. Evans and Elliot Wong of Evans Law Firm Inc.

The defendants in the 2014 case were Guggenheim Partners LLC, Guggenheim Life and Annuity Company, Security Benefit Life, and EquiTrust Life. Other participants in the alleged RICO enterprise were Mark Walter, chief executive officer of Guggenheim Partners and chairman and controlling owner of the Los Angeles Dodgers; Todd Boehly, president of Guggenheim Partners; Robert Patton Jr., client and associate of Walter and Boehly; Paragon Life Insurance Company; and Heritage Life Insurance Company. The docket does not identify the defendants' attorneys because the case ended almost immediately after it was filed. (See Whitmore v. Guggenheim, U.S. District Court, Northern District of Illinois, Case No. 1:14-cv-948.)

The Allegations against Guggenheim
The introduction to the 2014 complaint against Guggenheim contained 30 paragraphs summarizing the allegations. Here were ten of them:

7. This case is about the fraud that Guggenheim and others working in association with it committed to sell Guggenheim Insurers' annuity products to unwitting annuity purchasers, many of whom are elderly, while concealing the adverse effects of their depletion of the funds needed to satisfy the Guggenheim Insurers' long-term obligations to these annuity purchasers.

8. Guggenheim's plan was pernicious: acquire insurance companies weakened by the recession and use them to sell seemingly safe and secure annuity products (particularly annuities with large, upfront premiums) while funneling cash out to Guggenheim and its affiliates, friends and associates rather than holding or reserving it to satisfy their long-term obligations to the annuity holders.

11. In addition to saddling the Guggenheim Insurers with the highly illiquid affiliated promissory notes and billions of dollars of highly illiquid mortgage and other risky asset-backed securities, Guggenheim Chief Executive Officer Mark R. Walter, Guggenheim President Todd L. Boehly, and Guggenheim business associate Robert "Bobby" Patton Jr. used the Guggenheim Insurers as a cash machine to buy the most expensive sports franchise in world history, the Los Angeles Dodgers, with over a billion dollars in policyholders' funds.

13. To accomplish their illicit goals Defendants took a page out of the Enron playbook, creating a fraudulent scheme through complicated accounting machinations that gave the false appearance of financial strength and stability to Security Benefit Life, Guggenheim Life and EquiTrust Life by: (1) moving liabilities off their books to affiliated and secretly affiliated entities (primarily through non-economic "reinsurance" transactions with affiliated entities), (2) inflating their assets by counting already encumbered assets as though they were available to make annuity holder payments, (3) executing billions of dollars of what appear to be essentially uncollateralized loans to affiliated entities or associates and portraying the related-party unsecured paper as assets, and (4) hiding their non-performing assets.

14. At the center of this scheme was a shell game that Defendants hoped no one could follow, where money and liabilities were continuously shifted between companies with whom the Guggenheim Insurers acknowledged an affiliation (Security Benefit Life, Guggenheim Life, EquiTrust Life and Paragon Life Insurance Company of Indiana) and with a separate, secretly affiliated company that Defendants acquired and corrupted to facilitate the fraudulent scheme, Heritage Life Insurance Company (AZ).

18. At the same time Defendants were hiding the Guggenheim Insurers' liabilities, Defendants were also inflating their assets by additional fraudulent accounting machinations.

19. For example, collectively the three Guggenheim Insurers improperly counted as "admitted assets" over $2.59 billion of collateral that was already pledged to repay loans to the Federal Home Loan Banks.

23. In sum, after their acquisition by Guggenheim each of the Guggenheim Insurers was in short order rendered statutorily impaired, each having an essentially negative surplus (which means annuity holder funds were consequently impaired).

25. Flush with their annuity holders' cash, for example, Security Benefit Life and EquiTrust Life paid over $445 million in dividends to their respective Guggenheim parents, over $217 million in management fees to Guggenheim affiliates, and over $55 million in investment fees to Guggenheim affiliates. Additionally, beyond the $5.1 billion the Guggenheim Insurers paid to various affiliates within the Guggenheim family of companies in what appears to be largely unsecured promissory notes, they loaned almost $1 billion to Guggenheim business associates. Perhaps the most perverse aspect of Defendants' fraudulent scheme, however, is the acquisition of the Dodgers by Guggenheim, Walter, Boehly and Patton for $2.15 billion—$1.2 billion of which was financed by policyholder and annuity holder money from the Guggenheim Insurers.

30. Defendants' fraudulent scheme constitutes a violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c) and (d). Plaintiffs and the Class have been damaged by Defendants' pattern of racketeering activity because they were misled into purchasing annuities based on material misrepresentations of the financial strength of the issuing companies, annuity products that no reasonable person would purchase if not deceived. This suit is necessary to remedy the injury caused by Defendants' racketeering activity.

The Withdrawal of the 2014 Complaint
The 2014 complaint against Guggenheim was assigned immediately to District Judge Samuel Der-Yeghiayan. (In 2003 President George W. Bush nominated him and the Senate confirmed him.) On February 12, 2014, the day after the complaint was filed, one of the plaintiffs' attorneys filed a notice of voluntary dismissal. The notice contained no explanation. On February 13, the case was dismissed without prejudice.

General Observations
The preparation of the elaborate 2014 complaint against Guggenheim undoubtedly required a major expenditure of resources. I asked one of the plaintiffs' attorneys to explain why the complaint was withdrawn the day after it was filed, but he did not respond. Thus the reason for the abrupt withdrawal of the complaint is a mystery.

Available Material
I am offering a complimentary 172-page PDF consisting of the 105-page complaint against Guggenheim and 67 pages of exhibits. E-mail jmbelth@gmail.com and ask for the Whitmore/Guggenheim complaint.

At the outset I mentioned No. 107 (6/30/15). I wrote about related matters in Nos. 44 (4/22/14), 66 (8/21/14), 71 (11/6/14), 72 (11/12/14), 73 (11/19/14), 93 (4/17/15), 94 (4/20/15), 99 (5/6/15), 100 (5/11/15), and 109 (7/13/15).

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Email: jmbelth@gmail.com

Blog: www.josephmbelth.com

No. 109: Iowa's Frightening Accounting Rules—An Update

In Nos. 71, 72, and 73 posted November 6, 12, and 19, 2014, I discussed Iowa's frightening accounting rules. Iowa statutes allow for limited purpose subsidiaries (LPSs), which are reinsurance entities created by Iowa-domiciled insurance companies. Iowa allows the LPSs to treat as assets items that are not treated as assets under generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) and under statutory accounting practices (SAP) adopted by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners. This update is based on May 2015 independent auditor reports on the Iowa LPSs as of December 31, 2014. The reports are filed only in Iowa, and I obtained them in accordance with Iowa's Open Records Law.

The LPSs and Their Auditors
The eight Iowa LPSs are Cape Verity I Inc. (CV I), Cape Verity II Inc. (CV II), Cape Verity III Inc. (CV III), MNL Reinsurance Company (MNL Re), Solberg Reinsurance Company (Solberg Re), Symetra Reinsurance Corporation (Symetra Re), TLIC Oakbrook Reinsurance Inc. (Oakbrook), and TLIC Riverwood Reinsurance Inc. (Riverwood). CV I, CV II, and CV III are subsidiaries of Accordia Life and Annuity Company. MNL Re and Solberg Re are subsidiaries of Midland National Life Insurance Company. Oakbrook and Riverwood are subsidiaries of Transamerica Life Insurance Company. Symetra Re is a subsidiary of Symetra Life Insurance Company. (See No. 44 posted April 22, 2014 for a discussion of Symetra's redomestication from Washington State to Iowa.)

The reports for seven of the Iowa LPSs were prepared in the Des Moines office of PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP (PwC). The other, for Symetra Re, was prepared in the Seattle office of Ernst & Young LLP.

The Dubious Assets
All eight reports include an adverse opinion with regard to GAAP, and most of them also identify differences between SAP and practices permitted by Iowa. The reports on MNL Re and Solberg Re do not state whether the LLC note guarantee and the irrevocable standby letters of credit are treated as assets under SAP.

The differences among GAAP, SAP, and Iowa relate to items that are not treated as assets under GAAP or SAP but are treated as assets by Iowa. Here is a list of the dubious assets as of December 31, 2014 (the parenthetical figures are to the nearest million):

CV I: Contingent note ($459) is not an asset under GAAP or SAP, but is treated as an asset by Iowa.

CV II: Parental guarantee ($688) by Global Atlantic Financial Group Ltd. is not an asset under GAAP or SAP, but is treated as an asset by Iowa.

CV III: Contingent note ($223) is not an asset under GAAP or SAP, but is treated as an asset by Iowa.

MNL Re: LLC note guarantee ($705) is not an asset under GAAP, but is treated as an asset by Iowa.

Solberg Re: Irrevocable standby letters of credit ($514) are not assets under GAAP but are treated as assets by Iowa.

Symetra Re: Variable funding note ($71) is not an asset under GAAP or SAP but is treated as an asset by Iowa.

Oakbrook: Credit linked note ($884) is not an asset under GAAP or SAP, but is treated as an asset by Iowa.

Riverwood: Parental guarantee ($1,930) by Aegon USA is not an asset under GAAP or SAP but is treated as an asset by Iowa.

General Observations
Several reports mention a high risk-based capital (RBC) ratio if the item in question is treated as an asset, but say the LPS would be below the RBC mandatory control level if the item is not treated as an asset. The fact is that the LPS would be insolvent if the item is not treated as an asset.

In some of the reports the dubious assets are described briefly, and in some they are not described. Also, documents associated with those assets are not available under Iowa's Open Records Law. The Iowa Insurance Division says each item in question is part of the LPS's "plan of operation," which is confidential under the Iowa LPS law and regulations. The secrecy associated with those assets is one reason why I describe the LPSs as part of a shell game that eventually will collapse, with dire consequences for policyholders and the life insurance business.

Available Material
As an example of the reports, I am offering a complimentary 48-page PDF of the PwC report on Riverwood. It refers to the $1.93 billion parental guarantee by Aegon USA. See especially PDF page numbers 3, 4, 5, 9, 12, 14, 16, 17, and 35. E-mail jmbelth@gmail.com and ask for the PwC report on Riverwood dated May 29, 2015.

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Email: jmbelth@gmail.com

Blog: www.josephmbelth.com

No. 108: Guardian Life's Rectification of an Unsuitable Rollover—An Update

In No. 104R posted June 22, 2015, I discussed an unsuitable rollover of a client's retirement accumulation at College Retirement Equities Fund (CREF) into an individual retirement account containing a variable annuity issued by a subsidiary of Guardian Life Insurance Company of America. Guardian initially rejected the client's complaint, but later resolved the complaint to the client's satisfaction. This is an update on the case.

Background

The client was Beatrice (not her real name). She was aged 78 at the time of the rollover. Edgar Montenegro (CRD# 4768006), a registered representative of Park Avenue Securities, a Guardian subsidiary, sold Beatrice on the idea of using $200,000 of her $325,000 CREF accumulation to buy the annuity from Guardian Insurance & Annuity Company, another Guardian subsidiary. However, through what has been referred to as "a mistake in the purchase paperwork," the entire $325,000 accumulation was rolled into the annuity. Consequently Beatrice had to take withdrawals from the annuity to meet required minimum distributions, thereby forfeiting an enhanced lifetime guarantee. The guarantee was an annuity benefit for which she had paid.

The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) shows "BrokerCheck Reports" on its website (www.finra.org). The BrokerCheck report on Montenegro originally said the complaint was denied. Although reports do not identify cases by the names of clients, in this instance the case was identifiable from the facts shown in the report.

The Updated BrokerCheck Report

I saw the updated BrokerCheck report on June 30. It shows a "status" of "settled," a "status date" of June 10, 2015, a "settlement amount" of $342,902.18, and an "individual contribution amount" [presumably the amount contributed to the settlement by Montenegro] of zero. The "broker statement" in the updated report reads:

A firm affiliate [presumably Guardian Insurance & Annuity Company] entered into a confidential settlement with the customer without the firm [presumably Park Avenue Securities] or the firm affiliate admitting liability.

The "employment history" section of the updated BrokerCheck report says Montenegro is employed by Park Avenue Securities from June 2011 to "Present." However, the report contains this note:

Please note that the broker is required to provide this information only while registered with FINRA or a national securities exchange and the information is not updated via Form U4 after the broker ceases to be registered. Therefore, an employment end date of "Present" may not reflect the broker's current employment status.

I asked Jeanette Volpi, a Guardian spokeswoman, whether Montenegro is currently employed by Park Avenue Securities. In her prompt response, she said Montenegro is currently employed by Park Avenue Securities.

General Observations

Guardian's settlement with Beatrice could have been for the rollover amount of $325,000 without a surrender charge. However, the settlement amount shown in the updated BrokerCheck report suggests that the settlement was for the full current value of Beatrice's account without a surrender charge. Although it is regrettable that Guardian initially rejected Beatrice's complaint, I am favorably impressed by, and commend the company for, the manner in which the company handled the complaint in the end.

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Email: jmbelth@gmail.com

Blog: www.josephmbelth.com