No. 322: Pamela Yellen—Her Unbelievable "Bank-on-Yourself" Wealth-Building Strategy

Pamela Yellen was born in Buffalo, New York, on November 16, 1952. She graduated in 1974 from the University of San Francisco with a Bachelor of Arts degree, with emphasis in psychology. From 1984 to 1987 she was employed by a publication serving the camping and recreational vehicle industry. Later she became a consultant to more than 400,000 financial advisors across the U.S. and Canada. She is now a proponent of her "Bank-on-Yourself" system, which she calls a "safe wealth-building strategy." She is the author of two books: Bank on Yourself (2009) and The Bank on Yourself Revolution (2016). She donates 10 percent of her royalties to charities such as The Smile Train and The Nature Conservancy. She now lives with her husband outside Santa Fe, New Mexico. This post is based for the most part on her 2016 book.

The Endorsements

The subtitle of Yellen's 2016 book is "Fire Your Banker, Bypass Wall Street, and Take Control of Your Own Financial Future." The first eight pages (before the title page and the other front matter in the book) contain 26 endorsements. Here are the first three:

"Even if you aren't ready to actually fire your banker, you need all the helpful information you can find in these uncertain economic times. Pamela Yellen once again is 'right on the money' when it comes to financial security."—Harvey Mackay, Author of the New York Times #1 bestseller Swim With the Sharks Without Being Eaten Alive, www.harveymackay.com

Pamela Yellen should definitely win a Nobel Prize. With her guidance, you can grow a nest egg into a small fortune without the risks of conventional investments and political uncertainty. I urge you ... no, I beg you ... to get The Bank on Yourself Revolution. It's an investment in yourself and a book that will make a major difference in your life."—Joseph Sugarman, Entrepreneur, Author, and BluBlocker Corporation Founder, www.BluBlocker.com

"The Bank on Yourself Revolution provides a pathway to building your wealth and puts the traditional bank, stock and real estate markets firmly in the back seat. If you are searching for an alternative path to a secure retirement, this is a must read to grow your money safely and predictably ever[sic] year—even when the markets are crashing."—Kristi Frank, Star of Season One of Donald Trump's The Apprentice, well known for helping entrepreneurs start and grow their businesses, www.KristiFrank.com

The Dedication

Yellen dedicated her book to those she calls "Bank on Yourself revolutionaries." Here is the full dedication:

This book is dedicated to all the Bank on Yourself revolutionaries, the people who had the courage to question today's conventional financial wisdom, buck the system, and set out on a path less traveled. In doing so, you created true financial security for yourselves and your families. You are my heroes and my inspiration.

Harsh Criticism of Alternatives

Most of Yellen's book is devoted to harsh criticism of financial alternatives to her Bank on Yourself system. She says on page 7 that over the years she has investigated "more than 450 different financial products, strategies, and vehicles, and only a few passed my due diligence tests." Here are some but not all the alternatives she criticizes (with page numbers shown in parentheses): synthetic collateralized debt obligations (7), adjustable-rate mortgages (9), mutual funds (19), 401(k) plans (29), certificates of deposit (31), real estate investments (33), gold and other precious metals (35), savings accounts (41), traditional whole life policies (44), buy term life insurance and invest the difference (60), equity indexed universal life policies (66), individual retirement accounts (104), paying off home mortgages (162), 529 college plans (174), uniform gifts and transfers to minors (176), student loans (177), and annuities (227).

The Bank on Yourself Plan

As I went through the book, I kept looking for a description of the Bank on Yourself plan. Sprinkled throughout are brief descriptions hinting that the plan is based on some form of life insurance. Not until near the end of the book (pages 255-257) did I find anything close to a detailed description. It begins with this paragraph:

Out of approximately 1,000 life insurance companies, we've found only a handful that offer policies that meet all four requirements needed to maximize the power of the Bank on Yourself concept. When your plan is designed by one of the 200 Bank on Yourself Authorized Advisors, they recommend companies that have the following features and advantages:

The first feature is that the company must offer dividend-paying whole life policies. Also, the company must have paid dividends to policyholders every year for at least the last 100 years. It is not clear how anyone can verify the payment of dividends for at least a century.

The second feature is that the company must not use direct recognition. That means the company pays the same dividends whether the policyholder has or has not taken out a policy loan.

The third feature is that the company must offer a paid-up additions rider (PUAR). Yellen says the authorized advisor's commission "is typically 50-70 percent lower than with a traditionally designed policy." She also says: "At least 50 percent of your premium will typically be directed into this [PUAR] rider." I think commissions on amounts deposited into PUARs are substantially smaller than commissions on premiums for whole life, especially in the first policy year. Therefore the total commission would be smaller than the commission that would have been paid if the entire premium had gone into the whole life base policy.

The fourth feature is that the company must be among the financially strongest in the country. That determination must be made based on financial strength ratings assigned to the company by several independent rating agencies. I will have more to say on this subject later.

Yellen's plan seems to contemplate frequent and large policy loans to make major purchases. For that reason, it is strange that she says nothing about the policy loan clause. Thus she does not say whether the policy loan interest rate should be fixed or variable, what the rate should be if it is a fixed rate, or, if it is a variable rate, how the rate should be determined and what the maximum rate should be.

Accessing Yellen's System

Yellen does not publish a list of life insurance companies that meet her criteria. She says she is an educator, not a financial advisor, and therefore is prohibited from naming specific companies. She does not say whether she is a licensed insurance agent. She says developing a plan for the client is the job of an "Authorized Bank on Yourself Advisor." In other words, only an authorized advisor, who presumably is trained by her, is allowed to design a customized plan for the client.

Nor does Yellen publish a list of Bank on Yourself authorized advisors. In other words, the only way a client may access the Bank on Yourself plan is to contact Yellen, who will refer an authorized advisor to the client. Thus Yellen is operating what amounts to a closed system for accessing the Bank on Yourself plan.

The Lafayette Life Connection

Allan S. Roth is a certified financial planner and a certified public accountant. He has worked as a public accountant with KPMG, and has been with McKinsey & Company, Kaiser Permanente, and Wellpoint. Recently I saw an article by Roth entitled "Bestselling book's financial promises don't add up." On December 11, 2012, CBS News posted Roth's article, which was about Yellen's first book. Roth said in his article that he had met with a Yellen authorized advisor, who had made a presentation. Roth further said in his article that he had tried hard but had not been able to make sense of the numbers in the presentation. Roth said in his article that the authorized advisor's presentation had been based on a policy offered by The Lafayette Life Insurance Company, and that he (Roth) had been in touch with Lafayette Life about the presentation.

Mutual Holding Companies

Lafayette Life, which was established in 1905, is now part of Cincinnati-based Western & Southern Financial Group, a mutual holding company organization. I have written extensively about mutual holding companies. My first article on the subject, entitled "General American and the Mutual Holding Company Concept," was in the March 1997 issue of The Insurance Forum, the monthly newsletter I published from January 1974 through December 2013. Another article on the subject, entitled "Democracy at Provident Mutual—A Case Study in the Suppression of Communication among Policyowners," was in the May 1998 issue of the Forum. Both articles are in the complimentary package offered at the end of this post.

My Correspondence with Lafayette Life

On June 21, 2019, I sent a letter by regular mail to Bryan Chalmer Dunn, the president and chief executive officer of Lafayette Life. I asked several questions about the relationship between Yellen and Lafayette Life. I asked for a response by the close of business on June 28.

On June 27, I received a telephone call from Diane E. Planck, senior media relations specialist at Western & Southern, acknowledging receipt of the letter and asking for an extension. We agreed to extend the response date to the close of business on July 2. She graciously responded by email at the promised time. My letter and her email are shown later in this post.

Planck did not number her answers to correspond to my numbered questions. She did not answer the first question; I think the answer is yes, based on the previously mentioned Roth article. She answered the other questions directly or indirectly.

Planck's discussion of policy loan interest rates was helpful. She said the policy loan interest rate is variable, and is the larger of 5 percent or the "monthly average of the composite yield on seasoned corporate bonds" published by Moody's. I checked Moody's website and found that the averages were 4.08 percent for May 2019 and 3.89 percent for June 2019. Thus it appears that Lafayette Life's variable policy loan interest rate in those months was 5 percent.

Financial Strength

Lafayette Life's financial strength ratings as of September 18, 2018 were A+ (superior) from A. M. Best, AA– (very strong) from Standard & Poor's, and AA (very strong) from Fitch. For many years I published special ratings issues of the Forum. In the final years of the Forum, I deployed a system I had developed for using the ratings assigned by the major rating firms to classify life-health insurance companies, from the standpoint of financial strength, as suitable for "extremely conservative consumers" (category 1), for "very conservative consumers" (categories 1 and 2 combined), and for "conservative consumers" (categories 1, 2, and 3 combined). In the last of the special ratings issues—the September 2013 issue—I listed 19 companies for "extremely conservative consumers," 38 companies for "very conservative consumers," and 157 companies for "conservative consumers." Lafayette Life and two other Western & Southern companies were among the 38 companies for "very conservative consumers." Five pages of the 32-page September 2013 special ratings issue, including a description of the system and the names of the companies in each of the three categories, are in the complimentary package offered at the end of this post.

Text of June 21 Letter from Belth to Dunn

By way of introduction, I am professor emeritus of insurance in the Kelley School of Business at Indiana University (Bloomington). I am also a blogger at josephmbelth.com. For further information, please click "Bio" on the home page of my blog site.

Pamela Yellen wrote a 2016 book entitled The Bank on Yourself Revolution. She also wrote a 2009 book entitled Bank on Yourself. This letter relates to the 2016 book.

Ms. Yellen says on page 255 that there are only a handful of life insurance companies that meet the requirements needed to maximize the power of her Bank on Yourself concept. She does not identify the companies, but I saw an article on CBS News indicating that Lafayette Life is one of the companies. I am working on a blog post about her system, and have a few questions for you.

1. Are you familiar with Ms. Yellen's book?
2. Ms. Yellen says on pages 255-257 that the recommended companies issue a participating whole life policy with a paid-up additions rider and do not use direct recognition. Do you offer such a policy?
3. Ms. Yellen does not mention the nature of the policy loan clause. What is your policy loan interest rate, and is it a fixed rate or a variable rate? If it is a variable rate, what is the maximum rate?
4. Ms. Yellen says the recommended companies must have high ratings from several independent rating agencies. What are your current ratings by A. M. Best, Standard & Poor's, Moody's Investors Service, and Fitch?
5. Ms. Yellen says on page 250 that there are about 200 authorized advisors across the U.S. and Canada. She does not identify them, but a person interested in her system may contact her, and she will refer an authorized advisor to that person. Are you aware of any of your agents who are authorized advisors for her system? If so, how many are you aware of?
6. If your answer to the first part of (5) is yes, do you approve of their use of Ms. Yellen's system?

I need your reply to this letter by the close of business on Friday, June 28. Please send your reply by email to [my personal email address]. If you would like to speak with me, my direct telephone number is 000-000-0000, and I am on Eastern time. Thank you for your assistance.

Text of July 2 Email from Planck to Belth

Thank you again for contacting Lafayette Life concerning your upcoming blog. We share your passion for the life insurance industry and the important role insurance carriers have in providing products that help people with their financial security.

Information on our most current financial strength ratings (Lafayette is not rated by Moody's) and products (and if they are dividend paying) is available in detail at Lafayette Life's website.

The Lafayette Life Insurance Company is committed to offering people in the markets we serve a wide range of life insurance and annuity products to help meet their growing and increasingly diverse set of financial needs. Our product offerings include a dividend-paying whole life policy with a paid-up additions rider. All dividend-paying whole life policies from Lafayette Life are non-direct recognition, which means the dividend credited to the policy will be the same whether there is a loan or not. The loan interest we charge is the greater of 5% or the monthly average of the composite yield on seasoned corporate bonds as published by Moody's Investors Service, Inc., or any successor to that service.

Lafayette Life's products are sold through independent agents and independent marketing organizations. Our role is limited to providing life insurance policies and annuity contracts. We do not endorse or sponsor any selling system nor do we develop, advertise or promote the marketing content or materials for any selling system. We do not inquire about, attempt to determine, or identify in our systems whether any independent agents appointed to sell our products are users of any specific selling system.

Please be assured that Lafayette Life makes it clear through our contracts with those selling our products and disclosures to our customers that our life insurance policies and annuity contracts are insurance products.

I believe this addresses the questions you raised. Please let me know if you need anything else.

General Observations

Lafayette Life appears to take no interest in or responsibility for the methods used by the independent agents who sell its policies. Further, I think the same can be said about many if not all other companies that sell their policies through independent agents. In my opinion, this is a matter of serious concern, for two reasons. First, sales methods may be deceptive, misleading, or otherwise unfair to consumers. Second, companies and state insurance regulators may find it difficult to police the sales methods used in the field by independent agents.

I was not able to find anywhere in Yellen's book a detailed description of her Bank on Yourself system. I think, but cannot be certain, that she recommends clients purchase automobiles and make other major expenditures by taking out loans against life insurance policies and later repaying the policy loans. I think she is saying the procedure will build the client's wealth far more rapidly and safely than any other conceivable system. I do not believe it. Until such time as she illustrates the numbers in detail, I will continue refusing to believe it.

Available Material

I am offering a complimentary 19-page PDF consisting of an article in the March 1997 issue of the Forum (6 pages), an article in the May 1998 issue (8 pages), and an excerpt from the September 2013 issue (5 pages). Email jmbelth@gmail.com and ask for the July 2019 package about the Yellen system.

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Email: jmbelth@gmail.com

Blog: www.josephmbelth.com

No. 321: TIAA Is Exiting the Life Insurance Business

On June 26, 2019, Investment News carried an article by reporter Greg Iacurci disclosing that Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association of America (TIAA) is exiting the life insurance business at the end of 2019. The article quotes an industry observer as saying: "Part of the reason they're getting out is because they're not selling enough." Here I discuss this important development.

TIAA's Comments

The Iacurci article alludes to a June 25 memorandum from Dennis Rupp, TIAA's director of insurance wholesaling. I asked the TIAA media office for the Rupp memorandum, but did not receive it. Instead, I received a June 28 letter from Todd Sagmoe, TIAA's vice president of product management. He said:

Thank you for your inquiry into the recent TIAA decision to stop issuing new life insurance contracts. I can confirm that TIAA will no longer underwrite and issue new life insurance contracts. Here is the public response that TIAA has prepared: "While life insurance is a key component of our holistic approach to financial wellness, we have decided to stop underwriting new life insurance policies. To enhance our operational efficiency, we will offer a variety of solutions from other carefully selected providers to meet our customers' life insurance needs. We will maintain and continue to service existing policies to ensure a high-quality customer experience."

The Examination Reports

TIAA and its subsidiary, TIAA-CREF Life Insurance Company, are domiciled in New York. The most recent examination reports of the two companies by the New York State Department of Financial Services are as of December 31, 2013, and are dated June 10, 2015. The TIAA report says it "ceased issuing life insurance policies in 2005." However, I think TIAA-CREF Life continued issuing life insurance policies. Selected pages of the two examination reports are in the complimentary package offered at the end of this post.

The Life Insurance Price Issue

Long-time readers know that I conducted many studies of the price of life insurance protection from the viewpoint of the policyholder, and that I recommended a system for disclosing the information to consumers. Because of strong opposition from the life insurance business, my recommended disclosure system was not adopted. I described the system in an article entitled "Information Disclosure to the Life Insurance Consumer" in the December 1975 issue of the Drake Law Review. The article is in the complimentary package offered at the end of this post.

In the course of my research in the 1960s and 1970s, I became aware of a "lifetime" (whole life) policy issued by TIAA in 1965 to a man aged 35. The policy included the usual premium provision, fractional premium options, grace period and reinstatement clauses, a table of cash values, reduced paid-up insurance and extended term insurance, a loan clause with a fixed annual interest rate of 5 percent, an automatic premium loan clause, an ownership clause, an entire contract clause, two-year incontestability and suicide clauses, a reserve provision based on the 1958 C.S.O. mortality table and 2.5 percent interest, beneficiary provisions, settlement options, and a waiver-of-premium clause. The policy was "non-participating," but TIAA mailed to the policyholder each year a check representing a "voluntary dividend." No dividend options were available other than the cash option.

When I examined the price structure of the policy, I found that the price of the life insurance protection from the viewpoint of the policyholder, including the effect of the "voluntary dividends," was well below the price of the life insurance protection in any other policy I had seen. One explanation may have been that TIAA employed no agents, and instead sold directly to its narrow constituency—the faculty and senior administrative staff of colleges and universities. Another explanation may have been TIAA's reportedly stringent underwriting practices.

The LTC Insurance Incident

In November 2003, TIAA notified its then 46,000 long-term care (LTC) insurance policyholders that it was exiting the LTC insurance business and transferring its LTC insurance policyholders to Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. Because both companies were domiciled in New York, the transfer was subject to the approval of the person who is now the superintendent of financial services. On February 3, 2004, I submitted to the superintendent a "Statement of Joseph M. Belth on TIAA Transfer to MetLife" showing, among other things, five matters that should be conditions for approval of the transfer.

The LTC insurance incident led to three major articles in The Insurance Forum, my monthly newsletter. The first article, which was in the March/April 2004 issue, was entitled "TIAA's Surprising Exit from the Long-Term Care Insurance Business." The article included my statement to the superintendent, and is in the complimentary package offered at the end of this post.

General Observations
When TIAA exited the LTC insurance business in 2003 and sought to transfer its obligations to another insurance company, I had been writing since 1989 about the widespread practice of insurance companies seeking to shed their obligations to their policyholders.  I had deep respect for TIAA, and was disappointed to see it engage in that anti-policyholder activity.  Many of my academic colleagues felt the same way.

I interpret the Sagmoe letter as saying TIAA will not attempt to transfer its life insurance obligations to another company. Instead, I think TIAA will honor its obligations to its life insurance policyholders, and will run off its existing life insurance policies over many years. If my interpretation is incorrect, and TIAA moves to transfer its life insurance obligations to another company, I will report developments.

Available Material

I am offering a complimentary 51-page PDF consisting of selected pages from the latest TIAA and TIAA-CREF Life examination reports (21 pages), the 1975 Drake Law Review article (26 pages), and the March/April 2004 Forum article (4 pages). Email jmbelth@gmail.com and ask for the July 2019 package about TIAA.

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Email: jmbelth@gmail.com

Blog: www.josephmbelth.com

No. 320: Greg Lindberg—The North Carolina Department of Insurance Places Four of His Companies in Rehabilitation

On Thursday, June 27, 2019, four documents relating to Greg Lindberg's insurance companies were filed in a state court in North Carolina. The documents, which are in the complimentary package offered at the end of this post, were filed between 1:17 and 1:48 that afternoon. At 2:48, reporters Leslie Scism and Mark Maremont of The Wall Street Journal posted an article entitled "North Carolina Regulators Seize Control of Life Insurers Owned by Greg Lindberg." They posted an updated version at 6:17. Here I discuss the developments and mention briefly what is happening in a related federal criminal case.

The Verified Petition

One state court document is a "Verified Petition for an Order of Rehabilitation, and Order Appointing Receiver, and Injunctive Relief." The petitioner is Mike Causey, the North Carolina commissioner of insurance. The respondents are Southland National Insurance Corporation, Southland National Reinsurance Corporation, Bankers Life Insurance Company, and Colorado Bankers Life Insurance Company. The respondents are licensed in North Carolina, their principal place of business is in Durham, North Carolina, and Lindberg is the controlling shareholder.

The petition says the commissioner was concerned about the respondents' liquidity. On October 18, 2018, the commissioner and the respondents entered into a consent order for administrative supervision for 120 days. On February 5, 2019, they entered into an amended consent order for administrative supervision for an additional 120 days. On April 4, 2019, they entered into a second amended consent order for administrative supervision, and agreed that appointment of a receiver was necessary for the protection of the respondents' policyholders. The commissioner asked the court to enter an order of rehabilitation naming him the rehabilitator.

The Rehabilitation Order

Another state court document is an "Order of Rehabilitation, Order Appointing Receiver, and Order Granting Injunctive Relief." Senior Resident Wake County Court Judge Paul Ridgeway appointed the commissioner as the rehabilitator and the receiver, issued an injunction against interference with the rehabilitation, and required the rehabilitator to provide quarterly reports to the court.

The Moratorium Motion

Another state court document is a "Motion for Moratorium on Policy Surrenders and Other Relief." The North Carolina attorney general's office asked the court to issue an order granting a moratorium on cash surrenders, annuitizations, and policy loans, and ordering development of a plan for policyholders with legitimate hardship claims.

The Moratorium Order

Another state court document is an "Order Granting Motion for Moratorium on Policy Surrenders and Other Relief." Judge Ridgeway granted the motion and ordered the rehabilitator to adopt a moratorium and implement a policy for legitimate hardship claims.

Secrecy of the Consent Orders

When I asked the North Carolina Department of Insurance for the state court documents, a spokesperson provided them promptly. When I saw them, I requested the three consent orders referred to in the verified petition. The spokesperson said the consent orders are confidential pursuant to Section 58-30-70 of the North Carolina General Statutes. That section reads:

Confidentiality of hearings. In all proceedings and judicial reviews thereof under G.S. 58-30-60 and G.S. 58-30-65, all records of the insurer, other documents, and all Department files and Court records and papers, insofar as they pertain to or are part of the records of the proceedings, shall be and remain confidential except as necessary to obtain compliance therewith, unless the Court, after hearing arguments from the parties in chambers, orders otherwise; or unless the insurer requests that the matter be made public. Until such Court order, all papers filed with the clerk of the Court shall be held by him in a confidential file.

The section does not mention consent orders, and I do not recall any consent order being deemed confidential. I do not plan to appeal the denial. However, I would welcome comments from readers with legal experience in freedom-of-information matters.

The Federal Criminal Case

In No. 309 (April 17, 2019), I posted an item about a federal grand jury indictment of Greg Lindberg and three others for criminal wrongdoing. On April 2, the court unsealed the indictment. On April 3, a docket call was set for July 1. On May 2, the docket call was reset to July 15. Initially the case was assigned to District Judge Max O. Cogburn, Jr. On June 17, the case was reassigned to District Judge Kenneth D. Bell. On June 27, the case was reassigned back to Judge Cogburn and the docket call was reset to September 16. (See U.S.A. v. Lindberg, U.S. District Court, Western District of North Carolina, Case No. 5-19-cr-22.)

General Observations

I plan to follow developments in the rehabilitation proceedings related to Lindberg's insurance companies, and in the proceedings related to the federal criminal case against Lindberg and three others. I anticipate that the proceedings will be lengthy.

Available Material

I am offering a complimentary 46-page PDF consisting of the verified petition (25 pages), the rehabilitation order (9 pages), the moratorium motion (7 pages), and the moratorium order (5 pages). Email jmbelth@gmail.com and ask for the July 2019 Lindberg package.

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Email: jmbelth@gmail.com

Blog: www.josephmbelth.com

No. 319: David McCullough—His New Book and a Connection with the History of American Life Insurance

David McCullough, now aged 85, is one of my favorite authors. I have read all of his books, and each is a treasure. Here I discuss his latest book. It is entitled The Pioneers: The Heroic Story of the Settlers Who Brought the American Ideal West. I also discuss a connection with R. Carlyle Buley, an Indiana University history professor who wrote extensively not only about the American pioneer period but also about the history of American life insurance.

McCullough's New Book

In his new book, McCullough begins with the 1783 Paris peace treaty that ended the Revolutionary War. John Adams and John Jay insisted that all the British land west of the Alleghenies and northwest of the Ohio River and east of the Mississippi River should be ceded to the new United States. The British reluctantly agreed, and the U.S. thus doubled its size by adding a huge amount of wilderness that eventually became Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, and eastern Minnesota.

Among the New Englanders who promoted the idea of settling the new territory were Manasseh Cutler, a churchman who had served as an army chaplain during the Revolutionary War, and Rufus Putnam, who had been a general in the War. George Washington also liked the idea.

In 1787, before a national constitution had yet been adopted, Congress approved the famous Northwest Ordinance. It provided for freedom of religion and emphasized the importance of education. But the most controversial section abolished slavery forever in the huge new territory. Thus eleven years after the Declaration of Independence and 73 years before the Civil War, the New Englanders who planned to settle the huge Northwest territory forever abolished slavery there. McCullough describes in detail how they accomplished the feat. Here is a small portion of that description (on pages 29-30):

But it was Article VI that set forth a tenet such as never before stated in any American constitution. "There shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in the said territory." And, as was well understood, this had been agreed to when slavery existed in every one of the thirteen states. It was almost unimaginable that throughout a new territory as large as all of the thirteen states, there was to be no slavery....

Overall Manasseh Cutler had played the most important role by far. Years later he would tell [his son] Ephraim he had indeed prepared that part of the ordinance banning slavery and, as Ephraim also recorded, the reason for this, as well as the recognition of religion, morality, and knowledge as foundations of civil government, arose from the fact that his father was "acting for associates, friends, and neighbors, who would not embark in the enterprise, unless these principles were unalterably fixed."

In the opinion of [Manasseh's] two grandchildren, William Parker Cutler and Julia Perkins Cutler, who would later edit and publish Manasseh Cutler's journals and correspondence, his way with the southern members of Congress had been the deciding factor.

In any event, the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 would prove to be one of the most far-reaching acts of Congress in the history of the country.

As one widely respected, later-day historian, Albert Bushnell Hart of Harvard University, would write, "Never was there a more ingenious, systematic and successful piece of lobbying than that of the Reverend Manasseh Cutler" and the great Northwest Ordinance of 1787 stands alongside the Magna Carta and the Declaration of Independence as a bold assertion of the rights of the individual.

McCullough focuses primarily on the settling of Ohio, particularly in the area around Marietta. Although he writes little about the developments in the other states of the Old Northwest, his book is fascinating.

McCullough's Earlier Books

The Pioneers is McCullough's twelfth book. Here, listed chronologically, are his earlier books.

1. The Johnstown Flood: The Incredible Story Behind One of the Most Devastating Disasters America Has Ever Known (1968)
2. The Great Bridge: The Epic Story of the Building of the Brooklyn Bridge (1972)
3. The Path Between the Seas: The Creation of the Panama Canal, 1870-1914 (1977)
4. Mornings on Horseback (1981), about the young Theodore Roosevelt
5. Brave Companions: Portraits in History (1991), about several prominent American historical figures
6. Truman (1992), for which he received a 1993 Pulitzer Prize
7. John Adams (2001), for which he received a 2002 Pulitzer Prize
8. 1776 (2005)
9. The Greater Journey: Americans in Paris (2011), about American writers, poets, artists, sculptors, composers, and others who drew inspiration from the time they spent in Paris during the 19th century
10. The Wright Brothers (2015)
11. The American Spirit: Who We Are and What We Stand For (2017)

McCullough has received many awards in addition to the two Pulitzer Prizes mentioned above. He has received two National Book Awards, two Francis Parkman Prizes, a Presidential Medal of Freedom, many other awards, and dozens of honorary degrees.

R. Carlyle Buley

R. Carlyle Buley (1893-1968) served for many years as professor of history at Indiana University (IU) in Bloomington. He was the author of a two-volume work entitled The Old Northwest: Pioneer Period 1815-1840. It was published in 1950, and for it he received a 1951 Pulitzer Prize. His book is in McCullough's bibliography, and it is cited in a few notes. Unlike McCullough, Buley goes into detail about developments not only in Ohio but also in the other states of the Old Northwest.

I knew about Buley even before I arrived at IU in 1962. I had read his two major treatises about the history of life insurance in America. His first two-volume book about life insurance is entitled The American Life Convention 1906-1952: Study in the History of Life Insurance. It was published in 1953. The Convention was a life insurance company trade association that no longer exists. Almost 20 years ago it merged with what is now The American Council of Life Insurers. Buley wrote about the history of life insurance in America through a history of the Convention. For the book he received an Elizur Wright Award in recognition of "outstanding contribution to the literature of insurance."

Buley's second two-volume book about life insurance is entitled The Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States 1859-1964. It was published in 1967. Most histories of life insurance companies are written in glowing language and serve as sales pieces that promote the companies. Buley's history of Equitable, however, is written "warts and all." Today, Equitable no longer exists. It was bailed out of financial trouble about 30 years ago by a French company (AXA), and became AXA Equitable Life.

As an illustration of Buley's writing style, here are excerpts from pages 208-209 in the first volume of The American Life Convention, where he described the lead up to the famous Hughes-Armstrong Investigation of 1905. The "unsavory mess" to which he referred was a combination of the prominent struggle for control of Equitable and the rapid growth of deferred dividend (or "semi-tontine") policies.

One conclusion was fairly general: That the whole unsavory mess would not be in vain if from the odor should arise a better popular understanding of the deferred dividend system which had done so much to increase the expense of life insurance and so little to increase the value of a life insurance policy... What critics of the deferred dividend system apparently did not recognize was that part of the difficulty arose from the inadequacy of accounting procedures, which permitted accumulated deferred dividends to be carried as surplus instead of as a reserve which the companies should have been required to maintain against the deferred dividend policies.

One prominent voice, however, was raised in public defense of the deferred dividend system. Thomas A. Buckner, vice president of the New York Life, reviewed the history of the deferred dividend practice and pointed to the figures which indicated the people's choice: the Connecticut Mutual in 1869 had $177 million of life insurance in force, in 1904 it had $167 million; in 1869 the New York Life had $102 million in force, in 1904 it had $1.9 billion.

Also it was thought that the flood of publicity would not only educate the public as to the nature of life insurance but that it would enlarge the perspective of life insurance men in general and help fix the status of life insurance in the social and economic life of the country. The foreseeable result would be the triumph of conservatism, sanity, honesty, and justice, a return to the creed of old-fashioned honesty as stated by Jacob L. Greene [of Connecticut Mutual], Amzi Dodd [of Mutual Benefit Life], and others of their school, men who believed that the life insurance companies should be operated for the benefit of the policyholders rather than that of the officers.

Six years before Buley died, I arrived in Bloomington to begin my academic career at IU. Although I already knew a lot about him, I regret to say I never met him.

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Email: jmbelth@gmail.com

Blog: www.josephmbelth.com

No. 318: Factoring Companies—A California Lawsuit and a Texas Order Focus Attention on the Sale of Income Streams

A recent state court lawsuit in California and a recent disciplinary order in Texas have refocused attention on the questionable business of factoring companies, which acquire and resell income streams from pensions and annuities. Here I discuss the lawsuit and the order, and present the views of securities regulators on the subject.

The California Lawsuit

DRB Capital is a Delaware LLC based in Florida. Its website (www.drbcapital.com) provides some information. DRB offers cash for structured settlements, annuities, and "pre-settlement funding." The site does not disclose the names of the DRB officers. However, it is clear that DRB is a factoring company in the business of reselling, perhaps to clients of insurance agents and financial advisers, streams of income that DRB acquires through assignments from payees of structured settlement annuities and retirement annuities.

On November 13, 2018, DRB filed a lawsuit against Robert Perez (a California resident), New York Life Insurance Company, and New York Life Insurance and Annuity Corporation (NYLIAC). Perez is the payee of an individual retirement annuity (IRA) he inherited. Under a proposed assignment, Perez was to receive from DRB a lump sum in exchange for assigning to DRB 89 monthly IRA payments of $683.57 each beginning January 22, 2020 and ending May 22, 2027. The payments amount to a simple total of $60,837.73.

The complaint did not include a a copy of the IRA.  Nor did it include a copy of the proposed assignment agreement between DRB and Perez. The complaint named both New York Life and NYLIAC as defendants, but NYLIAC issued the IRA. The complaint did not disclose the size of the lump sum DRB was to pay Perez in exchange for the assignment of the 89 IRA payments. Therefore, when the lump sum is viewed as a loan by DRB to Perez (which is precisely what it is), it is impossible to calculate the annual interest rate on the loan. DRB said NYLIAC will not honor the assignment of the payments without a court order. Thus DRB sought a court order declaring the assignment valid and enforceable.

On January 23, 2019, NYLIAC responded to the DRB complaint in a "demurrer." NYLIAC said New York Life was not the issuer of the IRA and therefore was not a proper party in the case. NYLIAC said "the express anti-assignment language in the annuity contract ... bars the relief requested by DRB in the Complaint." NYLIAC said "the relief requested by DRB in the Complaint is barred because it would contravene Section 408 of the Internal Revenue Code and materially increase the burdens and risks of both Mr. Perez and NYLIAC." NYLIAC asked the court to sustain the demurrer without leave to amend.

On May 31, 2019, California Superior Court Judge Kenneth J. Medel issued an order sustaining NYLIAC's demurrer without leave to amend. He also ordered New York Life removed from the case. The DRB complaint, the NYLIAC demurrer, and the court order are in the complimentary package offered at the end of this post. (See DRB v. Perez, Superior Court of California, County of San Diego, Case No. 37-2018-00057432-CU-MC-CTL.)

The Texas Disciplinary Order

On June 6, 2019, Texas Securities Commissioner Travis J. Iles issued a disciplinary order directed at an individual and a firm in Dallas who had sold stream-of-income investments to clients. Commissioner Iles reprimanded the individual and the firm. He also directed them to pay almost $89,000 (twice the commissions they had received) to certain clients. The Texas order is in the complimentary package offered at the end of this post.

The Warnings from Securities Regulators

In May 2013, the Office of Investor Education and Advocacy of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) jointly issued an "Investor Bulletin" entitled "Pension or Settlement Streams." The bulletin is mandatory reading for anyone considering a sale of or an investment in a pension stream. Here are the first two paragraphs of the bulletin:

Do you receive a monthly pension from a former employer? Are you getting regular distributions from a settlement following a personal injury lawsuit? If so, you may be targeted by salespeople offering you a lump sum today to buy the rights to some or all of the payments you would otherwise receive in the future. Retired government employees and retired members of the military are among those being approached with such offers. Typically the lump sum offered will be less—sometimes much less—than the total of the periodic payments you would otherwise receive.

After acquiring the rights to a future income stream (such as a retiree's pension payments), these pension purchasing or structured settlement companies, sometimes called "factoring companies," may turn around and sell these income streams to retail investors, often through a financial adviser, broker or insurance agent. These products go by various names—pension loans, pension income programs, mirrored pensions, factored structured settlements or secondary-market annuities. They may be pitched to investors with words like "guaranteed" and "safe"—and may tout robust returns that outpace more traditionally conservative investments such as CDs or money market accounts. The advertised returns may sound enticing, but investors should be aware that these investments can be risky and complex. FINRA and the SEC's Office of Investor Education and Advocacy are issuing this Investor Alert to inform anyone considering selling their rights to an income stream—or investing in someone else's income stream—of the risks involved and to urge investors to proceed with caution.

The North American Securities Administrators Association (NASAA) is an organization of state, district, and territory securities regulators in the U.S. and Mexico, and provincial securities regulators in Canada. On April 4, 2016, NASAA issued an "Informed Investor Advisory: Pension Advance Scams." The advisory explains how the "scam" works. The "bottom line" says: "Before making any decisions with your money, ask questions, do your homework and contact your state or provincial securities regulator."

On April 5, 2016, the day after NASAA issued its advisory, the Texas State Securities Board issued an "Investor Alert." It is entitled "Pitfalls of Pension Advance Schemes." The SEC/FINRA bulletin, the NASAA advisory, and the Texas alert are in the complimentary package offered at the end of this post.

My Writings About Factoring Companies

I wrote articles about factoring companies in the August 2011 and October 2011 issues of The Insurance Forum, my monthly newsletter. There I discussed the activities of such companies in detail, including the high annual interest rates associated with factoring transactions. The articles are in the complimentary package offered at the end of this post.

I also posted two blog items on the subject: No. 115 (September 11, 2015) and No. 190 (November 28, 2016). More recently, I posted No. 293 (November 1, 2018) about a tragic situation in which one element of the case involved the assignment of a portion of the proceeds from a structured settlement annuity.

General Observations

In the October 2011 Forum article mentioned above, I expressed the opinion that regulation of the secondary market for structured settlement annuities and retirement annuities did not exist. I referred to the situation as a "regulatory vacuum." What federal, state, and provincial securities regulators have been doing more recently is encouraging, but I think regulatory attention in this area remains inadequate.

Available Material

I am offering a complimentary 40-page PDF consisting of the DRB complaint (3 pages), the NYLIAC demurrer (13 pages), the California court order (2 pages), the Texas disciplinary order (9 pages), the SEC/FINRA bulletin (4 pages), the NASAA advisory (2 pages), the Texas alert (2 pages), and the two Forum articles (5 pages). Email jmbelth@gmail.com and ask for the June 2019 package about factoring companies.

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Email: jmbelth@gmail.com

Blog: www.josephmbelth.com

No. 317: Stranger Originated Life Insurance and the New Jersey Supreme Court

On June 4, 2019, the New Jersey Supreme Court handed down a 6 to 0 opinion that represents a major setback for stranger originated life insurance (STOLI). The opinion is "on certification of questions of law from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit," and draws on facts from the opinions of the Third Circuit and the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey. Chief Justice Stuart Rabner wrote the opinion. Justices Jaynee LaVecchia, Anne M. Patterson, Faustino J. Fernandez-Vina, Lee A. Solomon, and Walter F. Timpone joined in the opinion. Justice Barry T. Albin did not participate. The "syllabus" and the full opinion are in the complimentary package offered at the end of this post. (See Sun Life of Canada v. Wells Fargo Bank, Supreme Court of New Jersey, A-49 September Term 2017, 080669.)

Facts of the Case

The facts of the case resemble those of many cases issued during the heyday of STOLI. The application was for a $5 million policy. The application vastly overstated the insured's income and assets, and a phony inspection report verified the false information. Also, the application substantially understated the amount of life insurance already in force on the insured's life. The application named a trust as the sole owner and beneficiary of the policy. The insured's grandson signed the application as trustee. Sun Life issued the policy in July 2007. Five weeks later, the grandson resigned as trustee and appointed certain "investors," or what I call "speculators in human life," as successor co-trustees. The trust agreement was amended so that most of the benefits would go to the investors, who were also empowered to sell the policy. More than two years later, after expiration of the two-year period of contestability, the trust sold the policy. The investors received nearly all the proceeds from the sale. Wells Fargo Bank eventually acquired the policy in a bankruptcy settlement and continued to pay the premiums.

The insured died in 2014. Wells Fargo sought to collect the death benefit. Sun Life investigated, discovered the fraud, refused to pay, and sought a declaratory judgment that the policy was void ab initio (from the beginning). Wells Fargo counterclaimed for breach of contract and, if the court voided the policy, sought a refund of the premiums it had paid.

Federal District Court Ruling

The federal district court in New Jersey found that New Jersey law applied, that it was a STOLI transaction lacking insurable interest in violation of the state's public policy, and declared the policy void ab initio. The court also granted Wells Fargo a refund of the premiums it had paid, reasoning that Wells Fargo was not to blame for the fraud, and that allowing Sun Life to retain the premiums would provide a windfall to Sun Life.

Third Circuit Ruling

Both parties appealed to the federal Third Circuit. Finding no dispositive New Jersey case law, the Third Circuit certified two questions of law to the New Jersey Supreme Court. Here are the questions:

1. Does a life insurance policy that is procured with the intent to benefit persons without an insurable interest in the life of the insured violate the public policy of New Jersey, and if so, is that policy void ab initio?
2. If such a policy is void ab initio, is a later purchaser of the policy, who was not involved in the illegal conduct, entitled to a refund of any premium payments that they made on the policy?

New Jersey Supreme Court Ruling

The New Jersey Supreme Court answered yes to both parts of the first certified question. In other words, a life insurance policy procured with the intent to benefit persons who do not have an insurable interest in the life of the insured violates the public policy of New Jersey, and such a policy is void ab initio.

On the second certified question, the court ruled that a party may be entitled to a refund of premiums it paid on the policy, "depending on the circumstances." To decide the appropriate remedy, the court ruled that trial courts should develop a record and balance the relevant equitable factors, such as a party's level of culpability, its participation in or knowledge of the fraud, and its failure to notice red flags. A party may be entitled to a refund of premiums it paid, particularly a later purchaser who was not involved in the fraudulent conduct. The court noted that the district court had considered equitable principles and had fashioned a compromise award, but had not commented on the award.

Earlier STOLI Cases
My first article about the secondary market for life insurance was in the March 1989 issue of The Insurance Forum. My second article was in the March 1999 issue of the Forum, and was prompted by my first evidence of what later became known as STOLI. The articles are in the complimentary package offered at the end of this post.

I have also written extensively about STOLI on my blog. Four such posts, in chronological order, are No. 131 (12/9/15), No. 166 (6/15/16), No. 167 (6/20/16), and No. 228 (8/1/17).

General Observations
I think major life insurance companies have instituted sufficient safeguards to prevent significant amounts of new STOLI business from being initiated. The problem now is the handling of the huge volume of STOLI business that was initiated during the heyday of STOLI and is now moving around among a shrinking number of investors. I think the STOLI business will continue to generate litigation for many years.

Available Material
I am offering a complimentary 69-page PDF consisting of the syllabus and full New Jersey Supreme Court opinion (53 pages), and the articles about the secondary market in the March 1989 and March 1999 issues of the Forum (16 pages). Email jmbelth@gmail.com and ask for the June 2019 package about STOLI.

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Email: jmbelth@gmail.com

Blog: www.josephmbelth.com

No. 316: John F. X. Mannion—A Memorial Tribute

John F. X. Mannion

John F. X. "Jack" Mannion, of Syracuse, New York, died on May 25, 2019, at age 86. He served for many years as Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Unity Mutual Life Insurance Company, which was based in Syracuse.

Jack was born in the Bronx on December 6, 1932, during the Great Depression. He graduated at the top of his class at All Hollows High School. He then attended the University of Notre Dame, where he enrolled in the Air Force ROTC program. He was a lifelong supporter of both All Hollows and Notre Dame. He served in the U.S. Air Force during the Korean War. After his discharge with the rank of captain, he started his insurance career as an agent. Jack's wife, Stephanie Miner, served as Mayor of Syracuse from 2010 to 2018.

Although Jack and I were fellow Syracusans, we never met face to face. I left Syracuse in 1958 and returned only for personal family visits and later for the 50th reunion of my high school class. However, Jack and I became good friends not long after I started publishing The Insurance Forum, my monthly newsletter. Whenever he saw an article there that intrigued him, he would write or call to talk about it. I always enjoyed our discussions because they helped me understand the viewpoint of a prominent practitioner in the business.

My favorite personal story about Jack was a letter from him not long after we became acquainted. He told me that, whenever he received an envelope showing my return address, he would open it with trepidation. He explained he was fearful that I was considering an article critical of his company. I assured him that, if I ever considered an article about his company, critical or not, he would hear about it from me in advance and by telephone rather than by letter.

Our final exchange was less than a year ago, when Jack sent me an email commending me on a particular item I had just posted on my blog.  I thanked him and said his kind words meant a lot to me.

Jack was a wonderful person, a strong supporter of my work, and a good friend. I will miss him greatly.

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Email: jmbelth@gmail.com

Blog: www.josephmbelth.com

No. 315: Long-Term Care Insurance —A Lawsuit Relating to the Calculation of Inflation Benefits

On May 17, 2018, Gerald Issokson (Gerald), executor of the estate of his mother, Pearl Issokson (Pearl), filed a class action lawsuit against Connecticut General Corporation and three other firms. Pearl owned long-term care (LTC) insurance coverage under a group LTC policy. The policy included home health care benefits up to a lifetime maximum benefit of $10,000, and an inflation provision. Pearl's coverage was provided through a certificate effective November 1, 1988. (See Issokson v. Connecticut General, U.S. District Court, District of Massachusetts, Case No. 3:18-cv-30070.)

The Complaint
Pearl died April 20, 2015. At the time of her death she was aged 92 and had been receiving home health care since 1990 due to physical and cognitive impairments. She was eligible for home health care benefits from 1990 through 2013, but neither she nor her family collected those benefits. Gerald asked the company to look into the matter.

The company sent Gerald a check for $16,130 representing the sum of the $10,000 lifetime maximum benefit and $6,130 for the impact of the inflation provision. Gerald alleges in the complaint that the company calculated the impact of the inflation provision using simple interest, although the insurance certificate seems to require that the impact of the inflation provision should be calculated using compound interest.

The Inflation Provision
The inflation provision in Pearl's insurance certificate consists of one sentence. It reads:

The benefits will automatically be increased by the lesser of the percent of increase in the Consumer Price Index during the prior calendar year or 5 percent.

When Gerald requested an explanation of the inflation calculation, a company spokesperson responded in a letter dated February 4, 2016. The letter shows the yearly percentage increases in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) for the years 1990 through 2013. The simple total of the yearly percentage increases in the CPI is indeed 61.3 percent. According to my calculation, however, the total of the yearly percentage increases in the CPI, compounded annually,  is 82.98 percent. Thus the check should have included $8,298 rather than $6,130 for the impact of the inflation provision. The reason why the discrepancy was only $2,168 was that the yearly percentage increases in the CPI were small during the time period in this case. Gerald's complaint and the spokesperson's letter are in the complimentary package offered at the end of this post.

The Classes
Gerald seeks to represent four classes. They are: (1) a "damages class" consisting of all current and future policyholders, nationwide, of any of the defendants whose certificates of insurance contain the language quoted above, or similar language, (2) an "injunctive class" consisting of all current policyholders, nationwide, of any of the defendants whose certificates of insurance contain the language quoted above, or similar language, (3) a "Massachusetts damages class," and (4) a "Massachusetts injunctive class."

The Counts
The complaint consists of five counts. They are: (1) breach of contract, (2) violations of the Connecticut Unfair Insurance Practices Act, (3) declaratory relief, (4) bad faith breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing, and (5) violations of certain Massachusetts laws.

Progress of the Case
The defendants have not filed an answer to the complaint. However, on July 16, 2018, the plaintiff and the defendants filed a joint stipulation containing three items:

1. This Court lacks personal jurisdiction over the claims of non-Massachusetts putative class members and all claims against Connecticut General Corporation.
2. Plaintiff lacks standing to assert class action claims under the Connecticut Unfair Insurance Practices Act against Connecticut General Corporation.
3. Plaintiff lacks Article III standing to seek declaratory relief.

On July 20, 2018, the judge commented on the joint stipulation. He said in part:

The court adopts the parties' proposal set forth in the Stipulation. Therefore, the court will treat the Stipulation as a fully briefed and opposed partial motion to dismiss, incorporating the identical arguments made in the briefing and oral argument regarding the partial motion to dismiss in Rain v. Connecticut General Corp., 17-cv-30115....

It is important to note that the subject of the Rain case is not related to the subject of the Issokson case. The judge has not yet ruled on the partial motion to dismiss in either the Rain case or the Issokson case.

General Observations
The underlying issue in the Issokson case is whether the impact of the inflation provision in Pearl's certificate should be calculated on a simple basis or on a compound basis. The defendants have not yet said a word about that underlying issue.

Based on my reading of the wording of the inflation provision in Pearl's certificate, I think the company should have used the compound calculation rather than the simple calculation. Even if one believes the opposite, the language in the certificate is certainly ambiguous on the subject, and an ambiguous provision is supposed to be interpreted against the party that drafted the provision.

Available Material
I am offering a complimentary 29-page PDF consisting of the Issokson complaint (22 pages), the company spokesperson's letter (2 pages), and the joint stipulation (5 pages). Send an email to jmbelth@gmail.com and ask for the June 2019 package about the Issokson LTC insurance case.

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Email: jmbelth@gmail.com

Blog: www.josephmbelth.com

No. 314: Indexed Universal Life Policies—The Views of Two Prominent Professionals About the Risks for Buyers

During the years of The Insurance Forum, and more recently on my blog, I have never written an article about indexed universal life (IUL) policies. I have been asked by many readers to write on the subject, but have not done so. The reason is simple. I have obtained and looked closely at samples of IUL policies. However, I have not understood them well enough to feel comfortable writing about them, and I have always avoided writing on topics I do not understand. Promoters of IUL policies have occasionally said I am too stupid to recognize a good thing when I see it. My response to such promoters is that they are welcome to their opinions.

Recently I have seen articles by two professionals for whom I have the highest regard: Lawrence Rybka and Richard Weber. I have obtained permission from them to share the articles with my readers. Here I introduce the authors briefly. I also show executive summaries and in one instance a few comments from the article. The full articles are in the complimentary package offered at the end of this post.

Lawrence Rybka

Lawrence J. Rybka, JD, CFP, is Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Valmark Financial Group, which includes a broker dealer, an investment advisor, and Executive Insurance Agency (the nation's first producer group). Valmark serves 120 premier independently-owned and independently-run wealth management/transfer firms in 31 states and has helped place over $60 billion of life insurance death benefits while managing insurance policies with a cumulative cash value of over $8 billion. Valmark's affiliated Registered Investment Advisor, Valmark Advisors, has over $6 billion in assets under management, including about $3 billion in variable sub-account assets within its TOPS funds. He earned his Bachelor's degree with honors in Finance from the University of Akron, and his Juris Doctorate from Wake Forest University.

Richard Weber

Richard Weber, MBA, CLU, AEP, is President and primary consultant for The Ethical Edge, Inc., providing fee-only insurance analytics and consulting services to family offices and high net worth individuals. He holds an MBA from the Haas School of Business at the University of California at Berkeley with a specialty in Insurance and Finance. He served for 11 years as an Instructor of Insurance at the University of California at Berkeley's Program in Personal Financial Planning. From 1993 through 1998, he served as Adjunct Professor of Ethics at The American College. He currently serves as Senior Adjunct Professor of Risk and Insurance in California Lutheran University's MBA program and is on the faculty of Texas Tech University's Personal Financial Planning degree program.

The Rybka Article

The Rybka article is entitled "How to Retire in the Magical Retirement Income Castle in the Clouds," and subtitled "What looks too good to be true, usually is." Here is the executive summary, followed by the first paragraph of the article:

Executive summary: This article examines the use of premium financed Indexed Universal Life (IUL) policies to provide retirement income for clients. It explores the major assumptions in the IUL policies and in the bank loans used to finance them. Most importantly, it reveals undisclosed risks often taken by clients in these transactions.

I recently attended a top meeting in the U.S. life insurance industry. During it, I experienced no less than three sessions where insurance agents shared presentations of major sales they claimed to have made during the year, each of which generated hundreds of thousands of dollars in commissions. All three presentations were variations on the recommendation that clients borrow significant sums to finance the premiums on IUL policies. The proposals showed that the loans would be paid back using projected policy cash values and have plenty remaining in the policy to provide a lifetime income of hundreds of thousands of dollars a year to the policyholder and a multi-million-dollar death benefit at the end. The presentations proposed the clients borrow money from major commercial banks who were willing to lend $2 to $3.5 million to each client over five to seven years to purchase these policies. These proposals are not outliers but part of massive sales efforts by some insurance companies and banks to push products that may be good for them, but carry significant risk for the client.

The Weber Article

The Weber article is entitled "Are You in Good Hands?" It was published as a newsletter on May 14, 2019 by Leimberg Information Services, Inc. The article discusses not only risk tolerance questions in IUL policies, but also risk tolerance questions in whole life policies, guaranteed death benefit universal life policies, universal life policies, and variable universal life policies. The technical editor of the article is Ben G. Baldwin, Jr., CLU, ChFC, CFP. Here is the executive summary:

Long associated within the financial practitioner community for addressing and attempting to overcome policy illustration abuse, Dick Weber began his decades-long exploration of these issues when assuming the Chair of the Society of Financial Service Professionals (FSP)'s Illustration Questionnaire (IQ) Committee. IQ emphasizes that the "illustration is not the policy," and educates its members about the responsible use of policy illustrations. Yet Indexed Universal Life (IUL) products have created new challenges for professionals seeking to apply a customer-focused standard of care to their recommendations for policies designed for a lifetime. IUL is most often characterized as giving owners the best of both worlds by offering investment upside potential, a minimum guaranteed growth feature and underlying life insurance protection. These features, along with the (largely incorrect) slogan "Zero is the Hero" has made IUL the fastest growing permanent life insurance product of the past decade.

Recent regulations intended to moderate the calculation and display of non-guaranteed benefits projected in IUL policy illustrations have largely backfired, inspiring what objectively appear as unachievable promises of future performance. How should insurance and non-insurance professionals react and respond? This newsletter goes beyond just the potential for misusing policy illustrations and delves into the suitability and fiduciary issues of serving a client's best interest.

Available Material

I am offering a complimentary 37-page PDF consisting of the full Rybka article (12 pages) and the full Weber article (25 pages). Email jmbelth@gmail.com and ask for the May 2019 package about IUL policies.

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Email: jmbelth@gmail.com

Blog: www.josephmbelth.com

No. 313: Long-Term Care Insurance and More on the Upcoming Hearing before the Virginia Bureau of Insurance

In No. 310 (April 22, 2019), I wrote about the May 21 public hearing to be held by the Virginia Bureau of Insurance (Bureau) on the subject of long-term care (LTC) insurance premium increase requests filed by many companies. April 22 was the deadline for filing public comments in advance of the hearing. On that date, I filed No. 310 as my comment. The Bureau posted on its website all the comments it received from the public, as well as information about the LTC insurance premium increase requests filed by many companies. This follow-up post is based on my review of the material posted on the Bureau's website.

Recent Bureau Approvals

The Bureau recently approved some substantial premium increase requests affecting substantial numbers of policyholders. Here are the companies and, in parentheses, the approved average premium increases expressed as percentages and the numbers of policyholders affected by the increases: American Fidelity Assurance (3%, 92), Jackson National Life (15%, 47), Kanawah Insurance (two plans) (48% and 44%, 1,204), Lincoln Benefit Life (35%, 257), Lincoln National Life (60%, 74), Mutual of Omaha (27%, 1,551), Northwestern Long Term Care (two plans) (28% and 27%, 2,710), Provident Life & Accident (102%, 734), RiverSource Life (35%, 1,305), Senior Health Insurance of Pennsylvania (25.0%, 633), and Virginia Insurance Guaranty Association (32%, 4,121).

Number of Comments

My tabulation suggests the Bureau received 177 comments from the public. I think the ten obscure public notices printed in newspapers around Virginia did not generate such a large number of comments. However, several articles about the hearing appeared in Virginia newspapers, and I think those articles prompted the large number of comments. One example is an excellent article entitled "Insurers now seeking huge increases in Virginians' premiums for long term care." The article, by reporter Dave Ress, appeared in the March 17, 2019 issue of the Daily Press (Newport News, VA).

Nature of the Comments

Many of the comments focused on the financial problems consumers are confronting because of increasing LTC insurance premiums. Many said that, when they purchased the insurance, they were not told the premiums would increase. Many said they were told that, if there were premium increases, the increases would be small and infrequent. Many expressed displeasure about being forced to absorb increases that were not their fault, but rather were caused by the companies' pricing errors. A few comments were from insurance agents who were upset because they had misled policyholders who trusted them.

Companies Identified

Seventy of the public comments did not identify the company with which the writer of the letter is or was a policyholder. Here are the 13 companies identified in 107 of the public comments, with the number of comments in parentheses: CNA Financial (2), CUNA Mutual (3), General Electric Capital (4), Genworth (36), John Hancock (44), Kanawha Insurance (3), Lincoln Benefit Life (1), Massachusetts Mutual (5), MetLife (3), Penn Treaty (2), TPM Life (1), Trustmark (1), and Unum (2).

Among the public comments, several of those who identified John Hancock as their company said they have coverage offered through the group LTC insurance program for federal government employees. I think many of the others who identified John Hancock without mentioning the group plan also have their coverage through the group plan.

There were two public comments that identified the company as the Virginia Life, Accident, and Sickness Insurance Guaranty Association. Those comments were references to Penn Treaty, where a court-ordered liquidation brought the Virginia Insurance Guaranty Association into the picture.

Most of the comments appear to have been from consumers. However, there were a few from agents, groups of agents, and other individuals writing on behalf of policyholders.

The ACLI/AHIP Letter

There were no comments from insurance companies. Instead, as usual, the companies hid behind their trade associations.

The American Council of Life Insurers (ACLI) is a trade association with approximately 290 member companies. America's Health Insurance Plans (AHIP) is a national association whose members provide coverage for health care and related services. ACLI and AHIP filed a joint six-page letter for the hearing record. The letter is over the signatures of Chuck Piacentini of ACLI and Amanda Matthiesen of AHIP. The letter is in the complimentary package offered at the end of this post. Here are the "Recommendation" and "Conclusion" paragraphs of the letter:

Recommendation

To ensure a stable regulatory environment that provides Virginia consumers with choice, transparency and protections for LTC insurance, we encourage the Commission to approve pending actuarially justified rate increases. Additionally, we encourage the Department of Insurance to adopt the most recent changes to the NAIC [National Association of Insurance Commissioners] LTC Insurance Model Regulation (NAIC Model), as well as issue the NAIC LTC Insurance Rate Increase Model Bulletin on Alternative Filing Requirements for LTC Premium Rate Increases (NAIC Bulletin).

Conclusion

We appreciate the opportunity to provide this statement and look forward to working with the State Corporation Commission and the Department of Insurance on creating a regulatory environment that ensures a robust private LTC insurance market that provides consumers with a choice of solid and dependable coverage for their LTC needs. We are committed to ensuring that consumers continue to enjoy the greater piece of mind that comes with knowing their coverage will be there when and for as long as they need it.

General Observations

It is not surprising that ACLI and AHIP "encourage the Commission to approve pending actuarially justified rate increases." The associations represent the companies, and would not be expected to encourage the Commission to deny or reduce the size of the requested premium increases.

The words "actuarially justified" should have been omitted from the "Recommendation" paragraph in the ACLI/AHIP letter.  Those words falsely imply that some premium increase requests are not actuarially justified.  Because company actuaries sign off on all premium increase requests, there is no such thing as a request that is not actuarially justified.  However, it is possible that a Bureau actuary might disagree with a company actuary.

As indicated in No. 310, for many years I have expressed the belief that the problem of financing the LTC exposure cannot be solved through the mechanism of private insurance. I explained in detail the reasoning behind that belief in an article in the July 2008 issue of The Insurance Forum. The article is in the complimentary package offered at the end of this post.

Now LTC insurance companies and their regulators are trying to figure out how to address the intractable problems they have created. I believe that nothing significant will emerge from the latest NAIC task force. I think it will "kick the can down the road," as several task force predecessors have done.

Available Material

I am offering a complimentary 11-page PDF consisting of the ACLI/AHIP letter to the Bureau (6 pages) and the July 2008 Forum article (5 pages). Email jmbelth@gmail.com and ask for the May 2019 LTC insurance package.

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Email: jmbelth@gmail.com

Blog: www.josephmbelth.com

No. 312: Robert Caro's Magnificent Small Book

Robert A. Caro is one of my favorite authors. For his work he has received two Pulitzer Prizes and other major awards too numerous to count. His first book was his 1,246-page master work, The Power Broker: Robert Moses and the Fall of New York, published in 1974. For it he received his first Pulitzer Prize.

Robert Moses
Although I lived the first 25 years of my life in Syracuse, New York, I had only a vague knowledge of Robert Moses. When I read Caro's book many years ago, I came to understand the achievements of that unelected individual who had amassed enormous political power, and who, in exercising that power, had transformed not only New York City but also disrupted the lives of millions of people. Anyone who doubts that the acquisition of political power and the use of that power are Caro's lifetime focus need only note the titles of the last five of the seven major parts of The Power Broker: "The Rise to Power," The "Use of Power," "The Love of Power," "The Lust for Power," and "The Loss of Power."

Lyndon Johnson
Caro then turned to Lyndon Johnson, about whom he has written four volumes and is now working on the fifth and final volume. The 882-page first volume was The Years of Lyndon Johnson: The Path to Power, published in 1982. The 506-page second volume was The Years of Lyndon Johnson: Means of Ascent, published in 1990. The 1,167-page third volume was The Years of Lyndon Johnson: Master of the Senate, published in 2002, and for which he received his second Pulitzer Prize. The 752-page fourth volume was The Years of Lyndon Johnson: The Passage of Power, published in 2012. The fourth volume ends in the summer of 1964, during the first year of Johnson's presidency, after passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.

The fifth and final volume does not have a title or a publication date. Presumably it will cover Johnson's other "Great Society" achievements, including the 1965 Civil Rights Act, the 1965 Voting Rights Act, Medicare, and Medicaid. Presumably it will also cover the Vietnam War, Johnson's decision not to run for reelection, and his life after he left office.

Working
Meanwhile, Caro has just come out with a magnificent 240-page book entitled Working: Researching, Interviewing, Writing, published in April 2019. It is a fascinating description of Caro's early life, how he got interested in Robert Moses and Lyndon Johnson, how his wife Ina serves as his principal helper, how they survived financially during the lean years when he was working on The Power Broker, how he does his research, how he conducts interviews, and how he writes. The book explains why he and Ina moved to the Hill Country of West Texas for three years, to get a feeling for the area where Johnson grew up, and to mingle with the people who knew Johnson and his family in the early years.

Theodore White's Views
In No. 307 (April 4, 2019), I quoted from a 1975 book entitled Breach of Faith: The Fall of Richard Nixon, by Theodore H. White. White died in 1986, but he remains one of my favorite authors. On the 1974 dust jacket of The Power Broker are ten strong endorsements from prominent authors and journalists. One of the endorsements was from White, who said this:

A masterpiece of American reporting. It's more than the story of a tragic figure or the exploitation of the unknown politics of our time. It's an elegantly written and enthralling work of art.

I agree with White. Caro's books are indeed works of art. Below I quote two paragraphs that appeared on page 6 of The Power Broker. They drew me in to read the entire book, and made me a Caro watcher.

The Paris Review Interview
The final section of Working is an interview with Caro entitled "The Art of Biography." It is reprinted from the Spring 2016 issue of The Paris Review. The interviewer is James Santel, whose sole function seems to have been to ask 14 brief questions and let Caro take it from there. In one of his responses, Caro quotes a portion of these two paragraphs from The Power Broker. They illustrate Caro's style and artistry:

Standing out from the map's delicate tracery of gridirons representing streets are heavy lines, lines girding the city or slashing across its expanses. These lines denote the major roads on which automobiles and trucks move, roads whose very location, moreover, does as much as any single factor to determine where and how a city's people live and work. With a single exception, the East River Drive, Robert Moses built every one of those roads. He built the Major Deegan Expressway, the Van Wyck Expressway, the Sheridan Expressway and the Bruckner Expressway. He built the Gowanus Expressway, the Prospect Expressway, the Whitestone Expressway, the Clearview Expressway and the Throgs Neck Expressway. He built the Cross-Bronx Expressway, the Brooklyn-Queens Expressway, the Nassau Expressway, the Staten Island Expressway and the Long Island Expressway. He built the Harlem River Drive and the West Side Highway.

Only one borough of New York City—the Bronx—is on the mainland of the United States, and bridges link the island boroughs that form metropolis. Since 1931, seven such bridges were built, immense structures, some of them anchored by towers as tall as seventy-story buildings, supported by cables made up of enough wire to drop a noose around the earth. Those bridges are the Triborough, the Verrazano, the Throgs Neck, the Marine, the Henry Hudson, the Cross Bay and the Bronx-Whitestone. Robert Moses built every one of those bridges.

Doing the Math
Caro watchers wonder whether Caro, now 83, will live long enough to finish the fifth and final volume on Johnson. Caro says they ask him to "do the math," and they wonder why he interrupted that effort to publish Working. He says he has done the math, there remain "several" more years of work on the fifth volume, and explains why he published Working now. Among elderly Caro watchers, there is the other math question of whether we will live long enough to read the fifth volume on Johnson.

For those who are not Caro watchers, I strongly recommend you read Working. I am confident you will find it enjoyable, and well worth the time. When you read it, you may join the ranks of Caro watchers.

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Email: jmbelth@gmail.com

Blog: www.josephmbelth.com

No. 311: Genworth Financial, China Oceanwide, the Delaware Department, and the Hindenburg Letter

On April 15, 2019, Genworth Financial, Inc. (Genworth) filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) an amended 10-K report for the year ended December 31, 2018. Here I discuss the amended report and several other recent developments relating to the proposed merger agreement between Genworth and China Oceanwide.

The Amended 10-K Report

In its 2018 proxy statement, filed with the SEC on November 1, 2018, Genworth said it expected to hold its 2019 annual meeting on or about July 18, 2019. The amended 10-K report says that, because Genworth and China Oceanwide are still trying to satisfy the closing conditions under their proposed merger agreement, Genworth postponed the meeting and implied there may not be a 2019 annual meeting. If there is a 2019 annual meeting, Genworth will provide adequate notice to shareholders. The explanatory note in the amended 10-K report is in the complimentary package offered at the end of this post.

A Recent 8-K Report

On March 14, 2019, Genworth filed with the SEC an 8-K (significant event) report listing developments relating to the proposed merger with China Oceanwide. The original merger agreement was entered into on October 21, 2016. Since then, the parties entered into nine "waiver agreements" under which the parties extended the "end date" in the merger agreement. In the waiver agreements, the parties also waived the right to terminate the merger agreement and abandon the merger due to a failure to consummate the merger agreement on or before a specified date. The dates of the waiver agreements listed in the recent 8-K report are: August 21, 2017; November 29, 2017; February 23, 2018; March 27, 2018; June 28, 2018; August 14, 2018; November 30, 2018; January 30, 2019; and March 14, 2019. In the last of those waiver agreements, the parties extended the end date to April 30, 2019, and waived until that date the right to terminate the merger agreement and abandon the merger due to a failure of the merger to have been consummated on or before March 15, 2019.

Also attached to the recent 8-K report is a Genworth press release dated March 14, 2019. It discusses the last of the above waiver agreements, and says the closing of the merger agreement remains subject to the approval of regulators in Canada and China. The Genworth press release is in the complimentary package offered at the end of this post.

The Delaware Department

On November 8, 2018, the Delaware Department of Insurance (Department) issued a press release announcing a November 24 hearing to be held on China Oceanwide's application to acquire Genworth and certain affiliates. The Department said the hearing would be presided over by Stephen P. Lamb, a former Vice Chancellor of the Delaware Court of Chancery. Judge Lamb is now of counsel in the Corporate and Litigation Departments in the Wilmington, Delaware office of the law firm of Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP. The Department's press release is in the package offered at the end of this post.

The Hindenburg Letter

On November 28, 2018, the Department held the hearing. The transcript mentioned a 13-page letter Hindenburg Research had submitted to the Department on November 20, 2018. Hindenburg, which was founded by Nathan Anderson, CFA, CAIA, engages in financial research. Hindenburg sometimes takes either a long position or a short position on the shares of public companies it examines. Hindenburg's name stems from what the firm describes as the "epitome of a totally man-made, totally avoidable disaster" where "Almost 100 people were loaded onto a balloon filled with the most flammable element in the universe."

In the Hindenburg letter, which is included in its entirety in the complimentary package offered at the end of this post, the firm discloses its short position on Genworth shares. The firm questions the ability of China Oceanwide to carry out its responsibilities under the merger agreement. Here are some of Hindenburg's comments:

• China Oceanwide has consistently generated negative operating performance.
• It has plugged its performance hole with borrowings, which have reached the point of clear unsustainability.
• Rating agencies have downgraded its key operating subsidiaries, similarly citing their debt load as "unsustainable." Meanwhile, recent media reports have shown that operating subsidiaries are scrambling to sell assets to pay off debt.
• When factoring in questionable "current" assets, the true working capital position of the conglomerate is impaired, and there are red flags in regard to related party receivables.
• The conglomerate has used more short-term debt and unstable equity share pledges to sustain its operations.

One witness at the Department's hearing was Thomas J. McInerney, president, chief executive officer, and a director of Genworth. Another witness was Xiaoxia Zhao, a director of Oceanwide Holding Co., Ltd., and general manager and director of Asia Pacific Global Capital. Zhao is not a native English speaker, and testified through an interpreter. Both witnesses said they were aware of the Hindenburg letter and disagreed with the findings described in it.

Judge Lamb's Recommendations

On December 14, 2018, Judge Lamb submitted to the Department a 44-page letter including his recommendations and a proposed order approving the merger agreement. Here are some comments he provided (shown here without citations) about the Hindenburg letter:

8. The First Email, the Second Email and the Third Email all relate to articles published by Hindenburg Investment Research. Those articles and the Hindenburg Letter purport to raise concerns primarily related to the financial stability of the Applicants and, to a lesser degree, the financial stability of Genworth and the Domestic Insurer.

9. Regarding the financial stability of the Applicants, the conclusions drawn by Hindenburg are inconsistent with the results of the due diligence conducted by Genworth and its outside financial advisors, and the sworn testimony of Mr. Zhao on behalf of the Applicants.

10. Given the analysis conducted by Genworth, the Department and their experts, there is sufficient evidence that the concerns raised by Hindenburg, insofar as such concerns relate to Section 5003(d)(1)(c) regarding the financial condition of any acquiring party being such as might jeopardize the financial stability of the insurer, or prejudice the interests of its policyholders, have been sufficiently addressed.

11. Genworth and the Department have both concluded and the evidence supports the conclusion, that the financial condition of the Applicants is not such as would jeopardize the financial stability of the Domestic Insurer or prejudice the interest of its policyholders.

17. Hindenburg states that it has a short position on shares of Genworth, essentially betting against the success of Genworth and the Proposed Acquisition. Based on this conflicting financial interest, the statements made by Hindenburg in its articles and the Hindenburg Letter should be viewed with skepticism.

The above five comments are from a subsection entitled "Public Comments" in Judge Lamb's letter. The full subsection is in the complimentary package offered at the end of this post.

The Department's Approval

On December 21, 2018, the Department issued a press release announcing Delaware Insurance Commissioner Trinidad Navarro's four-page Final Order and Decision approving the merger agreement between Genworth and China Oceanwide. The press release is in the complimentary package offered at the end of this post.

A Recent Press Release

On April 29, 2019, Genworth issued a press release announcing the parties' tenth waiver agreement. The parties extended the end date to June 30, 2019, and waived until that date the right to terminate the merger agreement and abandon the merger due to a failure of the merger to have been consummated on or before April 30, 2019. The press release is included in the complimentary package offered at the end of this post.

A Recent Article

Also on April 29, Best's Insurance News & Analysis posted an article entitled "Policyholders, Agents Allege Genworth Stripped $410 Million From Long-Term Care Unit." The article, by reporter Frank Klimko, discussed a lawsuit filed in Delaware state court, and said Genworth has filed a motion to dismiss the lawsuit.

General Observations

I have written extensively about long-term care (LTC) insurance in general and about Genworth in particular, but have never tried to evaluate the proposed merger agreement between Genworth and China Oceanwide. Thus I cannot comment about the likelihood of success for the merger. However, after reading the Hindenburg letter, I am concerned about the merger. I am also disturbed, for two reasons, by the manner in which the Department brushed off the letter.

First, I am troubled by McInerney's reference, in his testimony at the hearing, to allegations in a then-pending lawsuit filed in state court in New York against Hindenburg and others. On March 12, 2019 (3½ months after the hearing), the judge in the New York case granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint. The judge ruled, among other matters, that statements the defendants made about the plaintiff were protected expressions of opinion and were not defamatory. (See Eros International v. Mangrove Partners et al., Supreme Court of the State of New York, New York County, Index No. 653096/2017.)

Second, I am troubled by Judge Lamb's assertion that "the Hindenburg Letter should be viewed with skepticism" because of a "conflicting financial interest." Judge Lamb made the statement without acknowledging that the companies' executives, attorneys, accountants, investment consultants, and other advisors have "conflicting financial interests." In due course we will see whether the merger agreement is consummated, and if so, its impact on Genworth's policyholders.

Available Material

I am offering a complimentary 28-page PDF consisting of the explanatory note in Genworth's amended 10-K report (1 page), Genworth's March 14, 2019 press release (3 pages), the Department's November 8, 2018 press release (2 pages), the Hindenburg letter (13 pages), a subsection of Judge Lamb's December 14, 2018 letter (5 pages), the Department's December 21, 2018 press release (2 pages), and Genworth's April 29, 2019 press release (2 pages). Email jmbelth@gmail.com and ask for the May 2019 Genworth package.

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Email: jmbelth@gmail.com

Blog: www.josephmbelth.com

No. 310: Long-Term Care Insurance and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners

In No. 308 (posted April 11, 2019), I discussed the insolvency of Senior Health Insurance Company of Pennsylvania (SHIP), a long-term care (LTC) insurance company in run-off. On April 10, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) issued a press release entitled "NAIC Prioritizes Long-Term Care Insurance" and subtitled "State regulators form executive-level task force." The NAIC's press release is in the complimentary package offered at the end of this post.

The New Task Force

The chair of the new NAIC task force is Virginia Commissioner Scott A. White, and the vice chair is Colorado Commissioner Michael Conway. The first meeting of the task force is tentatively scheduled for Kansas City in connection with what the NAIC calls an "Insurance Summit" relating to "Where Innovation Meets Regulation." It is not surprising that insurance regulators in Florida (home of many retirees), Pennsylvania (home of Penn Treaty and SHIP), South Carolina (home of Kanawha), and Virginia (home of Genworth) are among those instrumental in forming the new task force.

On April 12, I sent No. 308 to the Virginia Bureau of Insurance and asked for confirmation of my belief that Commissioner White is chairing the new task force because Genworth is based in Virginia. In response, a spokesperson referred me to the NAIC. On April 15, I made the same request to the NAIC. An NAIC spokesperson responded, but did not answer the question I asked.

The Upcoming Virginia Hearing

On March 15, 2019, the Virginia Bureau of Insurance issued a press release announcing a public hearing to be held in Richmond on May 21. The Bureau said it is inviting public comment on recent LTC insurance premium rate increase requests the Bureau has received from numerous insurance companies. The Bureau said public comments for the hearing record may be submitted in advance by April 22. I am submitting this blog post for the hearing record. The Bureau's press release is in the complimentary package offered at the end of this post.

A Few Articles About LTC Insurance

I have been writing about LTC insurance for three decades. Several of the early articles appeared in my monthly newsletter, The Insurance Forum, which I began in 1974 and ended in 2013. Four of the Forum articles about LTC insurance are discussed briefly here, and are in the complimentary package offered at the end of this post.

My first article about LTC insurance was in the February 1988 issue of the Forum. It was in the form of an open letter to Danny Thomas, the legendary entertainer and philanthropist who founded St. Jude's Children's Research Hospital in Memphis. Thomas had endorsed an LTC insurance policy offered by Union Fidelity Life Insurance Company, but I felt the policy presented serious problems for anyone who purchased it. Thomas did not respond to my open letter, but a company officer told me the company was no longer selling the policy.

Within a few years, many companies had begun selling LTC insurance. The August 1991 issue of Consumer Reports, the magazine of Consumers Union (CU), contained a study entitled "Gotcha! The Traps in Long Term Care Insurance." CU identified some "fair" LTC insurance policies and some "poor" policies, but no "excellent" or "good" policies. I wrote about the CU study in the August 1991 issue of the Forum. I explained that an "excellent" or "good" policy could never be found, because the LTC exposure violates important insurance principles. For example, the potential loss should be of a type that is fortuitous; that is, the potential loss should be of a type that occurs by chance and should not be within the control of the insured person or family members. Another example is that the potential loss should be definite; that is, the potential loss should be of a type in which there is little room for dispute over whether a loss of the type covered by the insurance has occurred.

In the May 1997 issue of the Forum, I wrote about a promotional letter used by General Electric Capital Assurance Company in selling LTC insurance. The letter included this sentence, with the indicated underlining: "Your premiums will never increase because of your age or any changes in your health." I told a company officer that, although the sentence was technically correct, it was deceptive because the policy allowed the company to increase the premiums. The company officer explained why he thought the sentence was not deceptive. However, the company removed the sentence from its promotional letters.

In the July 2008 issue of the Forum, I expressed the opinion that the problem of financing the LTC exposure could not be solved through the mechanism of private insurance. There I expanded on what I had said earlier about the important insurance principles that LTC insurance violates. I also identified several other considerations that render private LTC insurance unworkable.

A Few Blog Posts about LTC Insurance

When I shut down the Forum, I started a blog on which I have continued to write about LTC insurance. Here I describe briefly three such blog posts, and provide links to them.

In No. 191 (posted December 9, 2016), I wrote about a looming catastrophe for the LTC insurance business. I discussed, among other matters, the financial problems at Penn Treaty, an LTC insurance company that had become insolvent in 2009. I also discussed a Congressional hearing that was prompted by sharp premium increases on LTC group insurance coverage purchased by federal government employees.

In No. 223 (posted June 23, 2017), I explained why it is wrong for state governments to help private LTC insurance companies sell the coverage to citizens of those states. I mentioned, among other matters, a mailing to residents of California over the signature of the California governor, and a similar mailing to residents of Indiana over the signature of the Indiana governor. The letters implied that LTC insurance coverage was endorsed by the respective states.

In No. 257 (posted March 12, 2018), I wrote about a major problem that had surfaced at General Electric. The company announced that, after a review of some old LTC insurance policies, the company had to increase its liabilities relating to those policies by about $15 billion. The announcement shocked the market and prompted intense discussion of the problems associated with LTC insurance.

General Observations

I believe that the problem of financing the LTC exposure cannot be solved through the mechanism of private insurance. In my view, there are only two solutions to the problem. One is through personal savings, an approach I described in the July 2008 Forum article.

The other solution is through mandatory coverage that would be part of a federal program of universal health insurance. I say mandatory, because we already have evidence that a national voluntary plan would not be workable. A national voluntary plan called "Community Living Assistance Services and Supports" ("CLASS") was part of the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. Experts in the Department of Health and Human Services tried, without success, to devise a workable voluntary CLASS program, but it never got off the ground and was quietly repealed.

The new NAIC task force is the most recent effort to address the problems associated with LTC insurance. I think it will meet with the same fate as earlier efforts unless it recognizes that "personal savings" and a "mandatory federal program" are the only workable solutions to the problem of financing the LTC exposure.

Available Material

I am offering a complimentary 14-page PDF consisting of the NAIC's press release (1 page), the Virginia Bureau's press release (1 page), and the four Forum articles mentioned in this post (12 pages). Email jmbelth@gmail.com and ask for the April 2019 LTC insurance package.

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Email: jmbelth@gmail.com

Blog: www.josephmbelth.com